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Abstract
The real exchange rate (RER) misalignment is a key variable in academic and 
policy circles. Among policy circles, sustained RER overvaluations are observed 
by authorities for future exchange rate adjustments. In some cases with capital 
flows pouring into emerging markets, those countries have tried to remain 
competitive by pursuing very active exchange policies to undervalue their 
currencies and foster growth through export promotion (e.g. China). These 
developments have led to a renewed debate on the role of exchange rate policies 
as industrial policy tools in both academic and policy circles. Policy practitioners 
usually examine RER misalignments to monitor the behavior of this key relative 
price and, if possible, exploit distortions in the traded and non-traded relative 
price to promote growth.  
The main goal of this paper is to provide a systematic characterization of real 
exchange rate undervaluations. What are the consequences of undervaluation? 
What are the main determinants of undervaluations? Could policymakers generate 
and sustain RER undervaluations? More specifically, our goal is to assess whether 
policymakers can exploit (if any) the nexus between RER and policy to weaken 
the currency and promote growth through competitive devaluations. In this 
context, this paper complements and improves upon the existing literature by 
formulating a theoretical based model to compute equilibrium real exchange rate 
and its misalignment and to estimate and calculate RER misalignments. One of 
the novelties is to derive and solve for what we call intertemporal BOP 
equilibrium and equilibrium in the tradable and non-tradable goods market based 
on the current account dynamics and Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) 
productivities. After solving for the RER in the steady state, we estimate the 
fundamental RER equation using cointegration techniques for time series –i.e. 
Johansen's (1988,1991) multivariate analysis and the error correction model 
(ECM) by Bewley (1979) and Wickens and Breusch (1987)– and for 
heterogeneous panel data –i.e. the pooled mean group estimator (PMGE) by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). An empirical novelty of this paper is to model 
RER misalignments and estimating VAR models that link them with shocks to 
fundamentals and permits us to calculate the speed of reversion of RER 
misalignments.  
Once we estimate the equilibrium RER, we proceed to calculate the RER 
misalignment and, more specifically, we construct a dataset of real undervaluation 
episodes. Then, we present some basic evidence on the behavior of 
macroeconomic aggregates (output, demand, and inflation, among others) during 
undervaluation episodes using the “event analysis” methodology. Finally, we 
evaluate whether (and if so, to what extent) economic policies can be used to 
either cause or sustain real undervaluations. In this context we empirically model 
the likelihood and magnitude of sustaining RER undervaluations by examining 
their link to policy instruments (e.g. exchange rate regimes, capital controls, 
among other policies) using Probit and Tobit models, respectively.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The real exchange rate (RER), defined as the relative price of traded to non-
traded goods, is a key factor to understand and evaluate the nature of the shocks 
affecting the economy. It signals the allocation of resources across these sectors, 
thus providing a measure of the relative incentives to different types of activity in
an economy. The RER behavior also allows us to examine a broader set of 
macroeconomic, structural and sectoral policies as well as evaluate economic 
performance.
The issue of misaligned currencies (in real terms) is important in academic 
and policy circles because it may reflect distortions in relative prices attributed to 
(unsound) domestic policies. Why is our study of RER misalignments relevant? 
Because, by signaling distortions in relative prices, the characterization of RER 
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misalignments would allow us to understand their causes and consequences so 
that policymakers could attempt to implement the required adjustments.
Most of the literature on real exchange rate misalignments has focused on the 
deleterious effects of a real overvaluation of the currency (Dollar, 1992; Razin 
and Collins, 1999). This strand of the literature argues that RER overvaluation of 
the currency may have an adverse impact on economic performance —especially, 
if this results from poor macroeconomic and inconsistent exchange rate policies. 
This effect is transmitted through different channels: (a) a relatively stronger 
currency tend to raise the cost of imports (among them, intermediate inputs and 
capital goods), thus having a detrimental effect on investment, (b) the loss of 
competitiveness associated with the overvaluation could hamper the country’s 
ability to adjust internationally and reallocate resources more efficiently across 
the different sectors of economic activity. For instance, the experience of Latin 
American countries in the 1980s defending their nominal pegs in an environment 
with widening fiscal and external imbalances led to substantial RER 
overvaluation. In turn, this created distortions in relative price that subsidized 
inefficient industries and hinder growth.
One of the salient characteristics of the global economy is the rising financial 
integration (as observed by the surge in cross-border asset trade in the 2000s) that 
has led to important changes in the patterns of saving and investment across the 
world. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008a) have extensively documented the 
fact that emerging market economies (in particular, emerging Asia and oil 
exporting countries) have become net suppliers of savings while the United States 
became an absorber of global savings. This saving glut in emerging markets and 
the excess consumption in the U.S. led to the so-called global imbalances. The 
recent debate on the resolution of these imbalances has brought attention towards 
the role of the real exchange rate as the relative price that would drive the 
international adjustment of countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005, 2006, 
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2008b) argue that the depreciation of the US dollar may help improve the net 
foreign asset (NFA) position of the country through trade and financial effects. 
While the trade effect suggests that current account deficits will narrow (and, 
eventually, turn into a surplus) thanks to a required weakening of the U.S. dollar, 
the financial effect implies that the dollar depreciation may lead to an 
improvement of the NFA position because the U.S. external liabilities are mostly 
denominated in U.S. dollars whereas its external assets have a more varied 
currency composition. Therefore, the real exchange rate exerts an influence on 
both net capital flows and net capital gains on external holdings (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007; Galstyan and Lane, 2008). 
One of the story lines of the global imbalances is the massive accumulation of 
foreign assets (in excess of liabilities) by emerging markets —which is reflected 
by the hoarding of international reserves.1 This accumulation of reserves has been 
the result of emerging market economies undertaking competitive devaluations to 
keep their currencies undervalued and, hence, promote exports. Related to this,
event-study analyses show that growth accelerations tend to be associated with 
higher investment, export surges and real exchange rate depreciation (Hausmann, 
Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005). Moreover, a positive co-movement between RER 
undervaluation and growth is found in China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Uganda, and Tanzania (Rodrik, 2008). This strand of the literature argues that 
undervaluation facilitates growth among developing countries and stresses the 
role of the relative price of traded to non-traded goods as an instrument of 
industrial policy in the process of economic convergence. Hence, RER 
undervaluation may trigger growth (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005; 
Rodrik, 2008). Theoretically, Rodrik (2008) argues that RER undervaluation acts 
                                                
1The practice of reserve hoarding by some countries (e.g. China and Argentina) is aimed at 
keeping the RER undervalued and, hence, promote growth through rising exports –as suggested by 
the “mercantilist” view of exchange rate policy (Hausmann et al. 2005; Rodrik, 2008).
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as a second-best mechanism to alleviate distortions in developing countries (e.g.
institutional weaknesses and incomplete contracts in the traded sector, and 
information and coordination problems) and, hence, foster structural change and 
spur growth. Aizenman and Lee (2007) suggest that RER undervaluations may be 
used to internalize learning-by-doing (LBD) externalities in the traded sector if 
the LBD calls for subsidies to labor in tradables. This debate has led to a heated 
argument about the desirability of undervaluations and the likelihood of support 
them through economic policies. In this context, one of our purposes of this study 
is to understand the causes and consequences of real exchange rate misalignments 
—and, more specifically, real undervaluation of the currency. Aizenman and Lee 
(2007) claim that activist exchange rate policies —by keeping the RER 
undervalued— may generate competitive gains that help exports increase and, 
hence, promote economic growth. 
If it is true that real undervaluation of the currency leads to higher growth, the 
relevant policy question is what type of policy shocks may cause RER 
undervaluations and how persistent these are. Rogoff (1996) argues that 
deviations of the RER from its parity (and, hence, misalignments) are very 
persistent and may sometimes be linked to the evolution of fundamentals —e.g. 
driven by real shocks that represent shifts in relative prices consistent with some 
internal and external equilibrium (Lucas, 1982; Stockman, 1987; Edwards, 
1989a). Thus, it is preferable to measure RER misalignments in terms of 
deviations from its long-run equilibrium value and to use this to provide a link 
between (the persistence of) RER misalignments and economic policies. In this 
context, this study aims to assess the following questions: (1) What are the real 
consequences of undervaluations (on real output, investment, exports among 
others)? (2) If there is a positive growth-undervaluation nexus, can it be exploited 
by policymakers? What economic policy actions may drive this correlation?
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This study complements and extends the empirical literature on the real 
exchange rate in the following dimensions: first, it calculates the fundamental 
RER misalignments for a wide array of countries as deviations of actual from 
theoretically-founded measures of equilibrium RER. Second, it builds a model of 
real exchange rate determination where the equilibrium RER is achieved by 
guaranteeing simultaneous equilibrium in the balance of payments and in the 
market of traded and non-traded goods. This model would provide a benchmark 
for the measurement of the equilibrium Real Exchange Rate and enables the 
computation of RER misalignments as deviations from the equilibrium RER. 
Third, we estimate the long run fundamental real exchange rate equation resulting 
from the model using both time series and panel data techniques for non-
stationary series. We should point out that, although the issue of the equilibrium 
RER has received attention from, for example, Edwards, 1989a; Faruqee, 1995; 
Balvers and Bergstrand, 1997; MacDonald and Stein, 1999; Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2002, 2004, 2006, our work improves upon recent research (e.g. 
Calderon, 2004; Dufrénot et al., 2005) by focusing on time-series as well as 
heterogeneous panel techniques to estimate the coefficients of the long run RER. 
This is important given the heterogeneity of our sample which comprises an 
unbalanced panel dataset of 79 countries, of which 21 are industrial economies 
and 58 are developing countries over the period 1970-2005 (i.e. at most 36 
observations per country).2 Fourth, we define RER undervaluation episodes as 
those where our calculated excess depreciation (relative to the equilibrium one) 
excess a determined threshold. Fifth, we conduct an event analysis study of the 
behavior of growth (and its demand components) and exchange rate policies (say, 
FOREX intervention, monetary arrangements, and so on) during episodes of 
undervaluation. Finally, we examine the influence of macroeconomic policies on 
                                                
2 The use of panel cointegration techniques would allow us to overcome the low power of the 
time-series unit roots and cointegration testing procedure.
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the incidence and magnitude of RER undervaluation using Probit and Tobit 
modeling, respectively.
This paper consists of the following six sections. Chapter 2 presents our 
theoretical model of RER that determines the long-run fundamental RER equation 
while Chapter 3 explains the data used in the empirical work. Chapter 4 outlines 
and empirical model of RER misalignments and explains the econometric 
methodology applied to estimate the long run RER equation —i.e. time series and 
panel unit roots and cointegration analysis, the pooled mean group estimator
(PMGE) and the error correction model (ECM). In Chapter 5 we first define 
episodes of real undervaluation of the domestic currency using binary variables
that take the value of 1 whenever the misalignment goes beyond certain threshold. 
Then, we examine the behavior of selected macroeconomic indicators around 
sharp undervaluation episodes using event analysis. Chapter 6 describes the 
econometric methodology applied to evaluate the determinants of the incidence 
and size of RER misalignments (Probit and Tobit analysis, respectively) and 
analyzes the results from our Probit and Tobit analysis while Chapter 7 concludes.
Chapter 2 builds a theoretical model of exchange rate determination where the 
steady state solution yields our fundamental long-run real exchange rate equation. 
The building blocks of the model in this study follow Mussa (1984) and Frenkel 
and Mussa (1985) in the determination of the balance of payments (BOP)
equilibrium (or external equilibrium), and Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) 
in devising the set up for the equilibrium in the traded and non-traded goods. We 
optimize a dynamic general equilibrium model where the main drivers of the RER 
are net foreign assets, the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) productivity 
differentials and the terms of trade (TOT). One of the salient and novel features of 
this study is the derivation of what we call inter-temporal BOP equilibrium (i.e.
solved from current account dynamics) and equilibrium in the tradable and non-
tradable goods market (i.e. yielding the relationship between RER and 
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productivity suggested by HBS effect). Therefore, according to our model, the 
equilibrium real exchange rate is determined in an intertemporal optimizing 
framework that guarantees the simultaneous attainment of BOP equilibrium as 
well as equilibrium in the traded and non-traded goods markets (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1985; Obstfeld and Stockman, 1985; Edwards, 1989a; Alberola and 
Lopez, 2001).3
Chapter 3 discusses the data used in our characterization of RER 
misalignments. This includes the data needed for: (a) the estimation of the long-
run fundamental real exchange rate equation, (b) the event-analysis conducted on 
the behavior of macroeconomic variables around undervaluation episodes and (c) 
the determination of the likelihood and magnitude of RER undervaluation 
episodes using Probit and Tobit analysis. To accomplish these tasks we have 
collected annual information for 79 countries (21 of which are industrial 
economies) over the period 1970-2005.
Chapter 4 presents an empirical model on the dynamics of RER 
misalignments and discusses the econometric methodology applied to estimate the 
long run RER equation —that is, time-series and panel data techniques for non-
stationary series. We discuss the time series and panel data methodology to test 
for unit roots and cointegration among the RER and its fundamentals, and the 
ECM to empirically estimate the dynamics of RER misalignments.
Modeling RER misalignments requires the estimation of the fundamental 
RER equation using cointegration techniques for time series —i.e. Johansen's 
(1988, 1991) multivariate analysis and the ECM by Bewley (1979) and Wickens 
and Breusch (1987)— and for heterogeneous panel data —i.e. the pooled mean 
group estimator (PMGE) by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 
                                                
3 The ERER guarantees internal equilibrium if this relative price helps achieve equilibrium in the 
non-traded goods markets not only in the current but also in future periods. On the other hand, the 
ERER yields external equilibrium if it guarantees a sustainable current account position. This is 
compatible with long-run sustainable capital flows.
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Another novel feature in our study is the formulation of an empirical model on 
RER misalignments, where we link the deviations from RER equilibrium with 
deviations from the equilibrium in the economic fundamentals. Finally, this 
Chapter discusses the results from our statistical analysis. That is, we interpret the 
results obtained from our cointegration analysis of the long run fundamental RER 
equation estimated for a large sample of countries. 
In Chapter 5 we define episodes of undervaluation using binary variables. Our 
variable that defines an undervaluation episode takes the value of one (1) when 
the actual RER depreciation exceeds the equilibrium depreciation beyond certain 
threshold, and we examine the behavior of selected macroeconomic indicators 
around sharp undervaluation episodes using event analysis. More specifically, we 
calculate the RER misalignment as the deviation of the actual from the 
equilibrium RER, with the latter being computed from the estimated coefficients 
of the long run fundamental RER equation derived from the theoretical model in 
Chapter 2. After calculating RER misalignments, we construct a dataset of real 
exchange rate undervaluation episodes. Then we present some basic evidence on 
the co-movement of RER undervaluation and (real and nominal) macroeconomic 
aggregates. We specifically assess the behavior of macro aggregates during 
undervaluations using an “event analysis” methodology. 
Our event analysis of the RER undervaluation episodes is another novelty in 
our study. We identify episodes of undervaluation as those episodes of large real 
undervaluation of the currency (excess depreciations beyond some pre-determined 
threshold). Then, we examine the behavior of key real activity variables (e.g. real 
output, private consumption, investment and savings) and macroeconomic policy 
variables (say, capital controls and foreign exchange market intervention) using 
the event analysis approach. The event-analysis confirms the conjecture that real 
GDP growth accelerates during and after the start of an undervaluation episode 
while analyzing the full sample of countries. In addition, export growth speeds up 
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during the undervaluation episodes and it slows down in the aftermath. After the 
undervaluation ensues, domestic demand seems to also drive growth in GDP. The 
evidence shows that growth in private consumption and investment accelerates 
significantly. Given this result, we proceed to examine whether policymakers can 
exploit this positive co-movement and exert an influence on the RER 
undervaluation.
Chapter 6 describes the econometric methodology applied to evaluate the 
determinants of the incidence and size of RER misalignments (Probit and Tobit
analysis, respectively) and analyzes the results from our Probit and Tobit analysis. 
We evaluate whether (and if so, to what extent) economic policies can be used to 
either cause or sustain real undervaluations. In this context we empirically model 
the likelihood and magnitude of sustaining RER undervaluations by examining 
their link to policy instruments (e.g. exchange rate regimes, capital controls, 
among other policies) using Probit and Tobit models, respectively. Note that this 
exercise would permit us to test whether the “mercantilist” view of the exchange 
rate policy is empirically valid.  In short, our Probit analysis shows that pro-active 
economic policies may have an effect on the likelihood of sustaining the RER 
undervaluation while our Tobit model shows that the authorities may have a more 
limited ability to influence the magnitude of the RER undervaluation. 
Our Probit analysis shows evidence that active exchange rate policies may 
influence the incidence of RER undervaluations. For instance, intervention in the 
foreign exchange market is effective to support small to medium RER 
undervaluation and its effect becomes non-negligible for larger degrees of 
undervaluation. The flexibility of exchange rate arrangements —proxied by either 
the coarse or fine classification of arrangements made by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004)— has a positive and significant coefficient regardless of the threshold of 
undervaluation. These findings imply that countries with more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements and larger intervention in the FOREX market are able to 
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experience episodes of currency undervaluation. Analogous to the intervention 
result, an active fiscal policy seems to raise the likelihood of small to medium 
RER undervaluation, and it becomes ineffective when the RER undervaluation is 
larger (say, more than 20 percent). 
The Tobit analysis shows that policymakers may have a more limited role in 
influencing the magnitude of the RER undervaluation. In contrast to our Probit
results, flexible exchange arrangements and FOREX market intervention have a 
less robust link with the size of RER undervaluations. The exchange arrangement 
is mostly not significant in all regressions, while FOREX intervention has a 
positive and significant effect only when controlling for the fiscal policy stance.
Finally, we should point out that despite the comprehensive characterization 
of RER misalignments in this study, there are still some interesting avenues for 
future economic research. For instance, the persistence of real exchange rate 
misalignments may lead to the characterization of the duration of real exchange 
rate under- or over-valuation episodes. Naturally, one would ask whether the 
duration of RER misalignments is influenced by the prevailing monetary 
arrangement or existing real sector rigidities. Characterizing the duration of 
misalignments may also need to test whether the duration of the misalignment 
may impose an additional tax or provide an additional incentive to investment and 
economic activity.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Model of Real Exchange 
Rate Determination
The concept of fundamental real exchange rate misalignment requires 
modeling and calculating the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate. In this 
chapter we build a model of real exchange rate (RER) determination that 
constitutes our theoretical framework. This model would yield our fundamental 
real exchange rate equation; that is, the long-run relationship between the RER 
and its fundamentals. We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with inter-
temporal optimizing agents that links the equilibrium RER with the evolution of 
the current account (more specifically, the net external position of the country and 
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terms of trade) and the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson productivity differential.4 The 
econometric estimation of the steady state solution of this model (i.e. our 
fundamental RER regression equation) would allow us to calculate equilibrium 
real exchange rate (ERER) and; hence, the RER misalignment as deviations of the 
actual from ERER. 
2.1 Theoretical Insights: the Literature Review
In this section we briefly review the existing literature on the determination of 
RER in the long run and the calculation of RER misalignments based on 
fundamentals. The RER misalignment is conceptually defined as the deviation of 
the actual RER relative to some benchmark (or equilibrium) level. Its calculation 
therefore depends upon the measurement of the equilibrium level of RER. A 
survey of the literature on RER misalignments (Edwards and Savastano, 2000) 
classifies most empirical efforts in this area into two groups: one, single equation 
models and another, general equilibrium simulation models. In both approaches 
the equilibrium RER is defined as the relative price of tradable and non-tradable 
goods that achieves internal and external equilibrium simultaneously. Internal 
equilibrium is usually defined as the sustainable equilibrium in the market of non-
traded goods, which is compatible with unemployment rates at their natural level 
while external equilibrium takes place whenever the current account position can 
be financed with sustainable capital flows —that is, whenever the inter-temporal 
budget constraint is satisfied (Edwards, 1989a).
                                                
4 The model presented in Chapter 2 aims to introduce a simple theoretical framework to determine 
the equilibrium path of the real exchange rate. As specified, this model focuses on three key 
determinants of the real exchange rate: net foreign assets, the terms of trade and productivity. An 
extension to this framework would introduce government in our model. For instance, some models 
of exchange rate determination have introduced government spending as a determinant of the real 
exchange rate (e.g. Froot and Rogoff, 1991; De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf, 1994; Chinn, 
1999; Galstyan and Lane, 2008). 
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Three different approaches to measuring RER misalignment may be observed 
in the literature: PPP-based, model-based measure and the black market 
premium.5 The PPP-based measure of misalignment is calculated from the 
deviations of RER with respect to some parity level from some determined 
equilibrium year. As pointed out by Balassa (1964, 1990), the main disadvantage 
of this approach is that it only accounts for monetary sources of exchange rate 
fluctuations and not for real sources (for example, productivity shifts, TOT shocks 
among others). The model-based measure of RER misalignment is calculated as 
the deviation of the actual RER from some theoretically-based equilibrium path of 
the RER. Equilibrium RER models are usually specified by positing a relationship 
between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals (i.e. Edwards, 1989a; Frenkel 
and Razin, 1996). Particularly, Edwards (1989a), and Alberola and Lopez (2001) 
model the RER as the relative price that guarantee internal and external 
equilibrium simultaneously. The black market premium (BMP) is used as a proxy 
for RER misalignment. The drawback of the black market premium is that it is 
likely to be better capture the degree of foreign exchange controls than RER 
misalignments —especially in the era of increasing international financial 
integration.6 In addition, the empirical evidence finds that BMP overstates the 
degree of misalignment for developing countries in the 70s and 80s (Ghura and 
Grennes, 1993). 
2.1.1. PPP-based Measure
The concept of purchasing power parity was originally discussed by Cassel 
and he argued that under flexible exchange rates and the gold standard: (i) 
                                                
5 The single-equation approach follows the model-based measure of our theoretical and empirical 
model.
6 The black market premium on the foreign exchange market is a flawed measure of misalignment 
since it is more of an indicator of rationing in this market.
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monetary factors are the most important long-run determinants of the exchange 
rates; and (ii) frictions in goods’ arbitrage such as trade barriers, transaction costs, 
capital flows and expectations can also help determine the exchange rate.
Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) build their model from 
the PPP paradigm outlined by Cassel. Under an international gold standard, 
substantial relative changes in the purchasing power of two currencies should 
result in corresponding inverse changes in the exchange rates for each country. If 
this is the case, under equilibrium conditions metallic standard currencies have to 
be equal to their purchasing power in terms of units of identical gold content. The 
existence of non-transportable goods and services in a country makes it difficult 
to explain not only how there could be any necessity under the gold standard that 
the price levels could be identical between two countries but also how the two 
price levels could be compared at all with any approach to precision. The only 
necessary relationship between prices in different countries is the international 
uniformity of particular prices of commodities with the exchange rates that was 
consistent with the maintenance of international and internal equilibrium (Viner, 
1937).
In addition to the PPP method, Artus (1978) pointed out two additional 
methods to calculate the real exchange rate equilibrium: the asset-market 
disturbances and the underlying payments disequilibria. The asset-market 
disturbances approach is consistent with the large fluctuations since the Bretton 
Woods era. This implies that such fluctuations will continue as long as short-run 
real and monetary developments are not fully harmonized. However, the asset-
market view is consistent with the traditional view such as the PPP approach in 
the exchange rate evolution of the long-run because exchange rate expectations 
play a dominant role in the long-run. 
Despite the inexistence of measures or (dynamic) modeling of expectations, 
Cassel argued that random fluctuations in exchange rates may occur (Holmes, 
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1967). Years later, Muth (1961) proposed the concept of expectations defined the 
concept of rational expectations by introducing it in the underlying behavior of 
agents in an economic model, and later on Lucas (1976, 1977) contributed to 
modeling a dynamic of economy over time with these expectations. Frenkel and 
Mussa (1985) argued that adopting the assumption of rational expectations allow 
exchange rate model to determine endogenously the expectations of future 
exchange rates with the consistent structure in the economic system; hence, we 
are able to explain the exchange rate behavior with the explicit theory linking 
current and expected future prices with the role of information from expectations. 
Although deviations of the exchange rate from its PPP value are corrected by 
the reduction in current account imbalances and a gradual change in the exchange 
rate in the long run, the absence of non-tradable goods in the PPP theory is the 
main problem. The price ratio between tradable and non-tradable goods may not 
move together over time due to differences in productivities across sectors. For 
instance, there is supporting evidence that the real appreciation of the Japanese 
yen vis-à-vis the US dollar since World War II can be attributed to an 
exceptionally large productivity differential between traded and non-traded 
sectors (Rogoff, 1996). On the other hand, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a) found a 
correlation between trade-weighted real exchange rate changes and changes in net 
foreign asset positions across 15 OECD countries from 1981 to 1990. Finally, 
there is not conclusive on the nature of the effects of rising government spending 
on the real exchange rate. Rogoff (1992), on the one hand, argues that the 
resulting real appreciation is transitory whereas Alesina and Perotti (1995) assert 
that fiscal policy may generate a permanent appreciation in a model where 
distortionary taxes are used to finance government spending programs. 
Furthermore, the PPP approach measures changes in relevant variables from 
some base period, and this does not address the issue of whether the exchange rate 
is at its equilibrium level. PPP-based approach cannot therefore capture major 
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changes in economic policies, in economic structure or in the external 
environment (such as TOT movements).
2.1.2. Model-based Measure of RER Equilibrium
In the model-based measure of RER misalignments it is necessary to define a 
sustainable or equilibrium exchange rate. This overcomes the deficiencies of the 
PPP approach because the underlying payments of disequilibria method take care 
of the underlying balance-of-payments positions rather than the price level. 
Frenkel and Goldstein (1986) explain the underlying payments disequilibria as the 
underlying balance approach to the equilibrium exchange rate. This equilibrium 
exchange rate defines the real effective exchange rate (REER) which consists of 
medium-term internal and external macroeconomic balance —which Williamson 
(1983) labels as the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate and according to 
Wren-Lewis (2003), this is a partial equilibrium approach. The key exogenous 
inputs are medium term capital flows and the cyclically-adjusted level of output. 
This approach is similar to Keynesian cyclical effects and short-term transitory 
shocks in domestic and abroad. 
Bayoumi et al (1994) suggest the “desired equilibrium exchange rate” is the 
level according to which the actual stocks are at their desired levels in the long 
run. Hence, there is a set of desired macroeconomic objectives. The ERER is 
consistent with underlying macroeconomic balance based on the desired 
macroeconomic objectives. The calculated equilibrium exchange rate is not 
desired but it simply achieves the desired positions of internal and external 
balance. 
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On the other hand, the “behavioural equilibrium exchange rate” (BEER) 
approach developed by Clark and MacDonald (1999) –in a similar fashion than 
Williamson’s (1994) fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) approach–
explains the real exchange rate behavior in terms of economic fundamentals using
reduced-form econometric equations. The initial building block of the BEER 
approach is the uncovered interest parity (in real terms), where the equilibrium 
exchange rate in period t is explained by the expectation of the real exchange rate 
in t+l and the real interest differential with maturity t+k. Clark and MacDonald 
(1999, 2000) then assume that the unobservable expectation of the exchange rate 
is the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. Hence, the current equilibrium 
exchange rate is the sum of two components: the systematic long-run component 
and the real interest rate differential. Next, the authors relate the long-run 
equilibrium real exchange rate is related to fundamentals –say, the Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson effect and the net foreign assets in Clark and MacDonald 
(2000). Exchange rate misalignments resulting from the BEER approach at any 
point in time can be decomposed into the effect of transitory factors, random 
disturbances and the extent to which the economic fundamentals are away from 
their sustainable values. 
2.1.3. Single-equation Approach 
The single-equation approach usually derives reduced forms for the ERER 
from a wide variety of theoretical models and most of these efforts have been 
based on Edwards (1989a) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995b, 1996).7 The long run 
relationship derived from theoretical models usually links the RER with a set of 
                                                
7 Razin and Collins (1999), on the other hand, use a stochastic version of the Mundell-Fleming 
model as developed by Frenkel and Razin (1996).
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“fundamentals” (e.g. productivity differentials, terms of trade, government 
spending, trade policy, among other factors). RER misalignments arise when RER 
deviations from the equilibrium path are quite persistent. This may be due to 
inadequate macroeconomic, trade and exchange rate policies among other factors.
The single-equation approach is followed in our research. In order to compute 
the RER misalignment we first estimate the long-run ERER. Here we collect 
historical data on the RER and its fundamentals and apply time series and/or 
panel cointegration techniques.8
The RER fundamentals are decomposed into their permanent and transitory 
components, and we use the long-run values (or permanent component) of the 
RER fundamentals. This permanent component is so-called the permanent 
equilibrium exchange rate, PEER (MacDonald, 2000). Although researchers have 
not agreed on the procedure to calculate the permanent component of the 
fundamentals, a variety of trend-cycle decomposition techniques —such as 
Beveridge and Nelson (1981), the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, the band-pass 
filter (Baxter and King, 1999)— have been used in the literature to compute the 
long-run values of the fundamentals. In this paper, we use the band-pass filter due 
to the following advantages: one, it passes through components of the time series 
with periodic fluctuations between six and thirty two quarters while removing 
components at higher and lower frequencies, and another, it produces more 
flexible and easier to implement more accurate approximation to the optimal 
filter.
We then calculate the long-run equilibrium level of the RER by multiplying 
the estimated coefficients with the permanent values of the fundamentals. Finally, 
the RER misalignment is calculated by subtracting the equilibrium level from the 
                                                
8 Alberola et al. (1999), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) and Calderón (2004) are examples of 
RER equations estimated using panel cointegration techniques.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Model of Real Exchange Rate Determination 19
actual RER. For a detailed revision of empirical papers on the estimation of 
ERERs (see Table 13.5 in Edwards and Savastano, 2000).
2.1.4 General Equilibrium Simulation 
Other researchers have used General Equilibrium Simulation Models to assess 
the behavior or RERs (Williamson, 1991). Analogously to the single-equation 
method, the ERER should meet both internal and external equilibrium 
considerations. Most simulation models are based on flow considerations and 
ignore aspects such as the demand shocks or the impact of net foreign assets.
Most of the models that fall into these two categories are surveyed by 
Edwards and Savastano (2000) who consider that there is a linear long-run 
relationship between RERs and fundamentals. This is therefore a linear 
adjustment of shocks to fundamentals on the RER. Unfortunately, the theoretical 
literature has been unable to replicate the empirical results on the persistent of 
misalignments in the RER for industrial (as well as developing countries) after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system.9
2.1.5 Model Dependency of RER Misalignments
One of the main problems of computing fundamental RER misalignments 
using the single equation approach is that the measure of RER misalignment 
would be model dependent. However, Cassel (1928, pp.29) argues that:
                                                
9 The empirical literature finds that —among the studies in support of the validity of PPP in the 
long run— mean reversion of RER is slow, that is the size of the half-life of PPP deviations is 
between 3 and 5 years. In addition, the high degree of persistence in RER cannot be taken into 
account either by nominal shocks (highly volatile but not persistent) or by real shocks (persistent 
but with low volatility —e.g. preferences and technology). This is what Rogoff (1996) described 
as the PPP puzzle.
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…(t)he art of economic theory to a great extent consists in the ability to judge 
which of a number of different factors cooperating in a certain movement 
ought to be regarded as the most important and essential one. Obviously 
in such cases we must always be at work. Other factors which are only of 
a temporary character and may be expected to disappear, or at any rate 
can be theoretically assumed to be absent, must for that reason alone be 
put in a subordinate position(,)
Hence, it is important to find the model the main economic fundamentals that 
drive the behavior of RER misalignments.
2.1.6 A Brief Review of ERER Modeling 
2.1.6.1 Intertemporal Approach
The theoretical model of real exchange rate determination that it is built in 
Section 2.2 follows the intertemporal approach in the context of open economy 
macroeconomics. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1985) summarize in their review 
article, the inter-temporal approach becomes popular in the early 1980s (e.g.
Sachs, 1981). In the context of an open economy model, this approach suggests 
that the current account is the outcome of forward-looking dynamic saving and 
investment decisions. Moreover, the intertemporal approach to the current 
account can extend not only the absorption approach through private saving and 
investment decisions and government decisions from forward-looking based on 
expectations of future productivity growth, government spending and real interest 
rates. One of the theoretical foundations of the model developed in Section 2.2 
comes from Frenkel and Mussa (1985) influenced by Meade (1951)’s open 
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economy macroeconomics model extended by Mundell (1963) and Fleming 
(1962). 
Lucas (1976) argues that optimum decision rules are crucial to evaluate 
economic policy. Open-economy models might yield more reliable policy 
conclusions from optimization problems of households and firms rather than 
specified to match reduced-form estimates based on ad hoc econometric 
specifications. Moreover, developing the intertemporal approach came from 
events in the world capital market, especially the substantial current account 
imbalances. Therefore, his critique brings a base to the exchange rate dynamics on 
the explicit intertemporal optimization problems of individual agents (Ofstfeld 
and Stockman, 1985). According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1985), this 
intertemporal approach can also achieve the absorption and elasticities view with 
macroeconomic determinations of relative prices and the impact of the current 
account and future prices on saving and investment. Their first step is with a 
deterministic model of the current account by assuming that individual decision 
makers have perfect foresight and complete information about their economic 
environment. The intertemporal model in their survey starts from a one-good 
model with representative national residents with the intertemporal budget 
constraint for the economy while the representative consumer maximizes the 
time-separable utility function. 
This intertemporal approach provides us a useful explanation of the role of 
comparative advantage, modeling output fluctuations and investment, 
incorporating non-traded goods, consumption and investment, an illustration of 
consumer durables and the current account, linking the terms of trade and transfer 
problem, and emphasizing demographic structure, fiscal policy and the current 
account. For example, the foreign borrowing and lending can be viewed as 
intertemporal trade as the exchange of consumption is available on different dates. 
The intertemporal model illustrates how costly investment affects current account 
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dynamics due to a sluggish movement of the capital stocks. The Euler equation 
resulting from nontradables shows that overall consumption growth depends on 
the utility-based real interest factor and not simply on the relative intertemporal 
price of tradables. Dornbusch (1983) also incorporates non-traded goods in the 
intertemporal approach. Moreover, consumption need no longer be 
intertemporally smoothed when the time-preference rate and world tradable goods 
interest rate coincide. The terms of trade and the transfer problem motivate the 
intertemporal approach how changes in terms of trade affect saving and the 
current account (Obstfeld, 1982; Svensson and Razin, 1983). The transfer effect 
can operate thorough several channels in a general equilibrium setting. Two 
examples in such mechanisms are home preference for domestic exports and the 
presence of a nontradable sector that is a competitor for resources against tradable 
sector. In addition, there is a special case in the latter mechanism due to a change 
in the wealth effect on labor supply and, hence, on the supply of exportables 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1985; Buiter, 1989). 
2.1.6.2 Tradables vs. Nontradables
As Viner (1937) points out, the notion of non-traded goods –i.e. non-
transportable goods and services in a country– becomes a key factor explaining 
exchange rate determination. Kravis (1986) and Dornbusch (1989) empirically 
show that there is a significant service component in the RER. If productivity in 
tradables grows faster than those in nontradables, this causes higher wages in 
tradables which push the wages in nontradables upward. As a result, a real 
appreciation in nontradables will occur. This is known as Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson (HBS) effect where shifts in the RER are determined mainly by 
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movements in the relative productivity of traded and non-traded goods.10 In this 
context, fluctuations in terms of trade may have a strong co-movement with 
movements in RER if the non-traded sector is important.
In a recent paper, Obstfeld (2009) argues that the RER depends on the 
international productivity “difference in differences” between tradable and 
nontradable sectors. He argues that the HBS model provides a benchmark to 
measure the equilibrium real exchange rate: real appreciations predicted by this 
model do not involve a decline in export competitiveness but are purely 
productivity driven. This argument is empirically supported by De Gregorio, 
Giovannini and Wolf (1994), and Chinn and Johnston (1996).
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and 
MacDonald and Ricci (2001) suggest that the distribution sector plays an 
important role in our understanding of the link between the movements in the 
relative prices of tradable to non-tradable goods.11 Those papers theoretically 
argue that PPP fails in the presence of distribution costs since the distribution 
services are intensive in the use of labor and land, and generate a wedge between 
the prices of any good across countries. Burstein et al. (2000) incorporate the 
distribution sector in a model of exchange rate determination and find that the 
model can mimic large appreciations of the RER and is consistent with the fact 
that the RER in some emerging market economies (EMEs) is mostly driven by 
changes in traded prices. MacDonald and Ricci (2001) find that the RER may 
appreciate if there is an increase in the productivity and the degree of competition 
of the distribution sector of the home country relative to the foreign country (in a 
similar fashion to the HBS effect). They argue that improvements in the 
distribution of traded goods may lie behind their result. Ricci et al. (2008) also 
                                                
10Engel (1993, 2000) shows that the law of one price holds for traded goods.
11Burstein et al. (2003) show that distribution costs are very large for the average consumer good: 
they represent more than 40 percent of the retail price in the US and roughly 60 percent of the 
retail price in Argentina.
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find evidence in support of the HBS effect. This effect seems to be economically 
important as they estimate that a 10 % increase in relative productivity 
differentials appreciates REER by about 2%. They use a new dataset for the 
productivity differentials, which uses a six-sector classification on productivity 
and employment while their measure of TOT is based on the price of the main 
imported and exported commodities relative to the price of manufactured goods. 
2.1.6.3 Some Examples on Intertemporal Approach
Edwards (1987) formulated an intertemporal general equilibrium model for a 
small open economy where optimizing producers and consumers produce and 
consume three goods: importables, exportables and non-tradables. This 
framework enables us to analyze the relative transmission mechanisms between 
the real exchange rate and its fundamentals. There is no capital accumulation in 
this model. The equilibrium RER is achieved by guaranteeing the simultaneous 
equilibrium of the internal and external sectors. 
Ostry (1988) analyzes the relationship between changes in the terms of trade 
and balance of trade in an intertemporal optimizing model for a small country in 
which agents consume three goods which are imperfect substitutes. The inclusion 
of non-traded goods in this model changes the transmission channels through the 
real exchange rate which, in turn, affects the real trade balance (indirect effect). 
Svensson and Razin (1983) and Frenkel and Razin (1987) show that change in 
terms of trade has a direct effect on the consumption-based trade balance because 
it alters the excess of current GDP over aggregate spending, both measured in real 
terms. 
Edwards (1988b) extends the inter-temporal general equilibrium model to a 
small open economy with optimizing consumers and producers, and analyzes the 
relationship between terms of trade shocks and current account. He emphasizes 
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the role of non-traded goods in the transmission process and how the terms of 
trade disturbances influence the current account. He shows that it is possible for a 
temporary import tariff to worsen the current account in the period when it is 
imposed. Edwards (1989a) also analyzes equilibrium exchange rate behavior and 
RER overvaluation by asking how the equilibrium real exchange rate reacts to 
changes in degree of restrictions to intra- and inter-temporal trade and the effects 
of a change in the degree of capital controls. He finds, first, that tariff 
liberalization does not necessarily result in an equilibrium real depreciation but 
depends on key parameters; second, that the substitution effect dominates the 
income effect under more restrictive conditions; and third, that expected future 
tariff hikes generate an equilibrium real appreciation in the current period. 
Moreover, Edwards (1988a) examines the behavior of RER in developing 
countries with a dual exchange rate system. With this exchange rate system in 
place, he finds that discrepancies between actual and equilibrium real exchange 
rates disappear slowly. Nominal devaluations appear to be neutral in the long run, 
but macroeconomic disequilibria influences the real exchange rates in the short 
run. Finally, the long run equilibrium real exchange rate responds to changes in its 
fundamentals. He also argues that the possible extension to this strand of research 
is to estimate the indexes of RER rate misalignment to investigate whether RER 
disequilibrium is associated to poor economic performance.12
Edwards and Ostry (1990) build a general equilibrium model to assess how 
anticipated protectionist policies may affect the RER and the current account 
where these are labor market distortions. Their model finds that imposing tariffs 
                                                
12 To tackle this issue, we suggest: 1) estimating the coefficients of the long run equilibrium real 
exchange rate, 2) generating estimated RERs for each country with using estimated equilibrium 
sustainable values of its fundamentals, and 3) defining the RER misalignment as the difference 
between these estimated equilibrium and actual RERs, 4) calculating average indexes RER 
misalignment for each country, and 5) using these average indexes of misalignment to estimate 
whether countries with larger misalignment perform worse economic activities.    
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may have an effect on the RER and the current account about, although the effect 
may differ if the economy has rigid or fully flexible labor market. 
2.2 The Model
Let us denote the real exchange rate as tQ , where *
tt
t
t PS
P
Q  , the nominal 
exchange rate as tS , and the domestic and foreign prices as tP and 
*
tP , 
respectively.  Absolute PPP between two countries implies that tQ is constant and 
is written as:  
*
ttt PSP 
Relative PPP implies:
**
11
1
tt
t
tt
t
PS
P
PS
P 


Hence, the real exchange rate (in logs) can be expressed as (where xt = ln Xt):
)(  tttt pspq
We assume the power utility function  tCU :
  




1
11t
t
C
CU , 0
where tC is the total consumption and 
1
is elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution. In turn, total consumption is defined as a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function of consumption in traded and non-traded goods (CT
and CN, respectively), 
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where  is the share of non-traded goods in the consumption basket and 1 is 
the elasticity of intra-temporal substitution between traded and non-traded goods. 
This elasticity is calculated as :
 
 
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



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The consumption expenditure function can be expressed as:
N
t
N
t
T
t
T
ttt CPCPCP 
where TP and NP denote the prices of traded and non-traded goods, respectively. 
Analogously, the total expenditure on investment I and output Y are specified as 
follows:
N
t
N
t
T
t
T
ttt IPIPIP 
N
t
N
t
T
t
T
ttt YPYPYP 
Technology
The production of traded and non-traded goods is summarized by the following 
production functions::
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where labor (L) and physical capital (K) are the factors of production, and A
denotes the stochastic productivity disturbance. The superscript T in K, L, and A
denotes factors and productivity in the traded sector, whereas the superscript N
identifies analogous magnitudes in the non-traded sector.
We assume that labor is internationally immobile and migrates between sectors. 
The supply of labor in the Home country is inelastically fixed at Nt
T
t LLL 
where TtL is labor in the traded sector and 
N
tL is labor in the non-traded sector.
Total physical capital is Nt
T
tt KKK  , the sum of the capital stock in both 
traded and non-traded sectors, and the law of capital accumulation in each sector 
is as follows:
N
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N
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Zero Profit Condition
Assuming that the traded good is the numeraire (i.e. we normalize the price of 
traded goods TP to one), we carry out the firm optimization program in the traded 
and non-traded sectors.
In the case of the traded goods, we have: 
max  
T
t
T
t
TTT
t
T
t
T
t
T
t
T
t
rKwLLKA
rKwLYP
TT 

  )()( 1
where the first order conditions are:
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The optimization problem for the non-traded sector is:
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and the first order conditions for non-tradable good yield:
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The first order conditions for the firms in the traded and non-traded sectors yield 
the familiar condition that the real rate of retribution for each factor is equal to the 
marginal product of that factor. In other words, factor payments will exhaust the 
level of output (i.e. zero profit condition). This is a natural consequence of having 
constant returns to scale technology in both sectors.
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2.3 First-Order Conditions
We solve the social planner’s problem for a small open economy by 
maximizing  st
s
s CU 



0
 with respect to  0;,,,, 1  sfLKKCC stT stN stT stN stT st
subject to the following BOP equation:
 
    tttNtNNtNtNtTtTTtTt
N
t
T
t
N
t
T
t
T
t
frfKKCPKKC
rKLLwPrKwL
)1()1()1(
)()(
*
111 

 
where f represents the real net asset holdings.
The Lagrange function is:
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Combining the FOC with respect to capital in the traded sector and the holdings 
of foreign assets (ft+s1), we have:
*
111  tT rr 
Whereas combining the FOC with respect to ft+s+1 and that of non-traded capital 
stock, we have:
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From the FOC of the labor in traded sector, we also have that:
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By setting s = 0 and from the conditions of 0
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the relative consumption of traded and non-traded goods as a function of its 
relative price: 
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since the price of traded goods PT is the numeraire.
Thus, an increase in the relative price of traded goods reduces their relative 
consumption. We could also express the above expression as:
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where the right-hand-side shows the demand for traded and non-traded goods.
As a result, the total consumption is:
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and total consumption expenditure is:
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Therefore, the home country’s price level can be expressed as:
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Analogously, the price level in the foreign country is:
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Taking logarithms of tP and linearizing gives
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2.4 The Real Exchange Rate Equation
The logarithm of the real exchange can be approximated as:
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where  *Ttt
T
t
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t pspq 
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BOP
tq denotes the relative price of traded goods and expected to be stationary 
(Engle, 2000). Deviations from the law of one price in traded goods are large and 
persistent but stationary (Engle, 1993; Wei and Parsley, 1995), even in the 
presence of shipping costs (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997).13 On the other hand, PROtq
denotes the relative price of non-traded to traded goods. Engle (2000) suggests 
that the unit root behavior in real exchange rates might be induced by non-
stationary behavior of real exchange rates driven by permanent shocks to 
productivity in the traded vis-à-vis the non-traded sector. In the equation above, 
BOP
tq and 
PRO
tq are the components of the equilibrium real exchange rate tq that 
satisfy external and internal balances, respectively (see Edwards 1989a). They are 
consistent with the balance of payments constraint, whether or not this is in the 
long-run equilibrium. If the balance of payments is in the long-run equilibrium 
then it must satisfy a further condition which we now derive.
2.4.1. The Inter-Temporal BOP Equilibrium in the Real Exchange Rate
The balance of payments in nominal domestic currency terms is:
F
ttt
F
ttttt
T
t
m
t
T
tt
T
tt
T
tt BBSBRBSRQxPSQxPCA 1
*
1
**)()(
*
 
                                                
13 For instance, the literature shows that increased fiscal deficits appreciate the equilibrium RER if 
the rising expenditures are biased towards non-traded goods. Import tariffs and removal of capital 
controls also appreciate the ERER while a permanent deterioration of the terms of trade is likely to 
depreciate the ERER.
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where )( Ttt Qx is exports, )(
T
t
m
t Qx is imports expressed in foreign real prices, 
*
tB is domestic nominal holding of foreign assets expressed in foreign currency, 
F
tB is the foreign holding of domestic assets expressed in domestic currency, tR
is the domestic nominal interest rate, *tR is the world nominal interest rate and 
F
tttt BBSF  * is the net asset position14. Dividing by tP gives the real BOP 
constraint:
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14 Wickens (2008)
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If we assume that the expected nominal effective exchange rate is constant and 
uncovered interest parity condition holds, then 01  ts and *tt rr  .15  
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Dividing the above equation by 11  t ,
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constant so that **1 rrt  , we can show the change in the net foreign asset is:
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15 This is also the average yield on the stock of foreign assets.
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If we also assume that the trade balance is a Martingale process, so that expected 
future trade balances equal the current balance then,
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Hence, in the long-run balance of payments equilibrium, the net foreign asset 
position can be either negative, positive or zero depending on whether the trade 
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balance is positive, negative or zero. If we divide this equation by real GDP 
ty

in order to express the ratio of net foreign asset to GDP as t ,
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Solving the above expression gives the long-run equilibrium value of TOT,
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We now consider a log-linear approximation to the terms of trade, noting that:
1) If the net foreign asset is positive 0t , then 0TtQ .
2) If the net foreign asset is zero such as 0t , then 
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The logarithm of the TOT is:
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Hence, the (log of the) terms of trade is approximately
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where the term t is net foreign asset to GDP ratio, the term of 
1ln*ln  tPr 
expresses the world real interest rate or marginal product of capital in tradable 
sector, the term of
  tTtTtmtTtt yPQxQx lnln)(ln)(ln1  
depends on the terms of trade since the trade balance is a function of terms of 
trade. Hence, we can see the effect of terms of trade changes on the balance of 
trade. As a result, we can see the classical transfer effect pointed out by Keynes.16  
                                                
16 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) show that the size of the transfer effect is related to country 
characteristics such as trade openness, output per capita, country size, the composition of external 
liabilities, and restrictions on the external payments system. 
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2.4.2. Equilibrium in the Tradable and Non-Tradable Goods Markets
The behavior of sectoral relative prices between countries (i.e. the forcing 
variables that influence these relative prices) determines the evolution of the real 
exchange rate. We assume a Cobb-Douglas technology for the production of 
traded and non-traded goods, and we denote  and  the elasticity of output with 
respect to labor in the traded and non-traded sectors, respectively, where 
NT  0 ,
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Differentiating the production function of the traded and non-traded sectors with 
respect to labor (L), while holding capital (K) constant, we find that the marginal 
product of labor is:
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where k = K/L is the stock of capital per capita. If we take log differences of these 
four equations (and eliminate the time subscript for simplicity), we have:
where xdxxdx /)ln(ˆ  . Note that one of the underlying assumptions here is 
that labor is mobile across sectors but not across countries implies that wages in 
the traded and non-traded sectors within a country are equal (in nominal terms), 
that is:
NT WWW  .
Combining the four equations above, we find that:
kAAPPP TNNTNTN ˆ)()ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ  
where TN kkk ˆˆˆ  . For a small open economy with perfect international capital 
mobility and flexible labor markets, then the equation above becomes:
T
T
TNNTNTN AAAPPP 
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Note that the equation above links the relative price of non-tradables to 
productivity differentials in the traded and non-traded sectors.
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The following is technological progress between sectors,
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The following is also true from formula (1):
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Expressing the equation above in logs,
  NTNTTN yypp  log
As a result, the tradable to non-tradable price differential is equal to the 
productivity of the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector. Hence, the 
sectoral price differential in the inter-temporal equilibrium in the goods market is 
determined by:
     NtTtNTTtNt yypp  log
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We substitute this into the exchange rate associated with inter-temporal 
equilibrium in tradable and non-tradable goods. We obtain:
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Note that we obtain the last step by assuming identical preferences between 
domestic and foreign consumers —that is:
(a) The shares of traded and non-traded consumption in total consumption are 
similar for the representative domestic and foreign agents, and
(b) The elasticity of substitution is similar for the representative domestic and 
foreign agents.
The empirical long run RER model can be expressed as the sum of inter-temporal 
BOP equilibrium and inter-temporal equilibrium in the goods market to give:
   HBS, gTOTnfaf
qqq PROBOP


where the HBSt denotes the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson productivity term. If 
tradable goods productivity relative to non-tradable goods productivity is growing 
faster at home than abroad, home currency should appreciate in real terms (i.e.
HBS effect).
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For empirical purposes we express the real exchange rate equation as a linear 
regression equation as:
tititititi HBSTOTnfaq   210
where are main goal is to estimates the  coefficients.
2.4.3. The Case of Exportable, Importable and Non-Traded Goods: An 
Extension 
How would our model change if we assume that the traded sector is composed 
by an exportable good and importable good? To implement this extension to our 
model, let us assume that the Home country produces an exportable goods 
(superscript X) and a non-traded good while agents in the Home country, on the 
other hand, consume an importable good (superscript M) and the non-traded good. 
The production technology for the goods manufactured in the Home country is 
summarized by the following relationships:17
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where the output of non-traded goods exhibits constant returns to scale on non-
traded labor.
Total consumption in the Home country is specified as follows:
                                                
17 A more general version of the production functions for nontraded good would include capital as  
 NtNtNtNt LKGY , .    
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We solve the social planner’s problem for a small open economy by 
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where f represents the real net asset holdings and Nt
X
t LLL  . Note that, in this 
context, labor is allocated between the exportable sector or the non-traded one.
The Lagrange function is:
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Again, when we combine the FOC with respect to the capital stock in the 
exportable sector ( X stK 1 ) and the holding of assets ( 1 stf ), we find that:
*
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Hence, the (gross) real interest rate in period t+1 is equal to the (gross) retribution 
to capital adjusted for the depreciation rate in the exportable sector.
By setting s = 0 and from the conditions of 0
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the relative consumption of importable and non-traded goods as a function of its 
relative price: 
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Thus, an increase in the relative price of imported goods reduces their relative 
consumption. We could also express the above expression as:
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where the right-hand-side shows the demand for imported and non-traded goods.
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We now assume a Cobb-Douglas technology for the production of imported
and non-traded goods, and we denote  and  the elasticity of output with respect 
to labor in the imported and non-traded sectors, respectively, where 10  X ,
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Differentiating the production function of the traded and non-traded sectors with 
respect to labor (L), while holding capital (K) constant, we find that the marginal 
product of labor is:
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If we take log differences of these four equations (and eliminate the time subscript 
for simplicity), we have:
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Note that the assumption of labor mobility across sectors rather than across 
countries implies that wages in the imported and non-traded sectors within the 
Home country are equal (in nominal terms), that is:
NX WWW 
Combining the four equations above, we find that:
kAAPPP XNXNXN ˆ)1()ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ 
where Xkk ˆˆ  . 
Analogously, we can also formulate and solve the problem for the Foreign 
producer —who produces the importable (M) and a non-traded good (N*). We 
should note here that the good imported by the foreign country is the good that is 
exported by the foreign country (so here, to avoid further notation M is going to 
indicate X*). Again, we assume that M and N* have constant returns to scale 
technologies of production. Capital and labor are needed to produce the 
importable and the non-traded only needs labor. Hence, we can obtain the 
following relationship:
kAAPP MNMMN ˆ)1()ˆˆ(ˆˆ ** 
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Note that if for a small open economy with perfect international capital mobility 
and flexible labor markets, then the equation above becomes:
M
M
MNMMN AAAPP 
ˆ
)1()ˆˆ(ˆˆ ** 
The equation above links the relative price of non-tradables to productivity 
differentials in the foreign exportable and non-traded sectors.
Assuming that technological progress between sectors in the Foreign country is 
equal, then
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Expressing the equation above in logs,
** log NMMMN yypp  
As a result, the importable to non-tradable price differential is equal to the 
productivity of the importable sector relative to the non-tradable sector. Hence, 
the sectoral price differential in the inter-temporal equilibrium in the goods 
market is determined by:
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We substitute this into the exchange rate associated with inter-temporal 
equilibrium in importable and non-tradable goods. We obtain:
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Note that we obtain the last step by assuming identical preferences between 
domestic and foreign consumers —that is:
(c) The shares of immported and non-traded consumption in total 
consumption are similar for the representative domestic and foreign 
agents, and
(d) The elasticity of substitution is similar for the representative domestic and 
foreign agents.
2.5 Predictions of the Model
According to the theoretical model presented above we expect a positive 
relationship between RER and productivity (HBS effect) as well as between RER 
and terms of trade. If productivity in the traded sectors grows at a faster pace than 
that in the non-traded sector, wages in the traded sector would increase and thus 
push wages in the non-traded sector upwards. Hence, prices in non-traded goods 
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will increase and a real appreciation of the domestic currency will take place (this 
is the so-called Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect). These predictions are 
consistent with the De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) model where 
permanent surges in productivity and favorable TOT shocks may appreciate RER 
(i.e. positive relationship). 
Our theoretical model also predicts a positive relationship between the ratio of 
NFA to GDP and RER in the long run. This is consistent with the transfer effect 
predicted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), where a transfer of external wealth 
from the foreign to the domestic country will appreciate RER in the long run. 
Chapter 3
The Data
This chapter provides the description and sources of the data used in our 
empirical analysis. As we mentioned before, the main goal of this paper is to 
estimate fundamental RER misalignments and characterize the causes and 
consequences of these misalignments. Based on our theoretical model in Chapter 
2, we define the real exchange rate misalignment as the deviation of the actual 
RER from its equilibrium level. The equilibrium level of the RER is obtained 
from our estimated fundamental RER equation.
In this respect, we first describe the data on the real exchange rate and its 
fundamentals used for the estimation of the long run real exchange rate equation.  
More specifically, we collect information on the real effective exchange rate (our 
dependent variable) and its determinants: the ratio of net foreign asset to GDP 
(NFAy), the terms of trade (TOT) and the productivity differentials (Prod). 
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Next we describe the sources of data of the variables that are used to 
characterize the causes and consequences of RER misalignments, and more 
specifically, RER undervaluation episodes. Hence, we describe the sources of the 
data used for the event-analysis that characterizes the behavior of (aggregate) 
macroeconomic variables during sharp undervaluation episodes (consequences). 
Finally, we describe the variables used for econometric analysis of the incidence 
and magnitude of real exchange rate undervaluation episodes using limited 
dependent variable techniques —i.e. Probit and Tobit analysis, respectively.
To accomplish the tasks mentioned above, we gathered annual information for 
a sample of 79 countries over the period 1970-2005 for a wide array of variables 
such as exchange rate regimes, capital controls, foreign exchange intervention, 
trade and financial openness, liability dollarization and central government 
balance. 
3.1 The Fundamental Real Exchange Rate Equation
Following our theoretical model in Chapter 2, we compute the equilibrium 
RER by running a regression of the actual RER on the ratio of net foreign assets 
to GDP, the productivity differential and the terms of trade. 
Our dependent variable, the actual real exchange rate (RER), is proxied by the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) as defined by the domestic price index of 
country i vis-à-vis the price index of its main trading partners multiplied by the 
nominal exchange rate of country i,
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where eit is the nominal exchange rate of country i (vis-à-vis the US dollar) in 
period t, Pit is the consumer price index of country i in period t, ekt is the nominal 
exchange rate of the k-th trading partner of country k in period t (in units of local 
currency vis-à-vis the US dollar), and 0ktP is the wholesale price index of the k-th 
trading partners in period t. The nominal exchange rate, e, is proxied by the 
average price of the dollar in local currency (line rf of the International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS). Domestic and foreign prices, P, are 
proxied by the consumer price index of the country (line 64 of IFS). According to 
this definition, an increase in q implies a real appreciation of the domestic 
currency. 
Net foreign asset (NFA) data is drawn from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 
2007). This database comprises a set of foreign asset and liability stocks for a 
large group of industrial and developing countries spanning over the 1970-2005 
period. The construction of the data is thoroughly documented in Lane et al.
(2001, 2007), and the NFA position of country i in year t is defined as:
     itititititititit LLLARAEQYLEQYAFDILFDIANFA 
where the letters A and L denote assets and liabilities, respectively. Thus, the net 
foreign asset position is the sum of net holdings of direct foreign investment, 
FDIA-FDIL, plus net holdings of portfolio equity assets, EQYA-EQYL, and the net 
position in non-equity related assets (i.e. ''loan assets''). In turn, the net position in 
non-equity related assets consists of international reserves, RA, and the net loan 
position, LA-LL. 
In order to define productivity differentials (PROD) we first define the labor 
productivity in the traded and the non-traded sectors in the domestic country, 
while their foreign country’s analog correspond to the labor productivity of the 
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trading partner (as computed by the trade-weighted average of the productivity of 
the other countries in the sample).
Labor productivity in the traded and non-traded sectors is calculated using data 
on value added and employment based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of 
economic activity.18 Output per capita is proxied by the GDP per capita, and the 
output per capita of the foreign country is a trade-weighted average of GDP per 
capita of the domestic country's trading partners.
Finally, terms of trade (TOT) is the ratio of export to import prices. Data are 
taken from IMF, the World Bank, OECD, and national sources.
3.2 Calculating RER Misalignments
As we stated in Chapter 2, the real exchange rate misalignment is computed 
as deviation of the actual RER from its equilibrium value. Its equilibrium value is 
obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients of the long-run RER equation 
by the permanent values of the RER fundamentals. The permanent component of 
the RER fundamentals is obtained using the band-pass filter (Baxter and King, 
1999). Note that according to our definition of RER, positive (negative) 
deviations from the equilibrium imply a real exchange rate over- (under-) 
valuation.
In the first stage of our empirical assessment we estimated the long-run RER 
equation and estimated the RER misalignment. The second part of our empirical 
assessment would be to link economic policies and country characteristics to RER 
undervaluation. Our goal in this second stage is to show whether governments can 
sustain the real undervaluation of the currency through policy actions. For that 
                                                
18 The sign of the coefficient of relative labor productivity at Home (relative to the Foreign) 
country will be positive (negative) if the surge in aggregate labor productivity is explain by shocks 
to tradables (non-tradables). 
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reason, we evaluate the impact of economic policies on the incidence and 
magnitude of RER undervaluation.
3.3 The Behavior of Real Exchange Rate Undervaluations: The Data 
After defining the real exchange rate misalignments, we examine the behavior 
of real exchange rate undervaluations from two different perspective: (a) behavior 
of macroeconomic aggregates during episodes of undervaluation (event analysis), 
and (b) estimating the policy determinants of undervaluations. For both types of 
analysis we use a wide array of explanatory variables. In order to evaluate the 
behavior of selected macroeconomic aggregates around sharp real undervaluation 
episodes, we collect information of a set of macroeconomic indicators that 
comprises the following variables: real GDP growth, growth in real exports, an 
indicator of fiscal discipline, saving rates, private consumption, real domestic 
investment, the CPI inflation rate, the nominal exchange rate, intervention in the 
foreign exchange market and capital controls. Then we examine the ability of 
economic policies to affect the probability and magnitude of RER 
undervaluations. We include policy variables such as exchange rate regimes, 
capital controls, foreign exchange market intervention, trade openness, liability 
dollarization and fiscal discipline. These policy determinants will confirm our 
matrix of variables of interest in the assessment of the policy determinants of 
undervaluations.
Exchange Rate Regimes. We approximate the exchange rate regime de facto in 
place in the country by the database developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
and updated by Ilzetzky, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). These authors have 
developed a new system to classify historical exchange rate regimes. In contrast 
to previous classifications, their extensive database is not only uses of market-
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determined or parallel exchange rates but also develops a natural classification 
algorithm. Specifically, we use the fine classification of Reinhart-Rogoff that 
takes values between 1 and 15 where higher values indicate a higher level of 
flexibility in the exchange rate arrangements in place.
The data on capital controls used in this paper is a binary variable collected 
from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. It takes the value of 1 in the years when restrictions on capital 
account transactions are in place, and 0 otherwise (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 
2003). The typical problem of this type of data is that, although it captures the 
presence of controls, it fails to capture the intensity of the controls imposed. 
As a result, countries with closed capital account may increase the stringency 
of those controls by imposing restrictions on current account transactions, 
multiple exchange rate practices or the surrender of export proceeds while 
countries with an open capital account may still restrict the flow of capital by 
imposing other restrictions on cross-border financial transactions (Chinn and Ito, 
2007). To capture these aspects, we complement the measure mentioned above 
with the inverse of the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness which incorporates 
the different types of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions stated 
above. We multiply the Chinn-Ito index by -1 to capture the presence of different 
types of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. Higher values of this 
new index would imply more strict restrictions on cross-border financial 
operations.
We follow Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) in the construction of the 
foreign exchange market intervention variable. We aim to show whether FOREX 
intervention has a lasting effect on the real exchange rate. Although it has 
traditionally been argued that nominal interventions are unlikely to have a real 
impact, we examine whether FOREX interventions help to sustain misalignments. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) construct a measure of intervention that is 
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not affected by the growth-induced increase in money demand —which in turn 
may lead to either increases in domestic credit or in international reserves. To 
calculate such a measure, we construct first the ratio of reserves to broad money 
(M2) for country c in year y and month m, R2c,y,m,
myc
myc
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and, then, intervention in the FOREX market, Int2, is computed as the average of 
the monthly change in the ratio of reserves to broad money, R2,
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Note that Int2 is positive whenever reserve accumulation exceeds the increase in 
monetary aggregates —thus, implying a strong degree of intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. 
We also consider the extent of trade and financial openness as determinants of 
RER misalignments. Trade openness is proxied as the ratio of real value of 
exports and imports (that is, total trade) to real GDP, and the data is obtained from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Measuring financial 
openness involves data on foreign assets and liabilities from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001, 2007). We construct the ratio of foreign liabilities as a percentage 
of GDP (which include stocks of liabilities in portfolio equity, foreign direct 
investment, debt and financial derivatives) and, for robustness purposes, the ratio 
of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP.  We also assess the role played by the 
composition of capital flows in affecting the ability of the government to sustain 
RER undervaluations. Hence, we break down our measure of financial openness 
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into equity- and loan-related foreign liabilities. While the former includes the 
foreign liability position in foreign direct investment and portfolio equity, the 
latter includes only the debt liability position (i.e. portfolio debt and other 
investments). The same calculation is performed for the ratio of foreign assets and 
liabilities to GDP.
Liability dollarization is measured as the ratio of foreign liabilities of the 
financial sector to money. The data is taken from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) —more specifically, line 26C and Line 34 for foreign 
liabilities of the financial sector and broad money, respectively.  Although this is 
not a direct measure of the extent to which a country’s balance sheet present 
currency mismatches in assets and liabilities, there is a wide availability across 
countries and over time which is attractive for panel data analysis.
Our proxy for fiscal discipline is the central government balance as 
percentage of GDP and the data is obtained from WDI and the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (WEO). Savings, on the other hand, is measured as the ratio of 
gross domestic savings to GDP in local currency units taken from WDI whereas 
private consumption is the ratio of household final consumption expenditures to 
GDP in local currency units from WDI. Finally, export growth is annual 
percentage growth rate of exports of goods and services, gross domestic 
investment is calculated as the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP in local 
currency units, and inflation is the percentage change in consumer price index. All 
the variables mentioned above are constructed using data from the World Bank’s 
WDI.
Chapter 4
Empirical Evidence
This chapter describes the econometric techniques used in the estimation 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate (RER) and the analysis of the dynamics 
of RER misalignments. We first describe the econometric techniques used for 
the estimation of non-stationary time series and panel data sets and present an 
empirical model of real exchange rate misalignments. Next, we present the 
coefficient estimates of the long run RER equation that allows us to calculate 
the RER misalignment (or deviation from the long-run equilibrium). Our long-
run equilibrium RER values would be model dependent; hence, it relies on the 
specification and set of fundamentals included in the analysis —i.e. these 
fundamental are NFAy, Prod and TOT.
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4.1 Econometric Methodology
This sub-section overviews the literature on testing and estimation of non-
stationary time series and panel data models and presents an empirical model 
of RER misalignment behavior.
4.1.1 Stationarity and Cointegration Tests
To estimate the long-run RER equation we are first required to examine 
whether the RER and its fundamentals exhibit a unit root or are stationary 
processes. We conduct unit root tests for time series and panel data sets. In the 
case of time series, we proceeded to apply Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root tests. On the other hand, for panel data series, we implement 
homogeneous panel unit root tests such as Maddala and Wu (1999), Levin, Lin 
and Chu (2002), as well as heterogeneous tests like that of Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003) and Pesaran (2007). 
Analogously, we conduct tests of cointegration developed for time series 
and panel data. Our time series analysis uses the multivariate cointegration 
techniques developed by Johansen (1988, 1991) to estimate cointegrating 
vectors and, hence, characterize the long-run relationship between the RER 
and its fundamentals. In addition to the Johansen methodology, we use the 
Wickens and Breusch methodology (1987) to estimate the error correction 
model (ECM) on a country-by-country basis. This implies simply estimating a 
linear transformation of the ARDL model with an error correction term. One 
of the advantages of this method is that the ECM regression can 
instantaneously provide parameter estimates to examine the extent of short-run 
adjustment to disequilibrium (Banerjee et al, 1993). The Wickens-Breusch 
estimator belongs to the IV estimator family and is an alternative to the Engle-
Granger (1987) estimator. 
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Regarding panel data series, we use homogeneous panel cointegration tests 
developed by McCoskey and Kao (1998), and Kao (1999), and heterogeneous
tests by Pedroni (1999). The estimation of our long run RER regression 
equation is performed using non-stationary time series techniques for 
heterogeneous panels such as the Mean Group Estimator (MGE) by Pesaran, 
Smith and Im (1996) and the Pooled Mean Group Estimatior (PMGE) by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 
The empirical implementation of the model on a large cross-country time-
series sample poses two main challenges. First, although the model defines a 
long-run relationship among the RER and its fundamentals, the RER may not 
always be in equilibrium at every point in time due to imperfections, rigidities 
or regulations. The equilibrium may be achieved gradually in the long run. 
Hence, in the empirical analysis, the process of a short-run adjustment must 
complement the long run equilibrium model.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that countries can differ regarding, for 
instance, market imperfections (e.g. labor or product market rigidities), 
monetary arrangements or different access to the international goods and 
capital markets —and perhaps even in the parameters characterizing the long-
run equilibrium. Thus, it is important to take into account the very likely 
possibility of parameter heterogeneity across countries. We deal with each of 
these two issues in turn. 
As a result, we implement both the ECM and the PMGE techniques to 
provide us with even broader avenues to approach the estimation of the long 
run fundamental RER equation.
4.1.2 Pooled Mean Group (PMG) Estimator
Single-Country Estimation
The challenge that we face is to estimate long- and short-run relationships 
without being able to observe long- and short-run components of the variables 
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involved. Over the last decade or so, a booming cointegration literature has 
focused on the estimation of long-run relationships among I(1) variables 
(Johanssen 1995; Phillips and Hansen 1990). From this literature two common 
misconceptions have been derived: (a) long run relationships exist only in the 
context of cointegration of integrated variables. (b) Standard methods of 
estimation and inference are incorrect. Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran 
(1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) argue against both misconceptions, 
showing how small modifications to standard methods can render consistent 
and efficient estimates of the parameters in a long-run relationship between 
integrated and stationary variables.19 Furthermore, the methods proposed by 
Pesaran et al avoid the need for pre-testing and order-of-integration 
conformability given that they are valid whether or not the variables of interest 
are I(0) or I(1). The main requirements for the validity of this methodology are 
such that: one, there exists a long-run relationship among the variables of 
interest and, another, the dynamic specification of the model be augmented 
such that the regressors are strictly exogenous and the resulting residual is not 
serially correlated. For reasons that will become apparent shortly, Pesaran et al
call their method “an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 20 approach” to 
long-run modeling.
                                               
19 Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran and Shin (1999) propose the 
assumptions and properties of the ARDL method to estimate a long-run relationship. The
standard estimation and inference can be used whether the regressors are stationary or 
integrated. The main assumption is a single long-run relationship between the endogenous and 
forcing variables. It is worth noting that this assumption underlies implicitly the various 
single-equation based estimators of long-run relationships commonly found in the 
cointegration literature. Without such assumption, these estimators would at best identify 
some linear combination of all the long-run relationships present in the data. For consistency
and efficiency the shocks in the dynamic specification has to be serially uncorrelated and the 
forcing variables has to be strictly exogenous. The pre-requisites can be met by augmenting 
sufficiently the lag order of the dynamic regression equation. For practical purposes Pesaran 
and Shin (1999) recommend a two-step procedure while choosing the lag order with a 
consistent information criterion, and then the corresponding error-correction model is 
estimated and tested by standard methods. 
20 The comparison of the asymptotic properties of PMGE and MGE can be put in the general 
trade-off between consistency and efficiency. If the long-run coefficients are equal across 
countries, then the PMGE will be consistent and efficient while the MGE will only be 
consistent. If the long-run coefficients are not equal across countries, then the PMG estimates 
will be inconsistent while the MGE will be still a consistent estimate of the mean of long-run 
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Multi-Country Estimation
Typically, the appropriate sample for the implementation of these 
techniques is characterized by time-series (T) and cross-section (N) 
dimensions of roughly similar magnitude. In such conditions, there are a 
number of alternative methods for multi-country estimation, which allow for 
different degrees of parameter heterogeneity across countries. At one extreme, 
the fully heterogeneous-coefficient model imposes no cross-country parameter 
restrictions and can be estimated on a country-by-country basis— provided the 
time-series dimension of the data is sufficiently large. When the cross-country 
dimension is large, the mean of long- and short-run coefficients across 
countries can be estimated consistently by the un-weighted average of the 
individual country coefficients. This is the MGE introduced by Pesaran, 
Smith, and Im (1996). At the other extreme, the fully homogeneous-
coefficient model requires that all slope and intercept coefficients be equal 
across countries. This is the simple “pooled” estimator.
In ‘between two extremes’, there are a variety of estimators. The “dynamic 
fixed effects” estimator restricts all slope coefficients to be equal across 
countries but allows for different country intercepts. The PMGE introduced by 
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), restricts the long-run coefficients to be the 
same across countries but allows the short-run coefficients (including the 
speed of adjustment) to be country specific. The PMGE also generates 
consistent estimates of the mean of short-run coefficients across countries by 
taking the unweighted average of the individual country coefficients (provided 
that the cross-sectional dimension is large).
                                                                                                                            
coefficients across countries. The long-run homogeneity restrictions can be tested by
Hausman or likelihood ratio tests to compare the PMGE and MGE of the long run 
coefficients. Comparison of the small sample properties of these estimators relies on their 
sensitivity to outliers. In small samples (low T and N) the MGE, being an unweighted 
average, is excessively sensitive to the inclusion of outlying country estimates (for instance 
those obtained with small T). The PMGE performs better in this regard because it produces 
estimates that are similar to weighted averages of the respective country-specific estimates 
where the weights are given according to their precision which is the inverse of their 
corresponding variance-covariance matrix.
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In choosing between these estimators there is a general trade-off between 
consistency and efficiency. Estimators that impose cross-country constraints 
dominate the heterogeneous estimators in terms of efficiency if the restrictions 
are valid. If they are false, however, the restricted estimators are inconsistent. 
In particular, imposing invalid parameter homogeneity in dynamic models 
typically leads to downward-biased estimates of the speed of adjustment 
(Robertson and Symons, 1992; Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
For our purposes, the PMGE offers the best available compromise in the 
search for consistency and efficiency. This estimator is particularly useful 
when the long run is given by country-independent equilibrium conditions 
while the short-run adjustment depends on country characteristics such as 
financial development and relative price flexibility. The PMGE is sufficiently 
flexible to allow for the long-run coefficient homogeneity over only a subset 
of variables and/or countries. 
We use the PMG method21 to estimate the long run relationship which is 
common across countries while allowing for unrestricted country 
heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics. In the PMGE process the 
estimation of the long-run coefficients is jointly estimated across countries 
through a (concentrated) maximum likelihood procedure. The estimation of 
short-run coefficients (including the speed of adjustment), country-specific 
intercepts, and country-specific error variances is estimated on a country-by-
country basis through maximum likelihood with using the estimates of the 
long-run coefficients previously obtained. An important assumption for the 
consistency of our PMG estimates is the independence of the regression 
residuals across countries. In practice, non-zero error covariances usually arise 
from omitted common factors that influence the countries’ ARDL processes.
                                               
21 Please also refer to Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) where the PMGE is developed and 
compared with the MG estimator.
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4.1.3 Empirical Modeling of the Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
We have derived the long-run equilibrium solution for the RER which 
consists of two components in Chapter 2. In the short run the RER and the two 
components may deviate from the long-run equilibrium. We refer to the 
deviation of the RER as its misalignment. Our measure of misalignment in 
logarithms is:
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Wickens and Breusch (1987) show the equivalence of estimates from 
different transformations in the ECM such as the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation with ARDL regressors by Bewley (1979) and Barsden (1989) as 
well as the estimation of the general ECM with OLS by Banerjee, Galbraith 
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and Dolado (1990). The error correction model, as a linear transformation of 
the ARDL, provides the parameters to explain the extent of the short-run 
adjustment to disequilibrium (Banerjee et al. 1993) as we stated above in the 
empirical modeling of RER misalignments.
In order to estimate the ECM modeled we use the following empirical 
model:
ttttt exxqq   )())(1( 11  (4)
where q is the real exchange rate and 
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is the matrix of the RER 
fundamentals. Note that both TOT and Prod are expressed in logs. After 
running the regression (4), we plot  nii 1 coefficients where n is the number of 
countries in our sample (i.e. n = 79). Then we run the second regression with 3 
lags:
tttt qLqLq   1 (5)
4.2 Empirical Assessment
In this section we discuss the empirical results on the long-run RER
equation and the calculation of RER misalignments. We not only show 
evidence on the stochastic properties of the RER and its fundamentals (NFAy, 
Prod and TOT) but also examine the validity of the fundamental RER equation 
as a long-run cointegration relationship. This evidence is presented for both 
time series and panel data series. Finally, we calculate the RER misalignment 
and we depict their evolution across selected countries.
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4.2.1 Unit Roots
Before testing for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between 
RER and its fundamentals, it is required to examine the stochastic properties 
of each series involved in our analysis. Hence, we need to test whether RER, 
the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, relative productivity and the terms of 
trade are stationary or not. We perform this analysis both on time series and on 
panel datasets.
Time Series Unit Roots
Table 1 shows ADF tests for each country in our sample on the (log of the) 
real effective exchange rate (REER) and its fundamentals. For most of the 
countries in our sample, the REER is non-stationary in levels and stationary in 
differences. Hence, the real exchange rate is a I(1) process for most countries. 
Moreover, in most cases the RER fundamentals are stationary in differences 
—that is, NFAy, Prod, and TOT are I(1) process for most countries.
Table 2 summarizes the country-by-country ADF tests presented in Table 
1. Our results fail to reject the null of non-stationarity at the 5% significance 
level for the long level of the REER in more than 90% of the 118 countries. 
We reject the null of unit root in levels for 8% of the sample; hence, RER is 
not stationary in log levels in 92% of the cases at the 5% level of significance.
At the 5% significance level the ADF tests reject the null hypothesis for 
TOT (in log levels) in 12% of the countries. Hence, TOT is non-stationary in 
log levels in 88% of our sample. Prod is stationary in log levels in 6% of our 
sample. For 94% of the countries the Prod series is not stationary in levels. 
NFAy is stationary in log levels in 4% of our sample; therefore, for 96% of the 
countries NFAy is not stationary in levels and has a unit root. For the series in 
differences, we find that, at the 5% significance level, we reject the null 
hypothesis for the REER and its fundamentals in almost all countries (at least 
99% of the countries); hence, they are stationary with expressed in first 
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differences. Combining the evidence presented in levels and first differences, 
for most of our countries, RER and its fundamentals are I(1) processes in 
differences.
Panel Unit Root testing
We conduct both homogeneous panel unit root tests by Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002) and Maddala and Wu (1999) as well as heterogeneous tests by Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Pesaran (2007).
The homogeneous panel unit root tests assume that the AR(1) coefficient 
in regression test is equal across countries while heterogeneous tests address 
the issue of differences in the degree of persistence of the series across 
countries. The evidence is presented in Table 3 and shows the existence of a 
unit root in the panel series of the real exchange rates as well as in the panel 
series of each of its fundamentals. 
Table 3 shows that regardless of the panel unit root test used, 
homogeneous or heterogeneous, we are unable to reject the null of non-
stationary for all the panel data series in (log) levels. Nevertheless, we reject 
the null of unit root for all the panel data series in (log) differences. Hence, the 
panel unit root testing confirms that our series are I(1).
4.2.2 Cointegration Tests
Once we showed that all the series involved in our analysis (REER, NFAy, 
TOT, and productivity differentials) are I(1), we proceed to test whether they 
are cointegrated. To accomplish this task, we implement both time series and 
panel data cointegration tests. Note that for robustness checks, we will use 
different proxies for productivity such as the relative index of traded to non-
traded productivity as well as including the productivity of each sector 
separately. 
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Time Series Cointegration Test: the Trace Test (Johansen, 1988, 1991)
We perform the multivariate time-series cointegration analysis of REER, 
NFAy, TOT, and the productivity differential. In the presence of more than 2 
variables, there is the possibility of the existence of more than one 
cointegrating relationship. The trace and maximum eigenvalue (-max) tests 
indicate whether there is cointegration and, if so, whether there is more than 
one cointegrating relationship. To test for cointegration we follow the 
methodology developed by Johansen (1988, 1991) and compute the trace test
that examines the number of cointegrating vectors within the vector of 
variables. 
Table 4 reports the trace tests of cointegration for the 79 countries of our 
sample from 1970 to 2005. The optimal lag of the associated VECM model is 
selected using the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) —i.e. we 
choose the lag that minimizes the information criterion. We test for the 
existence of multivariate cointegration using the Johansen methodology in the 
vector [REER NFAy TOT Prod]. The procedure is sequential and tests for the 
null of: (a) no cointegration (r=0), (b) at most 1 cointegrating vectors (r 1), 
(c) at most 2 cointegrating vectors (r2), and (d) at most 3 cointegrating vector 
(r 3). Hence, for most countries there is evidence of cointegration, and in 
some cases, there is more than one cointegrating relationship.
Table 5 summarizes the information on the computed Trace Tests for each 
country as presented in Table 4. We report the percentage of countries in our 
sample where we reject the null hypothesis and r is the number of vectors of 
cointegration. At the 10% significance level, 86% of the countries are able to 
reject the null of no cointegration (r0); therefore, there is 1 vector of 
cointegration for 86% of the countries. For 28% of our sample we reject the 
null that there is at most 1 vector of cointegration (r1). Hence, there are 2 
vectors of cointegration for 28% of our sample.
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Panel Cointegration Tests
In addition to time series cointegration tests a la Johansen, we compute 
homogeneous and heterogeneous panel cointegration tests for RER and its 
fundamentals. The tests applied are mostly residual-based tests of panel 
cointegration: some of these tests are homogeneous (McCoskey and Kao, 
1998; Kao, 1999) and others allow some degree of heterogeneity either in the 
variance-covariance matrix or estimated parameters across countries (Pedroni, 
1999). The results for the full sample of countries are reported in Table 6. The 
evidence shows that the null of no cointegration is rejected regardless of the 
panel cointegration test used. There is a cointegrating relationship between 
RER and its fundamentals in the panel data.
4.3 Estimating the Long Run Fundamental Real Exchange Rate Equation
This sub-section discusses the estimation of the long run RER equation 
using time series and panel data techniques for non-stationary series.
4.3.1 Estimating the Fundamental Real Exchange Rate Equation
Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates for the long-run real exchange 
rate equation for the 79 countries in our sample from 1971 to 2005. According 
to the model outlined in Chapter 2, we expect a positive relationship between 
REER and productivity (Balassa-Samuelson effect) as well as between REER 
and terms of trade. That is, permanent shocks that lead to productivity surges 
in the traded sector and an improvement in the terms of trade would lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. These predictions are consistent with 
De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) where it is expected a positive 
relationship between permanent surges in productivity and the RER as well as 
between favorable terms of trade shocks and the RER. The model in Chapter 2 
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also predicts a positive relationship between the ratio of NFA and the real 
exchange rate in the long run. This is consistent with the transfer effects 
predicted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), where a transfer of external 
wealth from the foreign to the domestic country will appreciate the real 
exchange rate in the long-run. 
The country-by-country estimates of the long run real exchange rate 
equation are consistent with predictions of the theoretical model. The 
estimated long run coefficient of TOT is approximately significant in 90% of 
the sample. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the ratio of net 
foreign assets to GDP as well as those for productivity differentials are 
statistically significant in almost 70% of the countries in the sample.
Regarding the sign of those coefficients, we should point out that the 
country estimates for the relationship between TOT and the real exchange rate 
is positive in almost 80% of the cases. We also find a positive coefficient for 
the ratio of NFA to GDP in almost 50% of the countries. Finally, we 
approximately find that 40% of the country estimates yield a positive 
relationship between real exchange rate and productivity differentials. We 
should point out that the relationship between real exchange rates and 
productivity differentials –as predicted by the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis– may not hold if the law of one price does not hold. A strand of the 
literature suggests that the distribution sector may play a role in influencing 
the real exchange rate. Earlier in the literature, it was acknowledge the 
relevance of the distribution sector in affecting the RER through the “service 
content of the consumer price of goods” (Dornbusch, 1989). Later, Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000) argued that distribution sector may explain the relatively 
slow mean reversion in exchange rates. In a highly stylized model, 
MacDonald and Ricci (2001) find that surges in productivity and in the 
competitiveness of the distribution sector (relative to that of foreign countries) 
lead to a RER appreciation (as predicted by Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson). 
However, this is not the case when the distribution sector either considered in 
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the non-traded sector or when this sector is used only to deliver final goods to 
the consumer. In short, the distribution sector may allow for violations of the 
law of one price thus rendering the effect of productivity on the real exchange 
rate either positive or negative.
4.3.2 Estimating Homogeneous Panel Data Models with Non-stationary 
Data
In Table 8 we present the estimates of the panel cointegration techniques 
developed by Kao (1999) and Phillips and Moon (1999) —the dynamic least 
squares (DOLS) and the fully-modified OLS (FM-OLS) for panel data, 
respectively. Columns [1] and [2] include the ratio of traded to non-traded 
productivity while columns [3] and [4] include only productivity in the traded 
sector. We include only productivity in the non-traded sector in columns [5] 
and [6] and add productivity in traded and non-traded sectors in columns [7] 
and [8], separately. Our discussion of the results would be limited to the 
dynamic least squares estimation given that, according to Kao (1999), DOLS
estimates are empirically more efficient than FM-OLS ones.
Column [2] shows the estimation results of our preferred specification. 
The coefficient of NFAy is negative but statistically not significant while the 
coefficient of both TOT and Prod are positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Hence, favorable shifts in TOT and relative productivity surges 
in the traded sector are forces that lead to an appreciation of RER. This result 
is consistent with the predictions of our model. When we add separately traded 
sector productivity (column [4]) and non-traded productivity (column [6]), 
these coefficients are positive and significant. However, while adding both in 
the regression (column [8]), only the coefficient of productivity in the trade 
sector remains statistically different from zero. This implies that the result may 
be driven by the impact of the surges in productivity of the traded sector. 
These regression estimates assume that the coefficient estimates of our long 
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run RER equation are constant across countries. To prove whether this 
assumption is valid or not we will test the homogeneity assumption across our 
long-run coefficients.
4.3.3 Heterogeneous Panel Data Techniques: the Pooled Mean Group 
Estimator (PMGE)
We estimate the ARDL model for REER on its fundamentals using MGE
(Pesaran, 1995), PMGE (Pesaran et al., 1999), and the dynamic fixed effects22.
We estimate this relationship both for the full sample of countries (see Table 
9) and for dividing the sample by level of development in Table 10.23
We also consider partitioning the sample of countries by the nature of their 
export structure. Groups of countries that are major exporters of specific 
categories of goods are by a major export category. This category accounts for
50% or more of total exports of goods and services.24 Our regressions are with 
major exporters of non-fuel primary goods25, major exporters of fuel (mainly 
oil)26 and the group of primary exporters (PRIM) listed among major exporters 
of fuel and non-fuel primary products.
Full Sample of Countries
Overall if we impose no restrictions, only TOT is significant. With the 
PMG regression the ECM equation shows significant estimates; hence, we 
                                               
22 We note while MGE does not impose any restriction on the long-run coefficients of the 
RER equation, PMGE imposes common long-run effects across countries. The fixed effect 
(FE) estimator constrains all of the slope coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix of 
the error terms to be homogeneous across countries.
23 The sample of Asian countries includes Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
24 We consider the following categories: non-fuel primary exporters (SITC 0,1,2,4, plus 68) 
and fuel exporters (SITC 3). We also consider the group of primary exporters as a group 
(PRIM) which is the sum of the 2 groups mentioned before.
25 The sample of major exporters of non-fuel primary goods include Argentina, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Chile, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, 
Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Togo, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
26 This group includes Algeria, Rep. of Congo, Iran, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
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reject the null hypothesis of no long run relationship with REER, TOT, NFAy
and Prod. The average speed of adjustment is faster with the MGE (-0.360) 
than with the PMGE (-0.171). According to the MGE results, on average, TOT
and NFAy show a positive and statistically significant coefficient similar to the 
case in the PMGE. These cross-country average long-run coefficients by mean 
group are larger than those by PMG. 
The Hausman test27 of the null hypothesis performed both variable by 
variable and jointly is not statistically significant (i.e. PMG=MG). The results 
show that there are no systematic differences between PMGE and MGE of our 
long-run RER equation. This evidence suggests that assuming homogeneity 
across countries for the long-run coefficients of the RER equation is a valid 
assumption. There are no systematic differences between mean group and 
fixed effects estimates.
Industrial and Developing Countries
In industrial countries the PMGE shows that TOT and NFAy have a 
positive and significant coefficient (as expected by the theoretical model) 
whereas Prod shows a puzzlingly negative and significant coefficient. The 
significant ECM coefficient suggests that there is a significant error correction 
mechanism and that approximately 17% of the deviations from the ERER 
would be eliminated next period. TOT has a positive impact on RER in the 
short run with a coefficient of 0.117.
For developing countries the PMGE results show that TOT has a positive 
and significant coefficient while the coefficient of NFAy is positive although 
not statistically significant. Prod still shows a negative and significant 
coefficient. The existence of a significant error correction mechanism
confirms that approximately 21% of the deviations from the ERER would be 
eliminated next period. TOT has a positive impact on RER in the short run.
                                               
27 This test examines whether the differences in the coefficient estimates by the MGE and the 
PMGE are statistically similar or different.
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The MGE results in industrial countries find that, on average, TOT and 
NFAy show a positive and statistically significant coefficient similar to the
PMGE. These cross-country average long-run coefficients of mean group are 
larger than those of PMG. The ECM coefficient is also negative and
significant, and it is more doubles than the one obtained by PMG. Movements 
in its fundamentals do not seem to affect RER in the short run. The MGE
results in developing countries find qualitatively similar results to ones in the 
full sample. The average coefficient for TOT is positive and statistically 
significant similar to the magnitude of its coefficient by PMG. The average 
ECM coefficient is negative and significant and it is larger than the one 
obtained by PMG.  Movements in TOT lead to a real appreciation in the short 
run.
Emerging Market Economies and Asia
The results of PMG in EMEs are also qualitatively similar to those 
obtained for industrial economies. We find a robust positive relationship 
between RER and TOT as well as between RER and the NFAy. The 
relationship between RER and Prod is negative and significant. The ECM
coefficient in EMEs is significant and larger than that of industrial economies. 
This implies that the speed of reversion to the ERER is faster among EMEs 
than among industrial economies. The short-run shifts of its fundamentals do 
not seem to affect RER. The PMGE of Asian countries show that only the 
NFAy has a positive and significant coefficient (as expected by the theoretical 
model) whereas Prod and TOT show negative coefficients. The significant 
ECM coefficient suggests that approximately 20% of the deviations from 
ERER would be eliminated next period. TOT has a positive impact on RER in 
the short run.
The MGE in EMEs show that the coefficient estimates for all 
fundamentals are positive (as expected by theory) but only TOT is significant.
Hence, the ECM is, on average, faster than the one computed by PMG. The 
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mean group estimates for Asia yield average positive coefficients for NFAy
and Prod with the latter coefficient being statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The ECM is negative, significant and higher than the one obtained by
PMG. The TOT shifts affect RER in the short run.
Countries Classified by Major Export Goods
We run the PMGE model for PRIM and non-PRIM. The results for both 
sub samples are qualitatively similar to those found in a full sample as the 
coefficient of TOT and NFAy is positive and significant (as expected in the 
model) while the coefficient of Prod is negative and significant.
Approximately 20% of the deviations from ERER in PRIM would be 
eliminated next period while so would the ones in non-PRIM with 
approximately 16%. Movements in the fundamentals do not affect RER in the 
short run in either PRIM or non-PRIM.
With the MGE, on average, for both PRIM and non-PRIM the coefficient 
of TOT is positive and significant while the coefficient of NFAy and Prod is 
negative although not significant. The ECM is negative, significant and more 
doubles than the one by PMG. Shifts do not affect RER in the short run in 
either PRIM or non-PRIM.
Additional regression is for major exporters of non-fuel primary products. 
We exclude the major exporters of oil from our sample. Only the coefficient of 
TOT has the expected positive sign and statistically significant with the 
PMGE. The significant ECM coefficient suggests that approximately 20% of 
the deviations from ERER would be eliminated next period; hence, shifts in 
the fundamentals do not matter in the short run. We found no statistically 
significant fundamental with the MGE.
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4.4 Analysis of RER Misalignments
4.4.1 Calculating Real Exchange Rate Misalignments
To calculate the RER misalignment we use first the estimated 
cointegrating vector (normalized in RER) obtained by Johansen (1988, 1991) 
and Johansen and Juselius (1992). Then we multiply the long run coefficients 
of TOT, NFAy and Prod in Table 7 with the permanent values of these 
variables which are the trend component of the series using the band-pass 
filter (Baxter and King, 1999)28. RER misalignments are computed as 
deviations of the actual RER from its equilibrium value.29
We report the charts of some selected economies for RER misalignments
that signal not only undervaluation episodes but also currency crisis (see 
Figure 1.1-1.3).
China. We observe that the real value of the Remnibi has been 
undervalued by more than one-third (72 %) in 2005. This result confirms the 
findings of Chinn et al (2007) on the RER undervaluation in China and its 
tendency of keeping the RER undervalued in order to accelerate their 
economic growth (Cheung et al, 2007).
Argentina. We first observe a 32 % drop in the RER misalignment in 2002 
due to the economic crisis. The government had to abandon the convertibility 
system (1-to-1 hard peg to the US dollar). After the currency crisis, Argentina 
has followed a more aggressive activist exchange rate policy, thus keeping its 
currency undervalued in real terms. Finally, the overvaluation of the RER by 
                                               
28 Linear (or quadratic) trend models as well as first-differences do not produce desirable 
business-cycle filters while moving-average analysis and HP filter produces a reasonable 
approximation in filtering. The problem with the latter is that it may be biased towards zero 
deviations from the trend at the end of period. The advantage of the band-pass filter is that it 
passes through components of the time series with periodic fluctuations between six and thirty 
two quarters while removing components at higher and lower frequencies. These cut-off 
points are selected using the business cycle analysis at the NBER. The band-pass filter 
produces more flexible and easier to implement more accurate approximation to the optimal 
filter.
29 Note that: positive (negative) deviations from the equilibrium represent an overvaluation 
(undervaluation) of RER.
Chapter 4: Empirical Evidence 79
the end of the 1990s preceded the currency crisis and the fixation of the RER
(currency board or convertibility system).
Other Countries. The Brazilian real experienced its currency crisis in 1999 
as you can see the 7% fall in its misalignment while they reached its historic 
low of 4 Brazilian real per US dollar in 2002. We can also see these drops in 
RER misalignments before Asian crisis such as a 25% drop in Korea and 
about 50% in Thailand in 1998. In Mexican crisis its misalignment started to 
drop in 1994 (this happened in December) then a 28% drop in 1995.
4.4.2 Error Correction Modeling of RER Misalignments
We present the estimates of equation (4) for our sample of 79 countries 
using the Wickens and Breusch (1979) methodology. Our country estimates of 
the error correction coefficient, , are summarized in the histogram depicted 
in Figure 2.1. Most of the estimated values of  are between 0.4 and 0.8 and 
the mode of the distribution is around 0.7.30 This implies that, for most 
countries, 30% of the RER disequilibrium in the previous period would be 
corrected in the current period. Figure 2.2 plots the values of  coefficient 
which fluctuate from 0.0857 to 0.997. For example, while Singapore shows 
almost immediate correction of RER disequilibrium, the speed to adjustment 
is fairly low in Congo.
Table 11 shows the ECM estimations for eight (8) selected countries –i.e. 
Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
and South Africa. The selected countries have a statistically significant 
negative coefficient for lagged RER between 0.3 and 0.8. South Africa is the 
only exception: the RER reversion coefficient is statistically negligible. Mean 
reversion of RER is faster in China, The  coefficient is significant and equal 
                                               
30According to the mode of distribution, the half life of RER deviations from the equilibrium 
is equal to  
 





7.01
5.0ln
31.2 .
Chapter 4: Empirical Evidence 80
to -0.8, and higher in absolute value to that of Argentina (-0.66). In addition, 
short-term TOT and productivity fluctuations —as measured by the estimated 
coefficients of the log differences of TOT and Prod— have a positive impact 
on log difference of RER in Argentina. This implies that these temporary 
shocks lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency. In China, on the other 
hand, only short-run movements in NFAs may lead to exchange rate 
appreciation. Most of selected countries show negative coefficient in lagged 
productivity differentials except China, South Africa and Germany which have 
a positive coefficient and Germany’s coefficient is statistically significant.
Most of the selected countries show a positive coefficient in lagged TOT 
except China which has a negative and significant coefficient. Only China has 
a negative coefficient of lagged NFAy which is statistically significant. Other 
seven countries have positive coefficient estimates for the difference in TOT. 
Five countries show statistically significant coefficients while only China 
shows negative insignificant coefficient. In the most of countries temporary 
positive TOT shocks may appreciate the RER in the short run. The
coefficients of difference in NFAy and Prod are mixed.
Figure 2.3 reports the histogram of the standard error of α coefficients. We 
observe that most of the standard errors fluctuate between 0.1 and 0.2 and that 
the mode of the distribution is around 0.125. It seems to be normally 
distributed. Therefore, most of estimated α coefficients are statistically 
significant.
Next we run a vector autoregression (VAR) model for the difference of 
RER on lagged RER, lagged TOT, lagged NFAy, lagged Prod, difference of 
TOT, difference of NFAy and difference of Prod. Figures 2.4 through 2.7 
depict the response of change in RER to impulses/shocks to lagged RER, 
lagged fundamentals and change in fundamentals for the full sample in 
equation (4). Figures 2.4 and 2.5 present the impulse-response function (IRF) 
of changes in RER on the different determinants for Argentina whereas 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 present analogous results for China.
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Figure 2.4 shows the response of the subsequent changes in RER to shocks 
to lagged RER and lagged fundamentals in period t. In response to the shock 
to NFAy the RER depreciates with a maximum decline occurring after period 
2. The response of RER to period 8 is below -0.3 and not statistically 
significant. Surges in productivity, on the other hand, lead to a small real 
appreciation of the currency in the short run after period 2 with a statistically 
significance. Shocks that lead to a deviation from the equilibrium of lagged 
RER have a large initial impact up to the first period. Then it depreciates and 
statistically insignificant. Shocks to terms of trade shock appreciate the RER
and the response is statistically significant.
Figure 2.5 shows the response of the changes in the RER to transitory 
shocks in the fundamentals. In response to a transitory shock to NFAy the RER
depreciates with a maximum decline occurring in period 4. The response of 
RER to a one-standard deviation increase in NFAy is below -0.1 and 
insignificant. Temporary surges in productivity (proxied by a shock to changes 
in Prod) lead to a real appreciation of the currency in the short run (up to 
period 4) that is apparently insignificant. Temporary TOT shock has a large 
initial impact on RER. After generating an immediate (and statistically 
significant) appreciation of the domestic currency in real terms, the effect 
fades out after period 1, thus converging to a negligible impact in longer 
horizons.
Figure 2.6 shows the response of the subsequent changes in the RER to 
shocks to lagged RER and lagged fundamentals in period t. In response to the 
shock to NFAy, we observe that the RER depreciates with a maximum decline 
occurring after period 2. It seems to be statistically significant. Temporary 
surges in lagged Prod lead to a small depreciation of the currency in the short 
run after period 2 with a statistically insignificance. Temporary lagged RER
shock has a large initial impact up to the first period. Then it depreciates up to 
period 3, appreciates up to the 5th period and then fluctuates with a 2-period 
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cycle. It seems to be statistically insignificant. Temporary shock to lagged 
TOT appreciates gradually the RER and statistically significant.
Figure 2.7 shows the response of the changes in the RER to transitory 
shocks in the fundamentals. In response to a transitory shock to NFAs the 
RER depreciates overall. It seems to be statistically significant. Temporary 
surges in Prod lead to a real appreciation of the currency in the short run up to 
period 1 and fluctuate each period. Overall it declines and is not statistically 
significant. Temporary TOT have a small negative initial impact on the RER
and fluctuate with a small degree of appreciation overall.
In conclusion, this chapter estimated the equilibrium exchange rate (and, 
hence, calculated the RER misalignment) using econometric techniques that 
account for full heterogeneity as well as partial heterogeneity. Estimates using 
time series cointegration techniques such as Johansen (1988, 1991) and 
Johansen and Juselius address the issue of full heterogeneity in the long-run 
coefficient estimates of the real exchange rate equation across countries.  On 
the other hand, partial heterogeneity across countries is taken into account 
when using the ‘Pooled Mean Group’ estimator (PMGE), where the long-run 
coefficients of the RER equation are assumed invariant across countries 
whereas the short-term coefficients of adjustment (associated to the error 
correction model) are heterogeneous –i.e. due to different frictions existing 
across countries. Note that we use also use a fully heterogeneous panel data 
technique, the Mean Group estimator (MGE). However, since the 
homogeneity restriction of the long-run coefficients hold, the PMGE should 
outperform the MGE.
We should note that even if the PMGE homogeneity tests yield not 
significant differences in the long-run estimates across countries, inflated 
standard errors can lead to a failure to reject the null of homogeneity. Hence, 
time series cointegration techniques may be able to do a better job in tracking 
the evolution of the real exchange rate. 
Chapter 5
Characterizing Undervaluations: An 
Event-Analysis Approach
This chapter presents a more heuristic approach to characterizing the 
behavior of macroeconomic variables during, before and after episodes of 
undervaluation. First, we calculate simple averages during periods of 
undervaluation as well as two (2) years before and after for all countries —
and, also for developing countries— for the real macroeconomic aggregates 
such as GDP, exports, saving, investments, fiscal balance and private 
consumption, as well as nominal and financial variables like inflation, nominal 
exchange rate, intervention in FOREX market and capital controls. Second, 
we conduct an event analysis by performing regressions on the 
macroeconomic variables mentioned above on dummies that identify windows 
that include the start of an undervaluation episode, the period before and after. 
These panel regressions control for country and time-specific effects in order 
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to account for unobserved idiosyncratic and global components that may 
influence our results.
5.1 Identification of Undervaluation Episodes
We identify the different real exchange rate (RER) undervaluation 
episodes and we report the results in Table 12. How do we construct these 
episodes? We first create a binary variable that takes the value of 1 whenever 
the real exchange rate is undervalued and otherwise zero. We consider 
consecutive years of undervaluation in one episode if there is no significant 
recovery of more than half from the start of the undervaluation (i.e. the initial 
point of the event).
We define a window for the undervaluation episode that considers the two 
(2) years before the undervaluation episode as the “before” scenario, and the 2 
years post-undervaluation as the “after” scenario. If the undervaluation 
episode starts in the 2000s or near the end of our sample period and continues 
in 2005 (or, say, the undervaluation does not disappear in 2005), then we call 
it an “ongoing episode”. If the episodes seem to start before 1971 (the start of 
our estimation period), then we call it “pre-existent episode”.
We should point out that we use the following labels in the figures 
reported below: ‘GDP’ stands for real GDP growth rate, ‘Exp’ is export 
growth, ‘Fiscal’ is the ratio of government balance to GDP, ‘Savings’ is 
growth in savings, ‘Priv Con’ is growth in private consumption to GDP, 
‘Investment’ denotes growth in real investment, ‘Inflation’ is the annual CPI 
inflation, ‘NER’ is the change in nominal exchange rate, ‘Intervention’
represents the foreign exchange market intervention (multiplied by 10 for 
scale purposes in the figures), and ‘Control’ denotes the capital controls. For 
purposes of visual analysis, the proxy of capital controls, ‘Control’, is divided 
by 10 when used in the graphic analysis of the full sample of countries as well 
as that of developing countries. On the other hand, when the analysis is 
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undertaken for the sample of industrial countries only, this variable is divided 
by 100.
All Completed Episodes of Undervaluation for ALL Countries
Figure 3.1 depicts the average across episodes of the rate of growth of real 
GDP as well as its demand components for the full sample of countries. We 
find that real GDP growth accelerates during and after the occurrence of an 
undervaluation. Export growth, on the other hand, increases during 
undervaluation episodes but slows down in the aftermath. In fact, export 
growth prior to the undervaluation is higher than in the aftermath.  This 
behavior is similar to that of the changes in the value of exports for industrial 
countries leading up to a revaluation of the currency (Eichengreen et al. 1995). 
An analogous behavior is displayed by the saving rate. This is consistent with 
the evidence found in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) where under-
valuations of the currency are conducive to higher saving rates (see Figure 
3.1).
Our event analysis is consistent with a part of the story by Eichengreen et 
al. 1995 as weakening the domestic currency during the undervaluation 
episodes is through competitive devaluation supported by the FOREX, as the 
intervention prior to the revaluation (or appreciation) is positive (the monetary 
authority is buying the foreign currencies). For instance, the data shows 
(speculative) foreign exchange market pressures to revaluate the domestic 
currency in Argentina and China. As Eichengreen et al. (1995) point out, there 
is a faster export growth, a rapid increase in inflation, and then more 
devaluation in our event analysis dataset. As a result, stronger export growth 
and a strong domestic demand (supported by an increase in savings and in 
private consumption and stimulating investment growth). Those improvements
accelerate the domestic output growth. The devaluation makes trade deficits 
narrow and helps accumulate reserves, and then, fiscal and monetary policy 
remain tight.
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Other components of the GDP from the demand side grow at a faster pace 
in the aftermath of the event. For instance, the rate of growth of private 
consumption and investment accelerates significantly in the periods 
subsequent to the start of the undervaluation episode. This finding implies that 
the pick-up in growth observed after the start of the undervaluation episode 
may be partly driven by higher growth in the domestic demand –and, more 
specifically, faster growth in private consumption and investment.
Finally, we are unable to find any systematic pattern of behavior for the 
government budget balance during undervaluation episodes. We should note 
that Eichengreen et al. (1995) is also unable to find any systematic and 
significant pattern of behavior prior, during or after either large devaluation or 
large revaluation episodes.
Figure 3.2 depicts the behavior of variables associated to monetary policy 
such as inflation, the nominal exchange rate, intervention in the FOREX 
market and capital controls. 
During undervaluation episodes from our misalignments dataset, the 
domestic currency depreciates in real terms (thus, implying a nominal 
depreciation that is faster than the increase in the domestic-foreign inflation 
differential). Eichengreen et al. (1995) finds that the domestic currency of 
industrial countries prior to a revaluation episode is relatively weaker relative 
to other periods. 
We can also infer from Figure 3.2 that the real depreciation of the 
domestic currency is supported by the purchase of foreign currency in the 
FOREX market by the monetary authority (i.e. active exchange rate policy). In 
fact, foreign exchange market intervention is positive (purchases of foreign 
currency) before the undervaluation and it becomes negative (sales of foreign 
currency) during and after the event. This injection of currency prior to the 
event leads to a subsequent hike in CPI inflation. The monetary authority tries 
afterwards to control inflation by reducing the money supply through sales of 
foreign currency.
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Next we discuss the behavior of key macroeconomic variables for all 
completed episodes of undervaluation for the sample of developing countries 
and that of industrial countries. We examine whether the behavior of both 
groups of countries differ during these episodes.
Developing Countries
Figure 4.1 reports the evolution of GDP and its components from the 
demand side for the sample of developing countries. When we analyze al 
“completed” episodes of undervaluation for developing countries, we find that 
growth in real GDP rises at the start of the undervaluation episode and it even 
accelerates afterwards in an analogous fashion as that observed for all 
countries (see Figure 4.1). The faster growth in GDP during and after the 
undervaluation is correlated with the acceleration in private consumption
before, during and after the undervaluation episode while investment increases 
during the event and remains almost unchanged afterwards. Again, we find 
that the fiscal balance does not change systematically during these episodes.
So there is no evidence of tight fiscal policies either in the run up or after the 
beginning of the undervaluation.
In Figure 4.2, we observe that when the monetary authority purchases 
foreign currency (prior to the undervaluation episode), the nominal exchange 
rate depreciates. Hence, depreciation is supported by consistent intervention of 
the monetary authority in the foreign exchange market (i.e. buying foreign 
currency) to induce the undervaluation episode. Afterwards, the Central Bank 
shifts from purchasing to selling foreign currency. Inflation, on the other 
hand, increases during the event of an undervaluation –partly due to the 
injection of liquidity thanks to the (not fully sterilized) purchase of dollars. 
CPI inflation decreases in the aftermath (although it is still higher than 
previous inflation of the event). Finally, capital controls show no systematic 
behavior ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ the undervaluation episode for 
developing countries.
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Industrial Countries
Figure 5.1 shows that GDP drops during undervaluation episodes for 
industrial countries. This result is consistent with the finding that GDP growth 
remains subdued in the run-up to a revaluation among industrial countries (see 
Eichengreen et al. 1995). Interestingly, it shows a V-shaped pattern that is 
typically the norm for event-analysis of currency crisis (instead of the inverted
V-shape expected by the mercantilists). This result may need to distinguish 
between episodes of undervaluation triggered in the aftermath of currency 
crisis vis-à-vis episodes where the monetary authority is trying to lean against 
the wind during episodes of significant capital flows to the country or 
pressures towards appreciation of the currency.
The pick-up in growth in the aftermath of this episode appears to be 
mainly driven by higher private consumption and rising investment growth. 
Note that while private consumption increases during the episodes and even 
more after the episodes, growth in investment declines during the 
undervaluation episodes and increases in the aftermath of undervaluation 
episodes even more than before the episode starts.
Export growth increases during episodes of undervaluation and slows down in 
the aftermath. The same pattern of behavior is observed for the saving rate. 
Regarding the government budget balance, we are unable to find a significant 
difference in the fiscal position before, during or after the undervaluation 
episode.
In Figure 5.2, we observe a depreciation of the domestic currency and a 
slight decline in CPI inflation during the undervaluation episode relative to the 
period prior to the undervaluation. This evidence is consistent with the slight 
decline in inflation prior to a large revaluation of the currency (Eichengreen et 
al. 1995). Note that although nominal exchange rates appreciate even more 
after the undervaluation episodes, inflation still decreases after the event.
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5.2 Test Statistics for Event-Analysis Database
To test statistically whether macroeconomic variables exhibit different 
behavior before, during or after an undervaluation episode, we conduct the 
event analysis. We run regressions for these macroeconomic variables on 
dummies that capture the undervaluation episode as well as the windows 
before and after the event. We also control for country and time-specific 
effects in these regressions. More specifically, we regress the macroeconomic 
variables on the annual undervaluation event before 1, 2 and 3 years (T-1, T-2, 
and T-3), during (T) and after 1, 2 and 3 years (T+1, T+2, and T+3) using the 
sample of 79 countries for the period 1971-2005. We conduct the event 
analysis for the following variables: the growth rate of GDP, export growth 
rate, the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP, the ratio of savings to GDP, the ratio 
of private consumption to GDP, the ratio of investment to GDP, the CPI 
inflation, nominal exchange rates, FOREX market intervention and capital 
controls. Table 13 through 22 present these regressions that characterize the 
behavior of the variables mentioned above during undervaluation episodes. 
These regressions account for country and time effects and the regression 
analysis is conducted for “all episodes” and for “completed episodes” only.
Economic Growth. Table 13 shows growth regression of GDP growth on 
the window dummies and controlling for country effects (FE) and for country 
and time effects (TI). Overall the coefficient of time T (0 year) of the 
undervaluation episode is negative (positive) if growth is lower (higher) than 
in tranquil years. If the coefficient estimates in period T-1, T-2, and T-3 are 
negative (positive) and even lower (higher) than that of time T, then growth 
was lower (higher) before the episode. The same can be applied to the 
aftermath of the undervaluation –say, in period T+1, T+2, and T+3.
We find that the coefficient for the year 0 dummy is negative but 
statistically insignificant which implies that the growth rate during the 
undervaluation is similar to the average growth outside the undervaluation 
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window [T-3, …, T., …, T+3]. Growth in the year before the undervaluation 
episode starts (T-1) is lower than when it triggers (T). We also find that 
growth starts slowing down after 3 years.
The behavior of growth for developing countries around RER 
undervaluation episodes is similar to that of the full sample of countries: 
average growth during undervaluations is similar to the average of non-
undervaluation years and higher than the periods before and after. Growth in 
the period of undervaluation is smaller than the average growth outside this 
event window. While controlling for fixed effects, the growth rate of GDP is 
smaller in the second and third year after the undervaluation than that 
registered in year 0. 
Export Growth. Table 14 shows the regression of export growth on the 
undervaluation “window dummies” and controlling for FE and TI. As 
explained above in the case of the growth regressions, if the coefficient of time 
T (0 year) of the undervaluation episode is negative (positive) if export growth 
is lower (higher) than in those years. If the coefficient estimates in period T-1, 
T-2, T-3, T+1, T+2 and T+3 are negative (positive) and even lower (higher) 
than that of time T, then export growth was lower (higher) before the episode.
Table 14 shows that the coefficient for the year 0 dummy is positive but 
statistically not significant for all episodes –except for the sample of industrial 
countries in the post-Bretton Woods period. This implies that export growth 
during the undervaluation is higher than the average growth outside the 
undervaluation window [T-3, …, T., …, T+3]. For the sample of completed 
episodes, our results show that growth in period T-3 is lower than that of 
period T for all countries and developing countries. The rest of the coefficients 
are mostly negative and statistically insignificant.
The behavior of export growth around RER undervaluation episodes 
among developing countries is similar to that of the full sample of countries 
for the completed episodes: average growth during undervaluation is similar to 
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the average of non-undervaluation years and higher than the periods before 
and after. However, the full sample results obtained when analyzing ALL 
episodes yields opposite results to those obtained when examining only 
completed episodes. Export growth in the period of undervaluation for the 
completed episodes is smaller than the average growth outside this event 
window while that of all episodes is larger than its average growth outside the 
event window. While controlling for fixed effects, the growth rate of export is 
smaller in the 1st and 2nd years after the undervaluation than that registered in 
year 0. 
Fiscal Balance. The regression of fiscal discipline on the undervaluation 
dummies and the 7-year window is presented in Table 15. We also include in 
our regressions FE as well as TI. When we observe the regression results for 
the full sample of countries and the sample of developing countries (either all 
or only completed episodes), we fail to find a significant coefficient. This 
implies that the budget balance of the Central Government (as % of GDP) 
does not show a pattern of behavior different from the average observed 
outside the undervaluation window [T-3, …, T., …, T+3]. 
The fiscal balance among industrial countries is slightly higher (1.2 
percentage points of GDP) in year 0 relative to the average in periods outside 
the “event window.” We also show that before the undervaluation. The 
coefficient is positive and significant but smaller than that of year 0. Finally, 
the coefficient in the aftermath of the undervaluation is not significant in most 
cases –except for year T+2 when controlling for fixed effects only. As a result, 
fiscal balances are larger before and during the undervaluation and fiscal 
discipline become more lax in the aftermath. 
Saving Rate. In Table 16, we find that the coefficient of year 0 dummy 
(time T of the undervaluation episode) is positive and statistically significant 
for the full sample and developing countries, thus implying that the saving rate 
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during the undervaluation is different and higher than that of GDP outside the 
undervaluation window [T-3, …, T., …, T+3]. The savings rate at the start of 
the undervaluation episode (T) reaches its peak throughout the event and 
gradually slows down in the aftermath of the undervaluation episode.
While examining the completed episodes for our sample of industrial 
countries, the coefficient for the year 0 dummy is negative and statistically 
significant –which implies that the saving rate during the undervaluation is 
lower than the average ratio of savings to GDP outside the event-window [T-3, 
…, T., …, T+3]. The coefficients before the undervaluation period are 
negative and large in absolute value that that of year 0. Hence, the fiscal 
balance improves in the run up to the undervaluation period. Afterwards, the 
coefficients are mostly positive and not statistically significant.
In sum, we find that saving rates for developing countries increase prior, 
during and a year after the start of the undervaluation episode. On the other 
hand, industrial countries have a smaller saving rate prior to the 
undervaluation. This is consistent with the fact that a real undervaluation of 
the currency has helped enhanced the saving rate among developing countries 
–as opposed to that of industrial ones (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007). 
Private Consumption. Table 17 presents the evidence for the ratio of 
private consumption to GDP. Throughout the window most coefficients are 
negative and significant for either the full sample of countries or that of 
developing countries. Hence, the private consumption rate is weaker during 
the undervaluation event window than the average rate of private consumption 
outside of that window. Second, rate in consumption reaches bottom in year 0, 
whereas it is faster either before or after the start of the undervaluation. These 
results hold for both the full sample of countries and that of developing 
countries. Qualitatively similar but statistically weaker results are found for 
both samples when examining only completed episodes.  The lower private 
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consumption among developing countries prior and during the undervaluation 
is consistent with the rising saving rates.
Domestic Investment. The regressions for the ratio of gross capital 
formation to GDP are presented in Table 18. In most cases, the level of 
investment at the start of the undervaluation (year 0) is either lower or similar 
(that is, not statistically significant) than the average level outside the event 
window. Rate in real investment in the second and third year before the 
undervaluation takes place is higher than in the year of undervaluation. We 
note that in the aftermath of the undervaluation, rate in investment is higher in 
year 2 for the full sample of countries and in year 1 for developing countries. 
We should point out that the investment ratio is higher for developing 
countries prior and during the undervaluation episode whereas it is lower for 
industrial countries. This may reflect the higher investment rates in fast-
growing emerging markets such as China that may have used competitive 
devaluations to promote investment in tradables. 
CPI Inflation. We show the regression results for the annual rate of 
inflation on the event window dummies, country effects and time effects in 
Table 19. While controlling for country and time effects (TI columns), 
inflation in year 0 for the full sample of countries as well as for developing 
countries seems to be lower than the average outside the event window. 
Otherwise, we find that the regression coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Paradoxically, we find that inflation declines at the start of the 
undervaluation period.
Nominal Exchange Rate. Table 20 presents the evolution of the nominal 
exchange rate in the undervaluation window. If we analyze “ALL” event-
window coefficients for the full sample of countries and the sample of 
developing countries, we observe that all coefficients are significant. This 
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implies that the nominal exchange rate, on average, weakens in windows of 
undervaluation episodes. A closer look at the coefficients indicates that 
nominal exchange rates depreciates in the run-up to the undervaluation and 
reaches its peak in period T (year 0). Afterwards, it appreciates slightly 
relative to period T. In contrast, the coefficient for the year 0 dummy shows 
negative significance for industrial countries after 1974. Nominal exchange 
rates in the period of undervaluation are smaller than the average growth 
outside this event window.  
Intervention. Table 21 shows the regression of intervention (Int2) on the 
event window dummies. If we focus on all episodes of undervaluation, we fail 
to find a significant coefficient in most of the variables for the full sample of 
countries and for that of developing countries –except in period T+1. We find 
that intervention in the period after the undervaluation decreases relative to 
period T.
Capital Openness. The regressions of the index of capital account 
openness (Chinn and Ito, 2007) on event window dummy coefficients are 
presented in Table 22. We find that the coefficient for the year 0 dummy is 
negative and statistically insignificant except the coefficient for all episode in 
industrial countries shows positive insignificance which implies that the 
capital openness during the undervaluation is most likely different from the 
average capital openness outside the undervaluation window [T-3, …, T., …, 
T+3]. The behavior of capital openness around RER undervaluation episodes 
is similar to that of the full sample of countries: average growth during 
undervaluation is similar to the average of non-undervaluation. 
What do we learn from our event analysis? In conclusion, we find that real 
GDP growth accelerates during and after the event of undervaluation. While 
export explains the initial push towards higher GDP during the 
undervaluation, the increase in growth after the undervaluation is mostly 
explained by an increase in domestic demand (that is, higher consumption and 
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investment. Saving rates increased considerably prior, during and a year after 
the start of the undervaluation episode. To continue weakening the currency, 
the monetary authority will continue its intervention in the FX market. To 
prevent the monetization of that intervention, the Central Bank will sterilize 
the money inflows through open market operations. That will raise interest 
rates. Higher rates will increase saving by postponing present to future 
consumption.  Higher domestic savings may fund more investment projects.
The dynamics of saving and private consumption around undervaluation 
episode is more significant than that of investment. During this episode, the 
monetary authority attempts to weaken the currency further by continuing 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. To prevent higher inflation, the 
monetary authority sterilizes that intervention. This leads to higher interest 
rates. Hence, saving rates among developing countries will significantly 
increase prior, during and a year after the start of the undervaluation episode. 
There is also evidence that the lower private consumption among developing 
countries prior and during the undervaluation is consistent with the rising 
saving rates. The domestic households inter-temporally save more by shifting 
present to future consumption. The pattern of movement in investment may 
also be consistent with the fact that investment may partly be financed by the 
higher savings in the economy. However, the sensitivity of investment to the 
undervaluation is smaller than that of saving. In fact, the positive impact of 
undervaluations on investment may be offset by the negative impact of higher 
interest rates on investment projects –which raises the cost of borrowing.
In terms of the FOREX market, as expected, we find that the domestic 
currency depreciates in nominal and real terms during the undervaluation 
episode. This depreciation is supported by purchases of foreign currency by 
the Central Bank. In the aftermath of the undervaluation episode, the domestic 
currency continues depreciating at an even faster pace –along with a pick-up 
in inflation. In turn, the Central Bank shifts from purchasing to selling foreign 
currency —just to avoid that higher depreciation turns into rising inflation. 
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Finally, capital controls seem to have declined more during the undervaluation 
episodes.
Chapter 6
Policy Determinants of Real 
Exchange Rate Undervaluations
This chapter describes the econometric techniques used to examine 
whether policymakers can influence and sustain RER misalignments (and, 
more specifically, RER undervaluations) through policy actions. It also 
discusses the results from these estimations.
It has always been suggested among academic and policy circles that 
competitive devaluations can help nations grow by fostering exports. These 
competitive devaluations aim at keeping the currency weak and generating 
relative price gains for exporters. However, there is little evidence on whether 
policymakers can engineer an undervaluation of the currency through policy 
actions. Is the foreign exchange rate intervention (reserve hoarding) effective 
in weakening the currency (in real terms)? Does the fiscal stance help?  This 
chapter aims to bridge the gap between policy debate and the empirical 
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literature on the ability of policymakers to generate and sustain 
undervaluations. Therefore, novelty of this chapter is empirically to evaluate 
whether policymakers can influence and sustain RER misalignments in the 
case of RER undervaluations through policy actions while analyzing by Tobit 
and Probit estimations.
We empirically model the likelihood of sustaining a RER undervaluation 
as well as the magnitude of this undervaluation using limited dependent 
variable and censored variable techniques. In particular, we examine the 
impact of active economic policies on the likelihood (or incidence) of real 
exchange rate undervaluations using the Probit analysis while the Tobit 
analysis is used to assess the effects of economic policy on the size or 
magnitude of RER undervaluations.
6.1 Econometric Methodology
6.1.1 The Probit Model
The Probit model is a model of binary choice where the dependent 
variable takes the value of one whenever there is a sharp real undervaluation 
of the currency and zero otherwise. Suppose that X is a binary variable that 
can only take two possible outcomes, zero (0) and one (1). We also have a 
vector z of variables that is assumed to have an effect on the outcome X. 
Hence, we assume that our probabilistic model (Probit) takes the following 
form:
   ,1Pr zFXob 
   ,10Pr zFXob 
Our regression model is such that:
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The dependent variable takes the value of 1 whenever the actual RER 
depreciates more than equilibrium (or appreciates less than equilibrium) 
beyond a threshold, and 0 otherwise. We test whether policy variables have an 
influence on the likelihood of achieving an undervalued real exchange rate. 
The negative coefficient in the dependent variable shows the smaller a lag in 
the misalignment values the higher tendency to undervalue the RER. Our 
dependent variable X is a dichotomic variable which reflects whether or not 
we observe a certain phenomenon.
 1Pr Xob , if   0*  kqq
 0Pr Xob , otherwise
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This means that X reflects the incidence/likelihood of episodes, where the 
RER is below, is equilibrium level beyond a certain threshold k. The response, 
as we see, is binary which is a choice between 2 possible outcomes is. We 
model this response as a linear regression problem and the probability of 
achieving an undervalued RER beyond some threshold k such as 5, 10, 20 and 
25 percent. We regress the binary outcome on potential explanatory variables 
such as intervention, exchange rate arrangements, openness, monetary and 
fiscal variables. The expected value of achieving undervaluation in the model 
(given a set of explanatory variables z) is:
      
  
 zXob
kqqob
OtherwiseobkqqobzxE
|1Pr
Pr*1
Pr*0Pr*1|
*
*



= linear function of z
Our Probit analysis therefore evaluates the impact of active 
macroeconomic policies on the probabilities of a RER undervaluation taking 
place.
6.1.2 The Tobit Model
The Tobit model is a type of censored regression model where the latent 
variable cannot always be observed while the explanatory variables are always 
observed. It has the following general specification:
iii zx   '
0ix if 0ix
 ii xx if 0ix
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The latent variable,  ixE is iz' . The estimation of this model is similar to 
one of truncated regression. The log-likelihood for the censored regression 
model is:
    


















 
0
'
0
2
2'
2 1loglog2log
2
1
log
ii x
i
x
ii zzxL 



In our model the dependent variable is the extent of RER undervaluation when 
it takes place otherwise 0 when the RER is in equilibrium or overvalued.
The dependent variable is the absolute value of the undervaluation beyond 
a certain threshold, and 0 otherwise. We test whether policy variables have an 
influence on the extent of real undervaluation of the local currency. The 
negative coefficient in the dependent variable means that the smaller a lag in 
the misalignment the larger magnitude of undervaluation in the local currency. 
This model is used when the response is continuous but possibly censored 
with the dependent variable assuming discrete values. Although these values 
are unknown, we can still identify whether those values are greater than some 
threshold values. We want to investigate whether the RER undervaluations 
greater than some thresholds such as 5, 10, 20 and 25 percent. Hence, our 
dependent variable is as follows:
|| *qqX  if   0*  kqq
0X , otherwise
This implies that X reflects the magnitude of the deviation of RER below 
its equilibrium level beyond a certain threshold k. We measure the size of the 
undervaluation when it is greater than a threshold k and explain whether our 
explanatory variables affect the size of the undervaluation beyond a certain 
threshold. In short, our Tobit analysis examines the effects of macroeconomic 
policies on the magnitude of RER undervaluations. 
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6.2 Empirical Assessment: Policy Determinants of RER Undervaluation
In this sub-section we discuss our results on the linkages between 
economic policies and the likelihood (of sustaining) as well as the magnitude 
of RER undervaluations. More specifically, our goal is to examine: (a) the 
linkages between: policy actions and the likelihood of sustaining under-
valuations; and, (b) the extent to which policy can affect the magnitude of the 
undervaluation. These relationships are evaluated using Probit and Tobit
models, respectively. Some researchers argue that some countries (e.g. China 
and Argentina) have pursued active exchange rate policies to undervalue their 
currency in real terms so that they can foster growth in their economic activity
(Rodrik, 2008). 
In sum, we test whether it is likely that economic authorities can sustain 
undervaluations and whether they could affect their size through the use of 
active exchange rate policies (say, strong intervention in the foreign exchange 
market by the monetary authority), and the use of capital controls, strategies of 
outward orientation and fiscal discipline among other factors. 
In the following section we discuss the results of the effects of policy 
determinants on, the likelihood of a real exchange rate under-valuation beyond 
some determined threshold taking place, and the influence of the authorities on 
the magnitude of the real exchange rate undervaluation.
The incidence of RER undervaluation, I, is captured by a dummy variable
that takes the value of one when the RER deviation from its computed long-
run equilibrium is such that:


 
otherwise
qqif
qqI
,0
0,1
)(

where we define the occurrence of RER undervaluation for different values of 
the threshold  —more specifically,  = 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%. 
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We also define the variable magnitude of undervaluation, S, is captured by 
a dummy variable that the value of one when the RER deviation from its 
computed long-run equilibrium is as:


 
otherwise
qqifqq
qqS
,0
0,
)(

6.2.1 Can Pro-active Policies Determine the Likelihood of RER 
Undervaluations? A Probit Analysis
We model the likelihood (or incidence) of real exchange rate 
undervaluation episodes using Probit models and test whether pro-active 
economic policies may affect that probability. We assume that the set of 
policies that may exert an influence on the incidence of undervaluation 
episodes includes active exchange rate policies (typically, identified as more 
flexible exchange rate arrangements and substantial intervention in the foreign 
exchange market), outward-oriented policies in goods and asset markets (say, 
trade and financial openness) and the composition of capital flows, declining 
currency mismatches (as measured by the degree of liability dollarization), 
and fiscal discipline (as measured by the central government surplus).
We empirically explore the link between economic policies and the 
incidence (or likelihood) of RER undervaluation episodes controlling for 
country characteristics. Our purpose is to show whether governments can 
engineer real undervaluations of the currency (i.e. real depreciation beyond 
that attributed to fundamentals) through policy actions. Therefore, we evaluate 
the impact of economic policies on the probability of a RER undervaluation
taking place.
Our limited dependent variable analysis is carried out using the measure of 
undervaluation that is derived from the deviation of the actual RER from the 
time-series cointegration estimate of the equilibrium RER. We use these 
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estimates rather than the PMG estimates for the following reasons: first, it 
deals with the issue of heterogeneity of the long-run parameters across 
countries in our real exchange rate equation. Second, even if the Hausman 
tests of the PMGE fail to reject the null of homogeneity, this result could be 
driven by very large standard deviations in some countries. We should also 
point out that although the measures of misalignment calculated using the time 
series and panel date cointegration techniques may go in the same direction 
(indeed, they are positively correlated –especially, among industrial 
countries), there may be some large quantitative differences. These differences 
may be attributed to the fact that, in fact, the regression may be a better fit for 
average countries rather than countries that deviate from this average.
Baseline Results
Table 23 shows the baseline regression analysis for our Probit model 
where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 whenever there is an episode 
of RER undervaluation beyond 5%. The lagged misalignment is statistically 
significant in our Probit regressions. Hence, real exchange rate misalignments
in period t-1 would affect the likelihood of undervaluation in the current 
period (t), thus enabling the initial RER misalignment to play a role. For 
instance, the negative coefficient of the lagged misalignment found in 
regression [1] in Table 23 shows that a drastic devaluation likely occurs with a 
probability of 27.3% that might lead to an undervalued local currency in real 
terms if there is an initial disequilibrium. 
Financial openness appears to have no systematic relationship with the 
occurrence of real exchange rate undervaluation episodes —i.e. the estimated 
coefficient of foreign liabilities (FL) and total foreign assets and liabilities
(FAL) are not statistically significant. The lack of significance of the outcome 
measures of financial openness may be attributed to the fact that we do not 
take into account the composition of capital flows.31 The policy measure of 
                                               
31 We analyze whether the composition of capital flows matters in Table 24.
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financial closeness —as measured by a measure of capital controls derived 
from the Chinn-Ito index— enters with a significant coefficient but the sign is 
not robust. Closed capital accounts have a negative sign when we control for 
fiscal policy and a positive one when we do not control for that variable. If we 
include fiscal policy in our regression, capital account openness reduces the 
likelihood of undervaluation by about 9.5 percent, while excluding fiscal 
policy raises the effect of openness by 8.3 percent.
Fiscal discipline, as measured by the Central Government budget balance 
(as % of GDP) enters with a negative sign. This implies that countries with 
healthier fiscal positions are less likely to undervalue their currencies. 
Interestingly, the exchange rate regime (as proxied by the fine
classification of Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) and intervention in the foreign 
exchange market enter with a positive sign in our regressions. This implies 
that countries with more flexible exchange rate arrangements and more 
frequent intervention in the FOREX market are able to generate an 
undervaluation of the currency. Liability dollarization is only significant 
without fiscal policy; hence, dollarization matters on a probability to 
undervalue the exchange rate while central government does not process its 
policy.
Composition effects in Financial Openness
Table 24, on the other hand, presents the results for the composition effects 
of financial openness. That is, we test whether the structure of external 
liabilities plays a role in determining the likelihood of real undervaluations. 
Before we discuss these results we should point out that our policy measure of 
financial openness (the index of capital controls) enters the regressions with 
an insignificant coefficient. As we mentioned above, we conjecture that the 
failure to find a significant impact from outcome measures of financial 
openness such as the total foreign assets and liabilities may be due to fact that 
different types of capital flows may have opposite effects on the likelihood of 
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occurring RER undervaluations. For instance, Calderon and Kubota (2009) 
show that the composition of capital flows is important when analyzing the 
factors that help mitigate the impact of shocks on real exchange rate volatility. 
In fact, they found that shocks to the RER would be mitigated by the 
accumulation of equity-related foreign liabilities, whereas they would be 
amplified by loan-related foreign liabilities.
This distinction between different types of flows and integration to capital 
markets may be important due to the different persistence of these flows and 
its differential impact on RER and its deviations from equilibrium. Hence, we 
decompose foreign liabilities into equity- and loan-related liabilities. Note that 
the coefficient of equity-related liabilities is robustly negative across 
specifications while that of loan-related liabilities is positive and significant. 
This shows that the structure of external liabilities plays a role in explaining 
the probability of real exchange rate undervaluations taking place. 
Finally, we should point out the following interesting results in Table 24 
(when controlling for the structure of external liabilities): Countries with more 
flexible exchange rate arrangements (proxied either by the coarse or fine 
classification of exchange rate regimes) are more prone to generate an 
undervaluation of the currency. So do countries that intervene in the foreign 
exchange rate market.
Real Vulnerabilities
Table 25 tests whether vulnerabilities on the real side, and more 
specifically vulnerabilities in the outward orientation of the country, might 
prevent the country from sustaining undervaluations. We include measures of 
output concentration and export concentration. In fact, we include the 
Herfindahl index of output based on the 1-digit ISIC of economic activity and 
the Herfindahl index of export values using the COMTRADE database. In 
addition, to test whether the effect of openness depend upon the diversification 
of economic activity in the country, we interacted our trade openness ratio 
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with both measures of concentration. The results reported in Table 25 show 
that we fail to find a significant effect from trade openness and concentration. 
These results suggest that the trade patterns of specialization do not matter in 
determining the probability of RER undervaluation.
Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 26 through 28 replicates the results reported in Tables 23 through 
25 for different thresholds of RER undervaluation. In the first two columns of 
these Tables we report the baseline results for a RER undervaluation greater 
than 5%. Then, we present the results where the dependent variable is the 
occurrence of a RER undervaluation taking place as defined by higher 
thresholds –say, 10, 20 and 25 percent.
We find that in contrast to the results found with undervaluations beyond 
5%, capital controls have a positive and significant effect for undervaluations 
greater than 10, 20 or 25%. This implies that capital controls may be 
successfully used to sustain larger undervaluations. Since higher values 
indicate high intensity of capital controls, the positive coefficient estimate 
implies that capital controls may help to maintain the real exchange rate 
undervalued —say, by either avoiding further appreciation that what the 
equilibrium appreciation dictates or by leading to further depreciation (beyond 
the equilibrium level). 
The trade openness variable (open) fails to yield a significant coefficient 
estimate and so do the outcome measures of financial policy. Fiscal discipline, 
on the other hand, shows a negative and significant sign only when we 
consider thresholds of undervaluation of 5 and 10%. This implies that fiscal 
discipline reduces the likelihood of being able to sustain undervaluation 
episodes. If the threshold is 20 or 25 percent, the fiscal variable becomes 
insignificant. This shows that fiscal policy is effective while the probability of 
the RER undervaluation is still closer to its equilibrium and fiscal policy likely 
becomes ineffective while the threshold gets more than 20 percent.  
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Finally, the ability to sustain undervaluations granted by flexible exchange 
rate regimes and FOREX market intervention is robust for different thresholds 
of RER undervaluation (see Table 26). Higher values of the indicator of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market (Int2) help signal a more active 
policy to keep the currency undervalued. The regression analysis from Tables 
26 to 28 shows that with the 5 percent threshold the RER is more likely to 
undervalue while countries are pursuing a more active intervention in the 
foreign exchange rate market. As the value of the threshold increases, the 
coefficients become insignificant. This means that the RER is less likely to be 
undervalued when pursuing a more active intervention when the RER gets too 
far from its equilibrium.
Table 27 investigates the effects of the structural of external liabilities on 
the likelihood of generating and/or sustaining RER undervaluations. 
Consistent with the results found in Table 24, equity-related liabilities enter 
with a negative sign whereas loan-related liabilities have a positive coefficient. 
Countries with a large accumulation of loan-related liabilities are more prone 
to sustain RER undervaluations. 
Central government balance as a fiscal variable is a positive significant if 
the threshold is either 5 or 10 percent in Table 26 through 28. Table 28 
includes the real vulnerabilities —as proxied by concentration in economic 
activity and in the export sector. Again, we fail to find a significant coefficient 
for those variables.
6.2.2 Can Economic Policy Affect the Magnitude of RER 
Undervaluations? A Tobit Analysis
Baseline Results
Table 29 presents our Tobit analysis of RER undervaluations. The 
dependent variable measures the size of the undervaluation (in absolute value) 
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whenever the actual rate weakens relative to the equilibrium real exchange 
rate by more than 5%. The baseline results show a negative and significant 
coefficient for the lagged level of RER misalignment. This implies that the
degree of RER misalignment in the previous period would affect the extent of 
undervaluation in the current period. For instance, regression [1] in Table 29 
implies that if the RER misalignment index deteriorates by 50% (ln(?)=-0.69) 
in period t-1, the probability of affecting the level of RER undervaluation in 
period t by 15% (=-0.229 x -0.69).
Interestingly, either policy or outcome measures of financial openness fail 
to explain the magnitude of RER undervaluation. An analogous result is found 
for trade openness. Liability dollarization did not seem to matter either. In 
contrast, the central government budget balance has a negative and significant 
coefficient. This shows that fiscal policy may play a role in determining the 
extent of undervaluation in the exchange rate market. It also shows that fiscal 
discipline may reduce the size of the undervaluation.
Finally, the coefficient estimate of intervention in the FOREX market is 
not robust. When controlling for fiscal balance we find a statistically 
insignificant coefficient whereas it becomes positive and significant when we 
do not control for the fiscal position. On the other hand, the exchange 
arrangement is mostly not significant in all regressions but column [3] of 
Table 29.
Composition Effects in Financial Openness
Table 30 attempts to disentangle the effects of financial openness and 
investigates whether the structural of foreign liabilities helps determine the 
size of RER undervaluations. Analogously to the Probit analysis, we find that 
equity-related liabilities have negative and significant coefficient while loan-
related liabilities have positive and significant coefficient in almost all 
specifications reported in Table 30.
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Again, fiscal policy has a negative and significant coefficient, whereas 
intervention in the foreign exchange market is significant only when we 
exclude the fiscal position of our analysis. The coefficient is positive though, 
supporting the idea that active policies in the FOREX market may also 
influence the size of the undervaluation. Finally, we find that the exchange 
rate regime indicator —either measured by the coarse or find classification—
has a positive and significant coefficient estimate in most regressions. Hence, 
countries with more flexible arrangements are able to sustain and also affect 
the magnitude of the RER undervaluation.
Real Vulnerabilities
Table 31 includes measures of output and export concentration as well as 
their interactions with trade openness. We only find a positive coefficient for 
the Herfindahl index of export values (our measure of export concentration) 
on regression [2] of Table 31. The other coefficients of trade openness, trade 
and output structure as well as their interactions are insignificant. Output 
concentration patterns do not matter in influencing the size of undervaluation; 
however, export patterns might be influential on the extent of undervaluation. 
This means that the extent of undervaluation is more likely to increase in 
countries with less-diversified export structures (that is, higher concentration 
in exports).
Sensitivity Analysis
In a similar fashion to that of the Probit analysis, we report the Tobit 
analysis for different definitions of the dependent variables. Here, we change 
the threshold of the RER undervaluation —not only we report the initial 
results of 5% threshold but also run regressions with higher thresholds (such 
as 10, 20 and 25%). The results are reported in Tables 32 through 34.
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We find a robust negative coefficient for the (lagged level of the) RER 
misalignment. This implies that the lower the index of RER misalignments,
the higher the level of undervaluation beyond any threshold specified in Table 
32 through 34 (say, 5, 10, 20 and 25 percent). Capital controls seem to have a 
negligible relationship with the magnitude of RER undervaluations. This 
evidence is consistent with Glick and Hutchinson (2005) and IMF (2007) 
where capital controls do not seem to sustain the level of the RER or reduce its 
volatility.
Fiscal discipline —as measured by the central government (CG) budget 
balance as a ratio to GDP— has a negative and significant coefficient (see 
Table 32 through 34). This shows that fiscal policy matters in influencing the 
size of the RER undervaluation. Fiscal surpluses may contribute to fund active 
intervention in the foreign exchange rate market and may allow the authorities 
to keep the RER undervalued. However, the coefficient of CG balance 
becomes not significant when trying to sustain larger RER undervaluations 
(beyond 20%) in Table 33.
Intervention in the foreign exchange market has a positive coefficient 
estimate but not significant in most cases —except for regression [1] of Table 
34. On the other hand, the flexibility of the exchange rate regime has, in most 
cases, a positive relationship with the magnitude of the RER undervaluation in 
our Tobit model. It has a positive relationship in some (but not in most) 
regressions. In short, the evidence does not allow us to conclude that pro-
active exchange rate policies in the foreign exchange markets may help 
influence the degree of undervaluations.
Table 33 shows the differential impact on the magnitude of undervaluation 
of the equity-related and loan-related financial openness. In most cases 
throughout Table 33, accumulating equity-related liabilities may reduce the 
degree of undervaluation whereas higher loan-related liabilities would have 
the opposite effect. Finally, Table 34 reports the output and export 
concentration coefficient estimates in our Tobit model. Interestingly we find a 
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robust positive and significant coefficient for export concentration regardless 
of the level of the threshold undervaluation in our Tobit analysis. Hence, 
larger undervaluations are more likely to occur in countries with less 
diversified export revenues.
In conclusion, our limited dependent variable analysis (Probit and Tobit 
modeling) attempts to evaluate the ability of policy variables to influence over 
the incidence and magnitude of RER undervaluation. The Probit analysis 
shows that pro-active economic policies may affect the probability of 
sustaining a RER undervaluation. Intervention in the foreign exchange market 
is effective in supporting small to medium RER undervaluation and its effect 
becomes non-negligible for larger degrees of undervaluation. The flexibility of 
exchange rate arrangements —proxied by either the coarse or fine 
classification of exchange rate arrangements made by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004)— has a positive and significant coefficient regardless of the threshold 
of undervaluation. This implies that countries with more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements and more frequent intervention in the FOREX market are 
able to generate an undervaluation of the currency. Fiscal policy is also 
effective while the probability of the size of RER undervaluation is small to 
medium whereas it becomes ineffective when the RER undervaluation is 
larger (say, more than 20 percent).
Interestingly, our results suggest that fiscal discipline shows a negative 
sign which implies that countries with healthier fiscal positions are less likely 
to undervalue their currencies. Finally, financial openness proxied by 
aggregate external liabilities (FL) or external assets and liabilities (FAL) fails 
to have a significant effect. This could be attributed to the fact that it may be 
important to account for the composition effect of capital flows. In this 
context, we find a robustly negative coefficient for equity-related liabilities 
and a positive and significant coefficient for loan-related liabilities. This 
shows that the structure of external liabilities plays a role in explaining the 
probability of real exchange rate undervaluations taking place: while equity-
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related flows tend to reduce the ability of countries to sustain undervaluations, 
loan-related flows tend to sustain it. Finally, the coefficient of liability 
dollarization is not robust. foreign exchange market is effective in supporting 
small to medium RER undervaluation and its effect becomes non-negligible 
for larger degrees of undervaluation. The flexibility of exchange rate 
arrangements —proxied by either the coarse or fine classification of exchange 
rate arrangements made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)— has a positive and 
significant coefficient regardless of the threshold of undervaluation. This 
implies that countries with more flexible exchange rate arrangements and 
more frequent intervention in the FOREX market are able to generate an 
undervaluation of the currency. Fiscal policy is also effective while the 
probability of the size of RER undervaluation is small to medium whereas it 
becomes ineffective when the RER undervaluation is larger (say, more than 20 
percent). 
Interestingly, our results suggest that fiscal discipline shows a negative 
sign which implies that countries with healthier fiscal positions are less likely 
to undervalue their currencies. Finally, financial openness proxied by 
aggregate external liabilities (FL) or external assets and liabilities (FAL) fails 
to have a significant effect. This could be attributed to the fact that it may be 
important to account for the composition effect of capital flows. In this 
context, we find a robustly negative coefficient for equity-related liabilities 
and a positive and significant coefficient for loan-related liabilities. This 
shows that the structure of external liabilities plays a role in explaining the 
probability of real exchange rate undervaluations taking place: while equity-
related flows tend to reduce the ability of countries to sustain undervaluations, 
loan-related flows tend to sustain it. Finally, the coefficient of liability 
dollarization is not robust. We find that composition effects in financial 
openness may affect the magnitude of the RER undervaluation. More 
specifically, equity-related liabilities have negative and significant coefficient 
while loan-related liabilities have positive and significant coefficient in almost 
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all specifications. Once more, liability dollarization did not seem to matter 
either. Finally, export concentration —as measured by the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index of export revenues— shows a positive and significant 
coefficient. This means that export pattern matters on the magnitude of RER 
undervaluation. The results on the ability of exchange rate flexibility to affect 
the magnitude of the undervaluation are mixed.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Misalignments in the real exchange rate are a useful tool to analyze 
macroeconomic performance because they generate distortions in relative 
prices and are assumed to have an effect on real economic activity. Real 
exchange rate overvaluations are monitored by policymakers in order to 
design future exchange rate adjustments. However, RER undervaluations may 
be engineered to promote growth through exports. One strand of the literature 
has extensively documented the negative association between RER 
overvaluation and development (e.g. Dollar, 1992). On the other hand, recent 
evidence shows that RER undervaluation is present in episodes of growth 
accelerations (Hausmann et al. 2005). 
In this context, a comprehensive characterization of real exchange rate 
misalignment is crucial in academic and policy circles not only to guide and 
formulate exchange rate and monetary policy but also to design industrial 
policy. More specifically, given evidence on the growth effects of RER 
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undervaluation, the natural policy question that arises is whether policymakers 
can engineer an undervaluation of the domestic currency through economic 
policy.
In order to accomplish this task we first need to compute real exchange 
rate misalignments. The concept of misalignment is tightly associated to the 
definition of an equilibrium level of the RER, and the latter is based on a 
theoretical model where the equilibrium RER is obtained by achieving inter-
temporal BOP equilibrium and equilibrium in the tradable and non-tradable 
goods market. According to this model, the main determinants of the 
equilibrium RER are net foreign assets, terms of trade and relative labor 
productivity (i.e. HBS effect). This theoretical model will give us the 
framework to conceptually measure the equilibrium RER and, hence, calculate 
the fundamental RER misalignments. 
Our first goal is to complement and improve upon the existing literature on 
RER misalignments by: (a) formulating a theoretically-based model to 
compute ERER and modeling its misalignment, (b) estimating ERER using 
non-stationary panel data techniques for time series (Johansen, 1988, 1991) 
and for panel data, PMGE (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999) and (c) calculating 
and estimating RER misalignments using the ECM by Bewley (1979) and 
Wickens and Breusch (1987). 
Theoretically, we aim to combine the current account approach and the 
HBS productivity differentials with the RER equilibrium solving our 
intertemporal open economy model. One of the novelties of the model is the 
derivation of what we call intertemporal BOP equilibrium and equilibrium in 
the tradable and non-tradable goods market. This model provides us an 
analytical framework to conceptually measure RER misalignment and conduct 
economic policy discussion more accurately. Modeling the RER 
misalignments is another novelty. It relates the empirical modeling in a 
context of open economy macroeconomics with the intertemporal equilibrium 
of RER. Our determinants of ERER are net foreign assets, terms of trade, and 
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HBS effect derived from our theoretical model. According to our empirical 
exercise PMGE of a heterogeneous panel data technique that outperforms non-
stationary time series and the ECM allow us to calculate the RER 
misalignments which provide us more accurate benchmark to analyze the RER 
behaviors in economy and to draw better macroeconomic policy decisions. 
In this study, after calculating the fundamental RER misalignment, we 
define RER undervaluation episodes by creating a binary variable that takes 
the value of 1 when the actual RER has depreciated more (or appreciated less) 
than its equilibrium level (beyond some threshold). We determine threshold 
levels beyond which we characterize those time periods as periods of 
undervaluation. Then, we characterize episodes of RER undervaluation by: (a) 
examining the behavior of macroeconomic variables around periods of 
undervaluation using the event analysis approach, and (b) evaluating the 
ability of policy makers to affect the incidence and magnitude of RER 
undervaluation by using limited dependent variable estimation techniques —
i.e. Probit and Tobit analysis.
We conduct an event-analysis to examine the behavior of (real and 
nominal) macroeconomic aggregates during undervaluation episodes for a 
wide array of countries. In this analysis we find that real GDP growth 
accelerates during and after the event of undervaluation. Export growth, on the 
other hand, speeds up during the undervaluation episodes and it slows down in 
the aftermath. What drives higher growth in the aftermath of undervaluation 
episodes? The evidence appears to show that growth in private consumption 
and investment accelerates significantly in the aftermath of the undervaluation 
episode. Finally, although we do not find a significant difference in the fiscal 
balance before, during and after the undervaluation episodes, the coefficients 
indicate that fiscal austerity may pick up during the undervaluation episode.
Regarding the behavior of the nominal exchange rate, we find that the 
domestic currency depreciates in real terms and is supported by Central Bank 
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purchases of foreign currency in the FOREX market during the undervaluation 
episode. In the aftermath of the undervaluation, nominal exchange rates 
depreciate more than before or during the event. FOREX intervention is 
positive (i.e. buying foreign currency) before the undervaluation event and it 
becomes negative (selling foreign currency) during and after the event of 
undervaluation. However, inflation goes up slightly during undervaluation 
episodes and it goes back to almost the same average level as ‘before’ the 
event. Finally, capital controls seem to have declined more during the 
undervaluation episodes.
Next, we use Probit and Tobit modeling to evaluate the ability of 
macroeconomic policies to have an effect on the incidence and magnitude of 
RER undervaluation. The Probit analysis shows that pro-active economic 
policies may affect the probability of sustaining a RER undervaluation. 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market is effective in supporting small to 
medium RER undervaluation and its effect becomes non-negligible for larger 
degrees of undervaluation. The flexibility of exchange rate arrangements has a 
positive and significant coefficient regardless of the threshold of 
undervaluation. This implies that countries with more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements and more frequent intervention in the FOREX market are able to 
generate an undervaluation of the currency. Fiscal policy is also effective 
while the probability of the size of RER undervaluation is small to medium 
whereas it becomes ineffective when the RER undervaluation is larger (say, 
more than 20 percent). Interestingly, our results suggest that fiscal discipline 
shows a negative sign which implies that countries with healthier fiscal 
positions are less likely to undervalue their currencies. Finally, financial 
openness proxied by aggregate external liabilities or external assets and 
liabilities fails to have a significant effect. This could be attributed to the fact 
that it may be important to account for the composition effect of capital flows. 
In this context, we find a robustly negative coefficient for equity-related 
liabilities and a positive and significant coefficient for loan-related liabilities. 
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This shows that the structure of external liabilities plays a role in explaining 
the probability of real exchange rate undervaluations taking place: while 
equity-related flows tend to reduce the ability of countries to sustain 
undervaluations, loan-related flows tend to sustain it. Finally, the coefficient 
of liability dollarization is not robust.  
The Tobit analysis, on the other hand, shows evidence that the authorities 
may have a more limited ability to influence the magnitude of the RER 
undervaluation. In contrast to our Probit results, flexible exchange 
arrangements and FOREX market intervention have a less robust link with the 
size of RER undervaluations. The exchange arrangement is mostly not 
significant in all regressions, while FOREX intervention has a positive and 
significant effect only when controlling for the fiscal position. Fiscal policy is 
again effective only in small to medium undervaluations (below 20%). The 
central government budget balance has a negative and significant coefficient. 
This shows that the fiscal policy may play a role in determining the extent of 
undervaluation in the exchange rate market. It shows though that fiscal 
discipline may reduce the size of the undervaluation.
Consistent with the Probit results, we find that both policy and outcome 
measures of financial openness fail to explain the magnitude of RER 
undervaluation. However, we find that composition effects in financial 
openness may affect the magnitude of the RER undervaluation. More 
specifically, equity-related liabilities have negative and significant coefficient 
while loan-related liabilities have positive and significant coefficient in almost 
all specifications. Once more, liability dollarization did not seem to matter 
either. Finally, export concentration —as measured by the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index of export revenues— shows a positive and significant 
coefficient. This means that export pattern matters on the magnitude of RER 
undervaluation. The results on the ability of exchange rate flexibility to affect 
the magnitude of the undervaluation are mixed. 
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Finally, the analysis of real exchange rate misalignments still provides 
avenues for future research. More specifically, the persistence of real 
exchange rate misalignments (where deviations from equilibrium have a half-
life of 3-5 years) may lead to the characterization of the duration of real 
exchange rate under- or over-valuation episodes. Is the duration of RER 
misalignments determined by the monetary arrangements or real sector 
rigidities? In addition, we would like to characterize whether the duration of 
the misalignment may impose an additional tax or provide an additional 
incentive to investment and economic activity.
Appendix: Tables
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Table 1
Unit Root Testing on Real Exchange Rate and Fundamentals
Time-series augmented Dickey Fuller tests
Levels Differences
Country RER NFA TOT PROD RER NFA TOT PROD
ARG Argentina -3.27 ** 0.26 -3.34 ** -1.03 -7.25 ** -3.70 ** -6.341 ** -4.43 **
AUS Australia -1.11 -1.79 -1.48 -0.79 -5.13 ** -5.69 ** -4.747 ** -8.852 **
AUT Austria -1.56 -0.48 -0.90 1.81 -4.81 ** -5.52 ** -7.912 ** -6.85 **
BDI Burundi -0.67 -5.24 **
BEL Belgium -1.82 -0.57 -1.66 0.38 -3.75 ** -3.08 ** -4.703 ** -6.491 **
BEN Benin -2.82 * -3.90 **
BFA Burkina Faso -1.21 -2.66 * -1.24 -1.95 -7.36 ** -6.22 ** -6.16 ** -7.968 **
BGD Bangladesh -2.05 -2.41 -1.12 -4.40 ** -3.40 ** -10.541 ** -8.295 **
BHR Bahrain -0.58 -3.48 **
BHS Bahamas -0.52 -3.20 **
BLZ Belize -0.71 -3.75 **
BOL Bolivia -1.11 -2.58 -1.94 -6.15 ** -7.163 ** -5.707 **
BRA Brazil -1.71 -1.66 -1.15 -1.57 -5.94 ** -4.62 ** -6.217 ** -9.669 **
BRB Barbados -1.70 -3.97 **
BWA Botswana -2.27 -0.34 -2.10 -1.89 -4.64 ** -4.78 ** -5.856 ** -4.499 **
CAF Central African Republic 0.56 -6.56 **
CAN Canada -1.71 -0.23 -1.74 -0.15 -4.17 ** -3.52 ** -5.284 ** -6.338 **
CHE Switzerland -1.33 -2.01 -1.50 0.35 -6.51 ** -6.75 ** -6.275 ** -4.532 **
CHL Chile -1.56 -1.76 -1.61 -1.39 -5.63 ** -3.18 ** -6.892 ** -5.929 **
CHN China -1.32 -0.04 -0.99 -6.11 ** -5.77 ** -2.00 -3.622 ** -11.631 **
CIV Cote d'Ivoire -2.22 -1.70 -2.52 -0.26 -7.14 ** -6.35 ** -5.495 ** -6.222 **
CMR Cameroon -1.49 -6.14 **
COG Congo, Rep. -2.58 -1.58 -1.71 -0.39 -8.91 ** -5.15 ** -6.939 ** -6.727 **
COL Colombia -1.36 -2.72 * -1.54 -4.27 ** -7.232 ** -6.03 **
CRI Costa Rica -1.58 -1.44 -2.25 -0.68 -7.53 ** -4.21 ** -6.718 ** -7.087 **
CYP Cyprus -3.19 ** -4.68 **
DEU Germany -2.08 -1.39 -2.07 -2.60 -5.41 ** -4.31 ** -5.521 ** -5.489 **
DNK Denmark -2.23 -0.06 -1.03 -0.82 -5.13 ** -5.27 ** -6.78 ** -7.598 **
DOM Dominican Republic -1.61 -2.18 -3.78 ** -1.15 -7.78 ** -8.19 ** -5.386 ** -6.694 **
DZA Algeria 0.18 0.55 -1.72 -2.53 -4.61 ** -4.01 ** -5.875 ** -7.869 **
ECU Ecuador -1.61 -1.64 -1.41 -1.90 -5.46 ** -4.32 ** -7.413 ** -5.9 **
EGY Egypt -1.37 -1.06 -1.10 -0.82 -4.23 ** -5.28 ** -4.422 ** -4.714 **
ESP Spain -1.92 0.97 -1.36 1.86 -5.40 ** -5.00 ** -4.508 ** -3.57 **
ETH Ethiopia -0.49 -5.58 **
FIN Finland -1.76 -1.91 -1.81 -1.38 -4.45 ** -3.76 ** -5.241 ** -5.518 **
FJI Fiji -0.83 -4.84 **
FRA France -1.70 -1.76 -1.40 1.04 -6.60 ** -5.98 ** -6.89 ** -5.233 **
GAB Gabon -0.34 -6.83 **
GBR United Kingdom -1.12 -0.67 -1.85 -1.37 -5.40 ** -5.42 ** -5.49 ** -4.318 **
GHA Ghana -0.92 0.34 -2.38 -1.67 -3.86 ** -4.33 ** -8.19 ** -7.084 **
GMB Gambia -1.58 -1.78 -0.78 -7.81 ** -6.51 ** -5.725 **
GRC Greece -2.11 0.72 -1.38 0.32 -6.20 ** -3.40 ** -6.494 ** -8.42 **
GTM Guatemala -1.79 -1.58 -2.08 1.41 -5.57 ** -7.01 ** -7.851 ** -4.981 **
HKG Hong Kong -0.26 -4.47 **
HND Honduras -1.36 -1.12 -2.72 * -1.88 -6.37 ** -5.04 ** -6.193 ** -9.181 **
HTI Haiti -1.44 -2.26 -4.31 ** -1.79 -4.67 ** -5.73 ** -7.395 ** -5.614 **
IDN Indonesia -0.78 -2.15 -1.10 -1.57 -6.36 ** -6.42 ** -7.761 ** -7.095 **
IND India -0.74 -0.67 -2.46 -2.80 * -4.77 ** -3.15 ** -5.882 ** -7.63 **
IRL Ireland -1.79 -1.53 -1.39 -0.69 -5.67 ** -5.21 ** -6.892 ** -5.407 **
IRN Iran -2.13 -2.24 -1.65 -1.70 -6.81 ** -4.51 ** -4.636 ** -4.503 **
ISL Iceland -2.29 -0.28 -3.42 ** -1.33 -5.96 ** -6.52 ** -6.088 ** -5.877 **
ISR Israel -2.96 ** -1.71 -2.87 * -0.96 -7.24 ** -4.56 ** -7.214 ** -9.058 **
ITA Italy -1.63 -2.18 -1.51 0.11 -5.72 ** -5.05 ** -5.563 ** -6.461 **
JAM Jamaica -1.49 -1.59 -1.29 -0.87 -5.29 ** -4.66 ** -8.005 ** -7.207 **
JOR Jordan -0.70 -1.33 -1.83 0.40 -3.58 ** -4.10 ** -8.187 ** -5.373 **
JPN Japan -2.01 -0.09 -1.40 -3.91 ** -5.50 ** -5.75 ** -4.758 ** -4.978 **
KEN Kenya -1.73 -1.67 -1.54 -2.27 -7.16 ** -6.93 ** -5.863 ** -5.236 **
KOR Korea, Rep. -5.26 ** -0.83 -0.37 -0.30 -9.02 ** -4.11 ** -6.569 ** -5.845 **
KWT Kuwait -1.14 -3.94 **
Notes: RER is the real exchange rate index (in logs), NFA is the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, TOT is the (log of the) terms of trade index, and PROD is the ratio of the
traded to non-traded productivity in the Home country (in logs). 
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level. That is we reject the null of unit root at the 10(5)% level.
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Table 1
Unit Root Testing on Real Exchange Rate and Fundamentals
Time-series augmented Dickey Fuller tests
Levels Differences
Country RER NFA TOT PROD RER NFA TOT PROD
LKA Sri Lanka -1.51 -1.67 -3.52 ** -2.64 * -5.03 ** -5.07 ** -6.283 ** -7.458 **
LSO Lesotho -1.93 -4.61 **
LUX Luxembourg -2.19 -4.29 **
MAR Morocco -1.54 -3.60 ** -1.58 -3.77 ** -7.009 ** -7.9 **
MDG Madagascar -0.73 -1.40 -1.45 -1.50 -5.25 ** -6.65 ** -7.13 ** -6.288 **
MDV Maldives -1.84 -2.76 *
MEX Mexico -2.80 * -2.12 -0.86 -0.52 -6.07 ** -5.84 ** -6.861 ** -7.706 **
MLI Mali -1.80 -4.81 **
MLT Malta -2.78 * -3.76 **
MMR Myanmar 3.33 ** -3.57 **
MRT Mauritania 0.56 -4.07 **
MUS Mauritius -1.11 -6.66 **
MWI Malawi -0.71 -1.72 -0.03 -6.02 ** -5.35 ** -6.052 **
MYS Malaysia -0.27 -1.29 -2.74 * -2.20 -4.90 ** -3.41 ** -6.274 ** -7.07 **
NAM Namibia -1.75 -4.05 **
NER Niger -0.39 -1.84 -0.14 -1.13 -6.39 ** -9.56 ** -6.765 ** -8.251 **
NGA Nigeria -1.81 -1.21 -1.64 0.67 -4.14 ** -4.33 ** -6.687 ** -4.908 **
NIC Nicaragua -2.13 -1.58 -3.13 ** -1.11 -6.71 ** -4.29 ** -7.939 ** -6.238 **
NLD Netherlands -2.08 -1.50 -1.29 -0.57 -5.35 ** -7.67 ** -6.629 ** -7.713 **
NOR Norway -1.98 2.59 -1.20 -2.16 -5.40 ** -2.87 * -4.719 ** -6.032 **
NPL Nepal -1.19 -5.09 **
NZL New Zealand -2.30 -1.38 -2.25 -0.94 -4.54 ** -4.70 ** -5.414 ** -6.995 **
OMN Oman 0.26 -4.50 **
PAK Pakistan -0.95 -2.31 -1.22 -1.31 -5.43 ** -4.96 ** -8.398 ** -7.24 **
PAN Panama -0.31 -1.30 -1.84 -0.72 -4.86 ** -5.44 ** -6.005 ** -4.791 **
PER Peru -0.96 -2.87 * -2.95 ** -1.67 -6.37 ** -6.21 ** -7.738 ** -5.787 **
PHL Philippines -2.93 * -0.97 -2.32 -1.61 -7.39 ** -4.36 ** -5.331 ** -6.584 **
PNG Papua New Guinea -0.67 -0.57 -1.54 -3.38 ** -6.28 ** -3.54 ** -6.342 ** -4.88 **
PRT Portugal -0.87 -0.63 -1.74 -0.68 -3.95 ** -3.04 ** -5.786 ** -5.609 **
PRY Paraguay -0.75 -2.21 -2.08 -1.93 -7.38 ** -5.45 ** -9.192 ** -6.393 **
QAT Qatar -5.59 ** -3.06 **
RWA Rwanda -0.33 -3.73 **
SAU Saudi Arabia -0.23 -3.02 **
SDN Sudan -2.97 ** -6.76 **
SEN Senegal -0.84 -1.24 -2.28 -1.51 -6.77 ** -4.26 ** -7.858 ** -12.719 **
SGP Singapore -1.95 0.28 -1.98 -2.47 -3.87 ** -4.45 ** -3.863 ** -7.985 **
SLE Sierra Leone -1.77 -0.76 0.81 -6.15 ** -8.593 ** -6.578 **
SLV El Salvador -0.60 0.27 -3.40 ** 1.20 -6.94 ** -4.41 ** -6.91 ** -4.901 **
SUR Suriname -2.93 * -8.07 **
SWE Sweden -0.64 -0.79 2.01 -5.61 ** -7.002 ** -4.631 **
SWZ Swaziland -1.94 -5.38 **
SYC Seychelles -3.13 ** -4.72 **
SYR Syria -1.17 -1.28 -1.60 -1.10 -7.48 ** -5.56 ** -6.912 ** -9.808 **
TAZ Tanzania -0.66 -3.34 **
TCD Chad -0.64 -5.77 **
TGO Togo -1.05 -1.24 -2.96 ** -0.38 -6.71 ** -1.29 -11.113 ** -7.197 **
THA Thailand -0.31 -1.51 -1.14 1.34 -5.22 ** -4.95 ** -6.53 ** -7.887 **
TTO Trinidad & Tobago -1.74 -0.63 -1.45 -1.17 -5.72 ** -3.85 ** -6.384 ** -4.539 **
TUN Tunisia -1.40 -1.39 -1.98 -1.84 -4.61 ** -5.67 ** -5.147 ** -7.688 **
TUR Turkey -3.46 ** -0.46 -1.24 1.28 -9.21 ** -5.45 ** -5.431 ** -7.237 **
TWN Taiwan -2.74 * -6.61 **
UGA Uganda -4.64 ** -1.59 -1.33 -6.06 ** -3.46 ** -4.095 **
URY Uruguay -2.14 -1.56 -1.93 -3.91 ** -6.87 ** -4.68 ** -7.16 ** -10.467 **
USA United States -1.68 0.24 -1.40 0.56 -3.76 ** -5.07 ** -5.318 ** -5.923 **
VEN Venezuela -2.02 -0.84 -0.76 -1.29 -6.96 ** -3.64 ** -7.085 ** -5.018 **
WSM Samoa -1.24 -6.62 **
ZAF South Africa -1.25 -1.48 -1.35 0.59 -5.89 ** -5.99 ** -4.606 ** -1.793
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. -1.28 -1.31 -2.37 0.01 -6.35 ** -5.18 ** -7.413 ** -5.951 **
ZMB Zambia -1.91 -1.80 -0.99 -0.71 -4.38 ** -3.93 ** -6.887 ** -4.083 **
ZWE Zimbabwe -1.51 1.28 -2.77 * -3.89 ** -4.72 ** -0.85 -4.597 ** -9.998 **
Notes: RER is the real exchange rate index (in logs), NFA is the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, TOT is the (log of the) terms of trade index, and PROD is the ratio of the
traded to non-traded productivity in the Home country (in logs). 
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level. That is we reject the null of unit root at the 10(5)% level.
Tables 124
Table 2
Time-Series Unit Root Testing: Summary of Results
Percentage of the sample of countries that reject null of unit root
Annual information: RER and TOT (1960-2005)
NFA/GDP and Productivity (1970-2005)
Test in levels Test in differences
% sample significant at Number of
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% countries
Real exchange rate (RER) 3% 8% 14% 93% 99% 100% 118
Terms of trade (TOT) 2% 12% 18% 100% 100% 100% 82
Productivity (PROD) 5% 6% 9% 98% 99% 99% 81
Net foreign assets to GDP (NFA) 4% 4% 7% 81
Note. The table reads as follows: At the 5 percent significant level, only 8% of the sample of countries rejected the null of unit root in levels for the RER.
That is, there RER is stationary in levels for only 8% of the countries in our sample. On the other hand, 99% of the sample of countries reject the null
of unit root in differences. That is, for 99% of the countries in our sample, we can say that the RER differences are stationary.
The summary results are based on the findings reported in Table 2.
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Table 4
Testing for Cointegration among RER and Fundamentals
Trace test (Johansen, 1988, 1991)
Null hypothesis: Number of cointegrating vectors (r) is:
None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3
vs.  Alternative hypothesis: Number of cointegrating vectors (r) is:
Country r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4
ARG Argentina 36.1 * 13.9 2.6 0.0
AUS Australia 55.1 ** 18.6 9.1 1.9
AUT Austria 36.2 * 22.0 * 9.6 0.9
BEL Belgium 38.2 * 17.0 4.1 0.1
BFA Burkina Faso 23.7 13.4 7.5 2.5
BGD Bangladesh 69.2 ** 21.8 * 6.2 0.2
BOL Bolivia 40.4 * 20.0 9.6 1.5
BRA Brazil 39.2 * 22.8 * 11.4 * 4.6 **
BWA Botswana 61.5 ** 16.1 8.6 3.1 *
CAN Canada 26.2 11.7 6.7 2.2
CHE Switzerland 42.3 * 23.3 * 8.8 0.1
CHL Chile 71.9 ** 28.2 * 8.4 0.8
CHN China 76.6 ** 30.5 ** 7.5 0.6
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 49.5 ** 20.1 7.6 1.9
COG Congo, Rep. 40.3 * 14.4 3.0 0.1
COL Colombia 46.5 * 25.3 * 6.4 1.9
CRI Costa Rica 30.1 14.2 6.6 0.7
DEU Germany 41.9 * 18.4 9.2 2.0
DNK Denmark 46.6 * 26.8 * 10.1 0.1
DOM Dominican Rep. 64.6 ** 21.2 9.1 3.5 *
DZA Algeria 45.2 * 19.5 7.4 0.2
ECU Ecuador 51.0 ** 22.8 * 13.2 * 5.2 **
EGY Egypt 54.8 ** 25.8 * 11.0 * 3.3 *
ESP Spain 33.4 * 9.1 2.7 0.1
FIN Finland 19.1 10.3 2.5 0.2
FRA France 38.5 * 18.9 7.0 0.6
GBR United Kingdom 48.0 ** 17.9 5.5 0.1
GHA Ghana 39.3 * 10.1 3.0 0.5
GRC Greece 47.2 * 20.5 5.4 1.7
GTM Guatemala 44.5 * 16.9 8.5 2.4
HND Honduras 31.8 15.5 5.7 0.6
HTI Haiti 41.0 * 17.5 9.1 3.3 *
IDN Indonesia 35.7 * 16.9 5.6 0.7
IND India 52.0 ** 17.2 8.2 3.1 *
IRL Ireland 36.8 * 17.0 6.7 0.2
IRN Iran 34.1 * 19.2 9.8 2.5
ISL Iceland 49.0 ** 25.8 * 7.0 0.0
ISR Israel 39.9 * 15.9 5.7 0.4
ITA Italy 38.4 * 19.9 7.2 0.6
JAM Jamaica 27.1 11.2 4.0 0.2
JOR Jordan 37.5 * 17.5 8.9 0.6
We test the existence of cointegration in the vector conformed by {RER, NFA, TOT, PROD} using the
trace test developed by Johansen (1988, 1991)
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level. That is we reject the null hypothesis at the 10(5)% level.
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Table 4
Testing for Cointegration among RER and Fundamentals
Trace test (Johansen, 1988, 1991)
Null hypothesis: Number of cointegrating vectors (r) is:
None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3
vs.  Alternative hypothesis: Number of cointegrating vectors (r) is:
Country r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4
JPN Japan 41.3 * 15.2 3.6 0.6
KEN Kenya 63.7 ** 28.8 * 13.8 * 3.3 *
KOR Korea, Rep. 45.1 * 11.2 3.0 0.1
LKA Sri Lanka 31.2 17.0 8.5 3.4 *
MAR Morocco 65.9 ** 31.1 ** 11.9 * 2.4
MDG Madagascar 36.3 * 16.4 7.3 0.2
MEX Mexico 40.6 * 20.7 4.5 0.2
MYS Malaysia 44.3 * 18.9 8.6 2.2
NER Niger 51.0 ** 20.1 9.0 1.9
NGA Nigeria 25.8 12.7 3.7 1.1
NIC Nicaragua 44.9 * 14.8 4.9 1.9
NLD Netherlands 47.3 ** 18.3 7.0 2.0
NOR Norway 50.7 ** 18.9 6.5 0.0
NZL New Zealand 41.5 * 19.5 8.2 2.4
PAK Pakistan 48.7 ** 23.0 * 10.4 2.2
PAN Panama 44.8 * 15.4 4.2 0.4
PER Peru 54.4 ** 20.6 8.7 0.5
PHL Philippines 48.7 ** 29.0 * 13.6 * 2.4
PNG Papua New Guinea 39.4 * 16.2 8.9 2.8
PRT Portugal 39.4 * 14.3 3.0 0.0
PRY Paraguay 46.1 * 21.7 * 7.5 2.8
SEN Senegal 37.4 * 16.6 4.2 0.1
SGP Singapore 55.4 ** 22.7 * 6.8 3.0 *
SLV El Salvador 33.5 * 14.7 2.7 0.0
SWE Sweden 49.9 ** 19.5 8.3 2.8
SYR Syria 27.9 16.8 6.0 1.1
TGO Togo 56.7 ** 14.6 6.3 0.2
THA Thailand 23.5 13.0 4.3 0.6
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 35.2 * 13.4 6.4 0.0
TUN Tunisia 43.3 * 23.9 * 9.4 2.2
TUR Turkey 35.3 * 14.5 7.1 2.2
URY Uruguay 38.4 * 23.3 * 10.8 * 5.1 **
USA United States 35.7 * 19.2 4.5 0.1
VEN Venezuela 33.1 15.4 8.0 2.0
ZAF South Africa 62.1 ** 22.1 * 9.0 0.0
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 43.3 * 23.2 * 7.7 2.3
ZMB Zambia 52.9 ** 22.5 * 8.3 3.8 **
ZWE Zimbabwe 39.6 * 19.5 8.0 1.1
We test the existence of cointegration in the vector conformed by {RER, NFA, TOT, PROD} using the
trace test developed by Johansen (1988, 1991)
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level. That is we reject the null hypothesis at the 10(5)% level.
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Table 5
Testing the Long-run Validity of the Fundamental Real Exchange Rate Equation
Time Series Cointegration Test: Summary of Results
Percentage of countries where we reject the null hypothesis
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005 (Annual)
Null Alternative Null % countries significant at:
Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis 10% 5% 1%
r <= 0 vs. r = 1 No cointegration 86% 32% 15%
r <= 1 vs. r = 2 1 cointegrating vector 28% 3% 0%
r <= 2 vs. r = 3 2 cointegrating vectors 9% 0% 0%
r <= 3 vs. r = 4 3 cointegrating vectors 6% 0% 0%
Note. Using the critical values of the trace test at the 10% significance level, we find that there is at most 1 cointegrating
vector for 86% of the sample of countries, and at most 2 cointegrating vectors for 28% of the sample.
The summary results are based on the findings reported in Table 3
Tables 129
Table 6
Panel Cointegration Tests
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005 (Annual)
Test Statistic p-value
Homogenenous test (Kao, 1997)
DF_Rho -97.257 (0.000)
DF_t_Rho -48.887 (0.000)
DF_Rho_Star -96.346 (0.000)
DF_t_Rho_Star -48.884 (0.000)
Heterogeneous test (Pedroni, 1990)
panel v stat 0.778 (0.000)
panel rho stat -311.925 (0.000)
panel t stat (nonparametric) -11.632 (0.000)
panel t stat (parametric) -71.006 (0.000)
group rho stat -243.953 (0.000)
group t stat (nonparametric) -20.290 (0.000)
group t stat (parametric) -39.720 (0.000)
Note. All tests reject the null of no cointegration. That is, evidence from panel cointegration
tests show that there is evidence of a long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and
its fundamentals (say, terms of trade, net foreign assets to GDP, and relative productivity).
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Table 7
Time-Series Estimation of 
the Fundamental Real Exchange Rate Equation
Estimation method: Johansen's (1988, 1991) vector error correction model
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005 (Annual)
Terms of Net Foreign Relative
Country Trade Assets Productivity
DZA Algeria 8.337 ** -7.189 ** -8.267 **
ARG Argentina 0.339 0.136 0.626 **
AUS Australia 0.737 ** 0.977 ** 0.375
AUT Austria 1.286 ** -1.292 ** -0.413
BGD Bangladesh 1.427 ** 0.316 -0.397
BEL Belgium 1.213 ** 0.113 -0.241
BOL Bolivia 0.564 ** -0.162 0.434
BWA Botswana 3.862 ** 1.910 ** -3.246 **
BRA Brazil 0.702 ** 0.602 ** 0.296
BFA Burkina Faso -0.602 ** 3.956 ** 1.933 **
CAN Canada 1.209 ** -1.068 ** -0.245
CHL Chile 1.016 ** -2.274 ** -0.235
CHN China -0.012 1.732 ** 1.077 **
COL Colombia 1.914 ** 3.651 ** -0.793 **
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 4.504 ** 2.935 ** -3.749 **
COG Congo, Rep. -0.695 ** 1.466 ** 2.461 **
CRI Costa Rica 2.181 ** 1.175 ** -0.957 **
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 0.869 ** -0.529 ** 0.049
DNK Denmark 1.402 ** 0.015 -0.402
DOM Dominican Rep. 2.167 ** 1.577 ** -1.005 **
ECU Ecuador 0.315 -0.013 0.675 **
EGY Egypt 1.155 ** 0.282 -0.181
SLV El Salvador 2.190 ** -4.836 ** -1.725 **
FIN Finland 0.784 ** 0.557 ** 0.283
FRA France 0.947 ** -1.138 ** 0.055 *
DEU Germany 0.119 0.638 ** 0.846 **
GHA Ghana 6.363 ** 0.510 ** -5.381 **
GRC Greece 2.346 ** 1.082 ** -1.621 **
GTM Guatemala 1.772 ** -1.546 ** -0.839 **
HTI Haiti 1.264 ** -1.721 ** -0.327
HND Honduras 2.181 ** -0.293 -1.204 **
ISL Iceland -0.194 -0.931 ** -0.899 **
IND India -2.188 ** 2.269 ** 3.287 **
IDN Indonesia 0.124 2.685 ** 1.227 **
IRN Iran 1.663 ** -9.341 ** -0.328
IRL Ireland 0.598 ** -0.200 0.401
ISR Israel 1.200 ** 0.470 -0.161
ITA Italy 2.385 ** -3.288 ** -1.472 **
JAM Jamaica -12.878 ** -2.800 ** 13.459 **
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level.
continued
Tables 131
continued
Table 7
Time-Series Estimation 
of the Fundamental Real Exchange Rate Equation
Estimation method: Johansen's (1988, 1991) vector error correction model
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005 (Annual)
Terms of Net Foreign Relative
Country Trade Assets Productivity
JPN Japan 1.039 ** 1.415 ** -0.061 *
JOR Jordan 1.026 ** -1.098 ** -0.184
KEN Kenya 54.503 ** 95.589 ** -37.663 **
KOR Korea, Rep. 0.860 ** -0.837 ** 0.086 *
MDG Madagascar -1.463 ** 2.033 ** 2.896 **
MYS Malaysia 29.423 ** -15.727 ** -29.822 **
MEX Mexico 0.336 0.474 0.794 **
MAR Morocco 1.796 ** 0.661 ** -0.710 **
NLD Netherlands 1.118 ** 0.030 -0.127
NZL New Zealand 5.276 ** -1.108 ** -4.512 **
NIC Nicaragua -2.822 ** -0.174 3.800 **
NER Niger 0.997 ** 0.006 0.006
NGA Nigeria 1.046 ** 0.861 ** 0.031
NOR Norway 0.610 ** -0.253 0.439
PAK Pakistan 1.096 ** 20.184 ** 2.037 **
PAN Panama -5.110 ** -7.546 ** 4.842 **
PNG Papua New Guinea 0.984 ** -0.258 -0.069 *
PRY Paraguay -1.272 ** -0.672 ** 2.175 **
PER Peru -0.124 -11.076 ** -0.218
PHL Philippines -17.395 ** 4.922 ** 19.347 **
PRT Portugal 1.047 ** -0.081 * -0.055 *
SEN Senegal 1.662 ** 0.144 -0.674 **
SGP Singapore 1.099 ** -0.009 -0.098 *
ZAF South Africa 1.019 ** -1.005 ** -0.064 *
ESP Spain 9.308 ** -7.836 ** -9.166 **
LKA Sri Lanka 4.485 ** 4.928 ** -2.902 **
SWE Sweden 1.457 ** 0.037 -0.507 **
CHE Switzerland 1.083 ** -0.064 * -0.093 *
SYR Syria 0.727 ** -1.520 ** -0.027
THA Thailand 1.059 ** -0.249 -0.049
TGO Togo 1.281 ** -0.076 * -0.311
TTO Trinidad and Tobago -1.338 ** -0.246 2.341 **
TUN Tunisia 2.636 ** -0.026 -1.647 **
TUR Turkey 0.993 ** -4.442 ** -0.186
GBR United Kingdom 6.505 ** -1.579 ** -5.612 **
USA United States -0.517 ** 3.955 ** 1.517 **
URY Uruguay 1.753 ** 0.381 -0.725 **
VEN Venezuela -3.614 ** -13.577 ** 4.180 **
ZMB Zambia -0.114 0.678 ** 1.362 **
ZWE Zimbabwe 9.119 ** 0.028 -8.031 **
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level.
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Table 9
Estimating the Fundamental RER Equation: Heterogeneous Panel Data Techniques
Estimation method: Pesaran (1995), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005 (Annual)
Panel data estimators Hausman
Pooled Mean Mean Dynamic Homogeneity tests
Coefficients Group (PMG) Group (MG) FE PMG=MG MG=DFE
A. Long-run coefficients
Terms of Trade (TOT) 0.764 ** 0.653 ** 0.531 ** 0.24 0.00
  (in logs ) (0.06)       (0.19)       (0.21)       (0.63)          (0.96)         
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) 0.200 ** 0.576 ** 0.108 1.22 0.02
  (as a ratio to GDP ) (0.03)       (0.28)       (0.17)       (0.27)          (0.89)         
Traded-nontraded Productivity (PROD) -0.137 ** 0.117 -0.214 ** 0.72 0.01
  (in logs ) (0.02)       (0.24)       (0.09)       (0.40)          (0.91)         
B. Error-correction mechanism -0.171 ** -0.360 ** -0.135 ** ..   ..   
(0.02)       (0.02)       (0.02)       
C. Short-run coefficients
L.(D.(TOT)) 0.145 ** 0.095 ** 0.090 ..   ..   
(0.05)       (0.05)       (0.10)       
L.(D.(NFA)) 0.084 -0.304 ** 0.115 ** ..   ..   
(0.10)       (0.15)       (0.04)       
L.(D.(PROD)) -0.029 -0.005 -0.005 ..   ..   
(0.06)       (0.07)       (0.04)       
Constant 0.316 ** 1.138 ** 0.434 ** ..   ..   
(0.03)       (0.33)       (0.17)       
Overall Hausman homogeneity test
Statistic ..   ..   ..   1.71 0.03
 (p-value ) (0.64)          (1.00)         
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level.
Hausman homogeneity tests reports the Chi-square statistics that examines the equality between the: (a) pooled mean group (PMG) and mean group (MG)
estimation, and (b) Mean group (MG) and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimation. The numbers in parenthesis below the statistics reported are the p-values.
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Table 10
Pooled Mean Group Estimation of RER Equation: Robustness across Samples
Sample period: 1970-2005 (Annual)
Sub-samples by level of development Sub-samples by major exports
All Industrial Developing Emerging Asian Primary Non-fuel Manufacturing
Coefficients Countries Countries Countries Markets Countries Goods Primary Goods
I. Pooled mean group
Terms of Trade (TOT) 0.764 ** 0.285 ** 1.188 ** 0.270 ** -0.220 * 0.922 ** 0.720 ** 0.488 **
  (in logs ) (0.06)       (0.07)          (0.12)          (0.10)          (0.12)          (0.11)          (0.10)          (0.07)       
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) 0.200 ** 0.643 ** 0.022 0.675 ** 0.645 ** 0.099 ** -0.033 0.561 **
  (as a ratio to GDP ) (0.03)       (0.05)          (0.04)          (0.09)          (0.00) (0.04)          (0.05)          (0.04)       
Traded-nontraded Productivity (PROD) -0.137 ** -0.203 ** -0.079 ** -0.195 ** -0.233 ** -0.172 ** -0.387 ** -0.185 **
  (in logs ) (0.02)       (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.05)          (0.00) (0.05)          (0.06)          (0.03)       
Error-correction mechanism -0.171 ** -0.174 ** -0.209 ** -0.212 ** -0.204 ** -0.202 ** -0.195 ** -0.161 **
(0.02)       (0.02)          (0.04)          (0.03)          (0.00) (0.04)          (0.04)          (0.02)       
II. Mean group estimation
Terms of Trade (TOT) 0.653 ** 0.457 ** 1.195 ** 0.919 ** -0.123 0.732 ** 0.614 0.616 **
  (in logs ) (0.19)       (0.22)          (0.36)          (0.42)          (0.79)          (0.35)          (0.43)          (0.23)       
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) 0.576 ** 0.793 ** -0.025 0.987 1.739 ** -0.185 -0.299 0.928 **
  (as a ratio to GDP ) (0.28)       (0.37)          (0.18)          (0.94)          (0.14)          (0.55)          (0.69)          (0.30)       
Traded-nontraded Productivity (PROD) 0.117 0.243 -0.229 * 0.403 1.886 ** -0.377 -0.624 0.346
  (in logs ) (0.24)       (0.33)          (0.12)          (0.36)          (0.10)          (0.47)          (0.56)          (0.28)       
Error-correction mechanism -0.360 ** -0.366 ** -0.345 ** -0.332 ** -0.315 ** -0.451 ** -0.451 ** -0.318 **
(0.02)       (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.05)          (0.00) (0.04)          (0.04)          (0.02)       
C. Hausman homogeneity test (p-values)   1/
Terms of Trade (TOT) (0.628)     (0.522)        (0.986)        (0.181)        (0.856)        (0.675)        (0.851)        (0.607)     
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) (0.270)     (0.742)        (0.829)        (0.780)        (0.420)        (0.696)        (0.774)        (0.280)     
Traded-nontraded Productivity (PROD) (0.397)     (0.275)        (0.292)        (0.157)        (0.112)        (0.737)        (0.750)        (0.092)     
Overall test (0.635)     (0.631)        (0.736)        (0.384)        (0.399)        (0.838)        (0.939)        (0.319)     
Number of countries 79 21 58 21 12 25 20 54
Number of observations 2630 709 1921 700 391 818 651 1812
* (**) indicates that the test is significant at the 10 (5)% level.
1/ The Hausman homogeneity tests reports the p-value of the Chi-square statistic that examines the equality between the pooled mean group (PMG) and mean group (MG) estimators.
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Table 12: Number of Sharp Undervaluation Episodes 
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005
Code Country # of Episodes Code Country # of Episodes
1 ARG Argentina 4 41 JOR Jordan 1
2 AUS Australia 2 42 JPN Japan 0
3 AUT Austria 0 43 KEN Kenya 1
4 BEL Belgium 3 44 KOR Korea, Rep. 3
5 BFA Burkina Faso 1 45 LKA Sri Lanka 4
6 BGD Bangladesh 1 46 MAR Morocco 1
7 BOL Bolivia 3 47 MDG Madagascar 1
8 BRA Brazil 2 48 MEX Mexico 5
9 BWA Botswana 0 49 MYS Malaysia 2
10 CAN Canada 2 50 NER Niger 4
11 CHE Switzerland 2 51 NGA Nigeria 1
12 CHL Chile 3 52 NIC Nicaragua 1
13 CHN China 2 53 NLD Netherlands 1
14 CIV Cote d'Ivoire 3 54 NOR Norway 1
15 COG Congo, Rep. 3 55 NZL New Zealand 3
16 COL Colombia 3 56 PAK Pakistan 1
17 CRI Costa Rica 2 57 PAN Panama 3
18 DNK Denmark 2 58 PER Peru 2
19 DOM Dominican Republic 2 59 PHL Philippines 1
20 DEU Germany 3 60 PNG Papua New Guinea 3
21 DZA Algeria 2 61 PRT Portugal 4
22 ECU Ecuador 2 62 PRY Paraguay 6
23 EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 63 SEN Senegal 2
24 ESP Spain 3 64 SGP Singapore 3
25 FIN Finland 2 65 SLV El Salvador 3
26 FRA France 1 66 SWE Sweden 3
27 GBR United Kingdom 3 67 SYR Syrian Arab Republic 3
28 GHA Ghana 3 68 TGO Togo 3
29 GRC Greece 0 69 THA Thailand 3
30 GTM Guatemala 2 70 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 3
31 HND Honduras 3 71 TUN Tunisia 4
32 HTI Haiti 5 72 TUR Turkey 1
33 IDN Indonesia 3 73 URY Uruguay 3
34 IND India 3 74 USA United States 0
35 IRL Ireland 4 75 VEN Venezuela, RB 2
36 IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 76 ZAF South Africa 2
37 ISL Iceland 5 77 ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 1
38 ISR Israel 5 78 ZMB Zambia 3
39 ITA Italy 1 79 ZWE Zimbabwe 3
40 JAM Jamaica 6
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Table 13
Behavior of GDP Growth during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Economic Growth (GDP Growth Rates)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years 0.057 0.001 0.127 0.063 -0.169 -0.366
(before) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.44) (-0.39)
2 years 0.030 0.006 -0.062 -0.017 0.367 -0.225
(before) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.35)
1 year -0.679 ** -0.707 ** -0.745 * -0.771 * -0.437 -0.502
(before) (0.03)       (0.33)       (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.35)
0 year -0.201 -0.138 -0.061 -0.046 -0.687 ** -0.649 **
(current) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.30) (-0.29) (0.27)       (0.24)       
1 year -0.050 0.043 -0.007 0.090 -0.227 0.433
(after) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.34)
2 years -0.479 -0.144 -0.350 0.046 -0.948 ** -0.347
(after) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.43) (-0.43) (0.38)       (-0.34)
3 years -1.072 ** -0.677 * -1.077 ** -0.612 -1.130 ** -0.497
(after) (0.37)       (-0.37) (0.48)       (-0.47) (0.43)       (-0.38)
Completed Episodes
3 years -0.036 -0.047 0.003 0.019 -0.159 -0.231
(before) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.43) (-0.39)
2 years -0.064 -0.037 -0.195 -0.057 0.421 -0.060
(before) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.34)
1 year -0.765 ** -0.725 ** -0.885 ** -0.793 ** -0.313 -0.321
(before) (0.32)       (0.31)       (0.41)       (0.40)       (-0.37) (-0.33)
0 year -0.418 * -0.174 -0.339 -0.062 -0.710 ** -0.478 **
(current) (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.30) (0.25)       (0.22)       
1 year 0.000 0.228 -0.005 0.305 -0.029 0.550 *
(after) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.40) (-0.35)
2 years -0.364 0.079 -0.275 0.320 -0.751 * -0.278
(after) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.35)
3 years -1.276 ** -0.710 * -1.288 ** -0.610 -1.317 ** -0.468
(after) (0.38)       (-0.38) (0.48)       (-0.48) (0.45)       (-0.40)
Observations 2637 2637 1925 1925 712 712
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Table 14
Behavior of Export Growth during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Export Growth (Export Growth Rates)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries Industrial Countries (After 1973)
FE TI FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years -2.273 ** -2.279 ** -2.696 ** -2.482 * -0.854 -0.994 -0.357 -0.332
(before) (1.05)       (1.04)       (1.37)       (-1.37) (-1.07) (-0.96) (-1.07) (-0.96)
2 years -0.091 0.150 -0.415 0.177 0.991 -0.408 1.348 0.025
(before) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-1.23) (-1.22) (-0.95) (-0.84) (-0.95) (-0.85)
1 year -0.488 -0.450 -0.565 -0.764 -0.221 0.073 -0.072 0.356
(before) (-0.93) (-0.92) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-0.95) (-0.84) (-0.96) (-0.85)
0 year 0.687 0.543 0.693 0.492 0.692 0.828 1.183 * 1.292 **
(current) (-0.66) (-0.65) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.66) (-0.58) (-0.69) (0.60)       
1 year -0.114 0.194 0.063 0.444 -0.756 0.360 -0.404 0.354
(after) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-1.27) (-1.26) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.93) (-0.82)
2 years -0.646 -0.154 -0.519 0.148 -1.113 -0.104 -0.737 -0.102
(after) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-0.93) (-0.82) (-0.91) (-0.81)
3 years -0.314 0.356 -0.251 0.549 -0.428 0.433 -0.018 0.472
(after) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.40) (-1.39) (-1.06) (-0.94) (-1.04) (-0.92)
Completed Episodes
3 years -2.647 ** -2.541 ** -3.139 ** -2.763 ** -1.165 -1.163 -0.609 -0.565
(before) (1.03)       (1.02)       (1.34)       (1.35)       (-1.04) (-0.94) (-1.05) (-0.95)
2 years -0.498 -0.131 -0.912 -0.134 0.687 -0.561 1.106 -0.166
(before) (-0.91) (-0.90) (-1.19) (-1.20) (-0.92) (-0.82) (-0.93) (-0.84)
1 year -1.018 -0.881 -1.221 -1.218 -0.509 -0.202 -0.297 0.013
(before) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-0.91) (-0.81) (-0.92) (-0.83)
0 year -0.274 -0.294 -0.511 -0.419 0.363 0.402 1.083 * 0.695
(current) (-0.61) (-0.64) (-0.80) (-0.87) (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.61) (-0.55)
1 year -0.974 -0.846 -1.101 -0.691 -0.858 -0.253 -0.506 -0.432
(after) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-0.97) (-0.86) (-0.95) (-0.84)
2 years -1.270 -0.831 -1.514 -0.704 -0.710 -0.505 -0.334 -0.665
(after) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-0.97) (-0.86) (-0.95) (-0.84)
3 years -0.951 -0.196 -0.897 -0.009 -1.104 0.057 -0.682 -0.059
(after) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.13) (-1.00) (-1.10) (-0.97)
Observations 2471 2471 1764 1764 707 707 665 665
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Table 15
Behavior of Fiscal Balance during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Fiscal Balance (a ratio of fiscal balance to GDP)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.008 ** 0.007 **
(before) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)       (0.00)       
2 years 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 ** 0.007 **
(before) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)       (0.00)       
1 year 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 ** 0.009 **
(before) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)       (0.00)       
0 year 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.012 ** 0.012 **
(current) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)       (0.00)       
1 year 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.003
(after) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
2 years 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.006 ** 0.004
(after) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
3 years 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002
(after) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Completed Episodes
3 years 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.005 * 0.002
(before) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
2 years 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.002
(before) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
1 year 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.005 * 0.003
(before) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
0 year 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.007 ** 0.003
(current) (0.00)       (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)       (-0.00)
1 year 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(after) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
2 years 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.000
(after) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
3 years 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.001
(after) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Observations 2294 2294 1587 1587 707 707
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Table 16
Behavior of Savings during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Savings (a ratio of savings to GDP)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years 0.017 * 0.021 ** 0.028 ** 0.030 ** -0.018 ** -0.010
(before) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01)
2 years 0.012 0.015 * 0.020 ** 0.022 ** -0.017 ** -0.013 **
(before) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
1 year 0.012 0.016 ** 0.021 ** 0.024 ** -0.019 ** -0.012 **
(before) (-0.01) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01)
0 year 0.024 ** 0.026 ** 0.031 ** 0.032 ** -0.001 0.000
(current) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.00) (-0.00)
1 year 0.016 ** 0.017 ** 0.019 * 0.020 ** 0.006 0.009
(after) (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years 0.010 0.013 * 0.011 0.015 0.008 0.009
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.008 0.009
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Completed Episodes
3 years 0.009 0.017 ** 0.018 * 0.026 ** -0.021 ** -0.012 *
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01)
2 years 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.018 ** -0.020 ** -0.014 **
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01)       (0.01)       
1 year 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.018 ** -0.023 ** -0.014 **
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
0 year 0.009 * 0.021 ** 0.014 ** 0.030 ** -0.012 ** -0.008 **
(current) (-0.01) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.00)       (-0.00)
1 year 0.008 0.014 * 0.011 0.019 * 0.001 0.004
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years 0.004 0.011 0.005 0.016 * 0.003 0.004
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years -0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Observations 1636 1636 1228 1228 408 408
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Table 17
Behavior of Private Consumption during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Private Consumption (a ratio of private consumption to GDP)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years -0.011 * -0.013 * -0.014 * -0.016 * 0.002 0.001
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.011 * -0.012 ** -0.014 * -0.014 * 0.000 0.000
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year -0.016 ** -0.016 ** -0.018 ** -0.017 ** -0.004 -0.004
(before) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
0 year -0.020 ** -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.018 ** -0.021 ** -0.016 **
(current) (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.00)       (0.00)       
1 year -0.017 ** -0.017 ** -0.018 ** -0.020 ** -0.011 * -0.008
(after) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.014 ** -0.013 ** -0.015 * -0.016 ** -0.011 * -0.008
(after) (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01)
3 years -0.015 ** -0.014 ** -0.016 * -0.016 * -0.009 -0.007
(after) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Completed Episodes
3 years -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.014 * 0.008 0.004
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 * 0.006 0.004
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year -0.010 * -0.012 ** -0.013 * -0.015 ** 0.003 0.000
(before) (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
0 year -0.013 ** -0.015 ** -0.013 ** -0.017 ** -0.012 ** -0.008 **
(current) (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.00)       (0.00)       
1 year -0.013 ** -0.015 ** -0.015 * -0.020 ** -0.008 -0.002
(after) (0.01)       (0.01)       (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.011 * -0.012 * -0.012 -0.016 ** -0.007 -0.001
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years -0.013 * -0.013 * -0.015 * -0.017 * -0.006 -0.001
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Observations 2125 2125 1717 1717 408 408
Tables 142
Table 18
Behavior of Investment during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Investment (a ratio of investment to GDP)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years 0.009 0.012 ** 0.013 * 0.018 ** -0.011 * -0.008
(before) (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years 0.009 * 0.011 ** 0.012 ** 0.015 ** -0.008 * -0.005
(before) (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.011 * -0.008 -0.003
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
0 year 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007 * -0.014 ** -0.010 **
(current) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.01) (-0.00) (0.00)       (0.00)       
1 year 0.009 0.008 * 0.012 * 0.010 * 0.000 0.005
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years 0.009 * 0.008 * 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.007
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Completed Episodes
3 years 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.014 ** -0.006 -0.003
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years 0.005 0.008 * 0.007 0.011 * -0.003 -0.001
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.000
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
0 year -0.008 ** -0.003 -0.007 * -0.002 -0.010 ** -0.005
(current) (0.00)       (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00)       (-0.00)
1 year 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.003
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.006
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.010 *
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Observations 2152 2152 1744 1744 408 408
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Table 19
Behavior of Inflation during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Inflation (Consumer Price Index percent per annum)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years -63.000 -77.713 -82.002 -97.329 0.371 -1.283
(before) (-57.66) (-58.22) (-76.78) (-77.69) (-1.33) (-0.99)
2 years -60.263 -67.688 -79.419 -92.942 -0.145 -0.899
(before) (-51.54) (-51.94) (-68.44) (-69.03) (-1.20) (-0.89)
1 year -21.000 -25.545 -28.984 -35.063 0.173 -0.670
(before) (-51.45) (-51.80) (-68.27) (-68.78) (-1.20) (-0.88)
0 year -50.472 -66.210 * -65.838 -88.145 * -1.711 ** -0.891
(current) (-36.43) (-36.69) (-48.67) (-49.06) (0.83)       (-0.60)
1 year -53.281 -53.391 -71.560 -69.479 1.121 0.374
(after) (-52.85) (-53.30) (-70.71) (-71.42) (-1.20) (-0.88)
2 years -68.544 -70.197 -91.693 -98.483 1.706 1.421 *
(after) (-52.18) (-52.79) (-69.78) (-70.70) (-1.19) (-0.87)
3 years -44.770 -49.383 -58.102 -71.936 0.474 0.342
(after) (-57.42) (-58.00) (-77.20) (-77.98) (-1.29) (-0.95)
Completed Episodes
3 years -43.370 -64.826 -57.570 -84.932 1.650 -1.029
(before) (-56.32) (-57.34) (-75.10) (-76.67) (-1.31) (-0.97)
2 years -39.110 -53.066 -53.041 -78.456 1.133 -0.681
(before) (-49.83) (-50.68) (-66.23) (-67.50) (-1.17) (-0.87)
1 year 3.053 -9.137 0.676 -19.077 1.321 -0.449
(before) (-49.26) (-50.04) (-65.53) (-66.65) (-1.16) (-0.85)
0 year -8.357 -47.583 -12.308 -71.603 -0.236 -0.596
(current) (-33.79) (-36.61) (-45.13) (-49.72) (-0.78) (-0.58)
1 year -31.405 -45.054 -42.921 -62.579 0.256 0.494
(after) (-53.15) (-54.11) (-70.73) (-72.50) (-1.24) (-0.91)
2 years -50.683 -65.001 -66.990 -94.466 0.841 1.511 *
(after) (-52.96) (-53.96) (-70.40) (-72.16) (-1.25) (-0.91)
3 years -25.786 -41.559 -32.273 -62.699 0.023 0.774
(after) (-58.55) (-59.45) (-77.96) (-79.38) (-1.37) (-1.00)
Observations 2540 2540 1849 1849 691 691
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Table 20
Behavior of Nominal Exchange Rates during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Nominal Exchange Rates
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries Industrial Countries (After 1974)
FE TI FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years 240.493 ** 348.120 ** 305.180 ** 418.839 ** -10.738 -10.296 -13.334 -9.882
(before) (119.34)   (117.60)   (155.02)   (152.56)   (-17.71) (-18.28) (-16.17) (-16.68)
2 years 260.189 ** 347.191 ** 343.183 ** 437.743 ** -20.199 -18.291 -26.168 * -24.522 *
(before) (106.62)   (104.88)   (138.44)   (135.91)   (-15.76) (-16.18) (-14.71) (-15.18)
1 year 296.487 ** 370.060 ** 390.291 ** 464.646 ** -29.439 * -24.561 * -35.399 ** -30.896 **
(before) (106.62)   (104.81)   (138.06)   (135.35)   (-15.91) (-16.30) (14.87)     (15.31)     
0 year 308.507 ** 340.913 ** 399.896 ** 436.258 ** -20.344 * -21.486 * -22.149 ** -19.874 *
(current) (75.21)     (73.96)     (97.57)     (91.72)     (-11.13) (-11.18) (10.89)     (-10.95)
1 year 263.500 ** 270.414 ** 353.274 ** 363.605 ** -24.181 * -18.285 -34.957 ** -26.796 *
(after) (109.11)   (107.48)   (142.63)   (140.19)   (-15.73) (-16.14) (14.92)     (-15.25)
2 years 239.245 ** 220.996 ** 321.129 ** 305.438 ** -14.211 -10.796 -21.671 * -11.170
(after) (107.57)   (106.31)   (140.80)   (138.75)   (-15.45) (-15.89) (-13.90) (-14.19)
3 years 292.446 ** 236.061 ** 376.282 ** 310.878 ** 4.816 2.159 -2.147 2.223
(after) (119.51)   (117.84)   (156.29)   (153.61)   (-17.31) (-17.72) (-15.48) (-15.76)
Completed Episodes
3 years 115.122 304.678 ** 146.264 380.808 ** -0.212 0.510 -9.713 -4.793
(before) (-117.03) (115.92)   (-152.22) (150.50)   (-17.38) (-18.00) (-15.85) (-16.43)
2 years 128.325 296.808 ** 173.575 390.975 ** -10.567 -8.334 -22.216 * -19.421
(before) (-103.54) (102.46)   (-134.60) (132.94)   (-15.34) (-15.83) (-14.38) (-14.93)
1 year 145.928 305.441 ** 198.684 403.386 ** -19.023 -14.548 -31.975 ** -26.118 *
(before) (-102.60) (101.45)   (-133.17) (131.27)   (-15.30) (-15.77) (14.42)     (-14.96)
0 year 46.650 279.965 ** 63.942 399.262 ** 0.162 -6.186 -17.802 * -15.559 *
(current) (-70.18) (73.82)     (-91.33) (97.13)     (-10.32) (-10.68) (-10.04) (-10.22)
1 year 131.300 199.273 * 179.128 296.612 ** -14.903 -17.546 -31.379 ** -26.361 *
(after) (-110.14) (-109.27) (-143.14) (142.16)   (-16.33) (-16.83) (14.75)     (-15.08)
2 years 126.487 156.986 170.618 244.580 * -5.018 -9.551 -18.747 -14.160
(after) (-109.51) (-108.75) (-142.47) (-141.50) (-16.18) (-16.68) (-14.48) (-14.76)
3 years 190.798 * 181.212 239.074 * 257.102 * 18.295 8.186 4.456 3.758
(after) (-122.29) (-121.00) (-158.40) (-156.35) (-18.48) (-19.01) (-16.46) (-16.79)
Observations 2568 2568 1929 1929 639 639 576 576
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Table 21
Behavior of Intervention during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Intervention
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.019 * 0.019
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.008
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.008
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
0 year 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.001
(current) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year -0.016 * -0.014 -0.020 * -0.018 * 0.007 0.007
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.008 -0.008
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.027 ** 0.021 *
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01)
Completed Episodes
3 years 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.018 * 0.020 *
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.005
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.012
(before) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
0 year 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003
(current) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
1 year -0.017 * -0.013 -0.023 ** -0.018 * 0.015 0.014
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01)       (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
2 years -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
3 years -0.003 0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.023 * 0.018
(after) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Observations 1979 1979 1695 1695 284 284
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Table 22
Behavior of Control (Capital Openness) during Undervaluation Episodes: Simple Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: Control (Capital Openness)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (annual observations)
Methodology: Least squares (fixed effects and accounting for country- and time-specifiic effects)
All Countries Developing Countries Industrial Countries
FE TI FE TI FE TI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Episodes
3 years -0.206 ** -0.050 -0.137 -0.018 -0.452 ** -0.109
(before) (0.09)       (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.10) (0.22)       (-0.15)
2 years -0.157 * -0.034 -0.112 -0.019 -0.312 * -0.001
(before) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.19) (-0.13)
1 year -0.207 ** -0.096 -0.174 * -0.096 -0.308 * 0.001
(before) (0.08)       (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.13)
0 year -0.110 * -0.104 ** -0.166 ** -0.143 ** 0.093 0.108
(current) (-0.06) (0.05)       (0.07)       (0.06)       (-0.13) (-0.09)
1 year -0.087 -0.106 -0.092 -0.110 -0.028 0.064
(after) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.19) (-0.13)
2 years -0.057 -0.106 -0.058 -0.094 -0.011 0.025
(after) (-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.19) (-0.13)
3 years -0.036 -0.123 -0.036 -0.092 -0.028 -0.087
(after) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.21) (-0.14)
Completed Episodes
3 years -0.289 ** -0.053 -0.201 ** -0.001 -0.600 ** -0.145
(before) (0.09)       (-0.08) (0.10)       (-0.09) (0.21)       (-0.15)
2 years -0.239 ** -0.033 -0.178 ** 0.001 -0.459 ** -0.018
(before) (0.08)       (-0.07) (0.09)       (-0.08) (0.19)       (-0.13)
1 year -0.295 ** -0.096 -0.246 ** -0.072 -0.465 ** -0.046
(before) (0.08)       (-0.07) (0.09)       (-0.08) (0.18)       (-0.13)
0 year -0.342 ** -0.141 ** -0.376 ** -0.131 ** -0.215 * -0.044
(current) (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.06)       (0.06)       (-0.12) (-0.09)
1 year -0.147 * -0.132 * -0.152 * -0.098 -0.080 -0.132
(after) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.19) (-0.13)
2 years -0.112 -0.139 * -0.117 -0.092 -0.050 -0.171
(after) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.19) (-0.13)
3 years -0.075 -0.138 * -0.092 -0.085 -0.021 -0.246 *
(after) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.22) (-0.15)
Observations 2570 2570 1867 1867 703 703
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Table 23
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit  Estimation 
Baseline Regression Analysis
Baseline Regression Analysis
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.273 ** -0.242 ** -0.273 ** -0.242 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.04)        (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 -0.093 ** 0.083 ** -0.095 ** 0.082 **
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.04)        (0.05)        (0.04)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.93E-03 7.25E-04 ..   ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..   ..   6.60E-04 1.17E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.97E-03 6.90E-04 -1.66E-03 7.79E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 1.78E-04 2.87E-04 * 2.34E-04 3.31E-04 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -3.86E-05 ** ..   -3.88E-05 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.047 ** 0.035 ** 0.049 ** 0.037 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.01)        (0.02)        (0.01)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 1.079 ** 0.785 ** 1.084 ** 0.797 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)        (0.37)        (0.52)        (0.37)        
Observations 1081 1480 1081 1480
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 24
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit  Estimation 
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities 
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.271 ** -0.273 ** -0.235 ** -0.236 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.033 0.028 0.031 0.028
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.04)        (0.04)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.013 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.07E-05 6.51E-05 2.37E-03 2.57E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -8.43E-05 -6.91E-05 5.05E-05 5.75E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -3.73E-05 ** -3.66E-05 ** ..   ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.046 ** ..   0.033 ** ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.01)        
Course classification /4 ..   0.149 ** ..   0.107 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)        (0.04)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 1.051 ** 1.094 ** 0.840 ** 0.853 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)        (0.53)        (0.37)        (0.37)        
Observations 1081 1081 1476 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 25
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit  Estimation 
The Role of the Real Vulnerabilities
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.269 ** -0.251 ** -0.270 ** -0.251 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.043 0.039 0.042 0.039
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.009 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -8.73E-04 -5.33E-04 -7.28E-04 3.26E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.00)        
Output Concentration /3 0.101 ..   0.128 ..   
as Herfindahl Index ratio (1.99)        (2.52)        
Export Concentration /4 ..   0.048 ..   0.699
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.42)        (0.75)        
Output Concentration ..   ..   -1.19E-03 ..   
as openness times output concentration (0.03)        
Export Concentration ..   ..   ..   -0.010
as openness times export concentration (0.01)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.75E-04 -2.58E-04 -2.83E-04 -2.26E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -3.69E-05 ** -3.64E-05 ** -3.69E-05 ** -3.64E-05 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /5 0.048 ** 0.047 ** 0.048 ** 0.045 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 0.993 * 1.186 ** 0.999 * 1.200 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)        (0.58)        (0.53)        (0.58)        
Observations 1049 955 1046 952
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. 
The output concentration ratio gives more weight to larger firm.
4/ Herfindahl Index of Merchandise Export Revenue Concentration
5/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
6/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
Tables 150
T
ab
le
 2
6
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 o
f t
he
 L
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 R
E
R
 U
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n:
 P
ro
bi
t 
E
st
im
at
io
n 
Se
ns
it
iv
it
y 
to
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 T
hr
es
ho
ld
 o
f t
he
 U
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n 
E
pi
so
de
Sa
m
pl
e o
f 7
9 
co
un
tri
es
, 1
97
1-
20
05
 (A
nn
ua
l)
U
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n 
>
 5
%
U
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n 
>
 1
0%
U
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n 
>
 2
0%
U
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n 
>
 2
5%
V
ar
ia
bl
es
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]
[4
]
[5
]
[6
]
[7
]
[8
]
D
um
m
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
e
R
E
R
 m
is
al
ig
nm
en
t  
/1
-0
.2
73
**
-0
.2
73
**
-0
.2
60
**
-0
.2
60
**
-0
.2
31
**
-0
.2
31
**
-0
.2
16
**
-0
.2
16
**
   
as
 a
 ra
tio
 (o
ne
 la
g)
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
(0
.0
4)
   
   
  
F
in
an
cia
l O
pe
nn
es
s (
F
O
)
C
hi
nn
-I
to
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ca
pi
ta
l c
on
tr
ol
s 
/2
-0
.0
93
**
-0
.0
95
**
0.
10
0
**
0.
10
1
**
0.
10
3
*
0.
10
5
**
0.
11
6
**
0.
12
2
**
   
(o
ne
 la
g)
(0
.0
5)
   
   
  
(0
.0
5)
   
   
  
(0
.0
5)
   
   
  
(0
.0
5)
   
   
  
(0
.0
5)
   
   
  
(0
.0
5)
   
   
  
(0
.0
6)
   
   
  
(0
.0
6)
   
   
  
T
ot
al
 F
or
ei
gn
 L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s
0.
00
2
.. 
  
0.
00
2
.. 
  
0.
00
2
.. 
  
0.
00
3
**
.. 
  
   
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
T
ot
al
 F
or
ei
gn
 A
ss
et
s 
an
d 
Li
ab
ili
tie
s
.. 
  
6.
60
E
-0
4
.. 
  
5.
55
E
-0
4
.. 
  
6.
93
E
-0
4
.. 
  
1.
24
E
-0
3
   
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
T
ra
de
 O
pe
nn
es
s (
T
O
)
T
ra
de
 o
pe
nn
es
s
-1
.9
7E
-0
3
-1
.6
6E
-0
3
-3
.1
7E
-0
3
-2
.8
1E
-0
3
-1
.6
8E
-0
3
-1
.3
4E
-0
3
-1
.9
3E
-0
3
-1
.4
7E
-0
3
   
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P 
(o
ne
 la
g)
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
L
ia
bi
lit
y 
D
ol
la
riz
at
io
n
R
at
io
 o
f 
Fo
re
ig
n 
Li
ab
ili
tie
s 
to
 M
on
ey
1.
78
E
-0
4
2.
34
E
-0
4
2.
08
E
-0
4
2.
86
E
-0
4
2.
46
E
-0
4
3.
09
E
-0
4
1.
71
E
-0
4
2.
43
E
-0
4
   
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
F
isc
al
 P
oli
cy
C
en
tr
al
 G
ov
er
nm
ne
t B
al
an
ce
-3
.8
6E
-0
5
**
-3
.8
8E
-0
5
**
-3
.1
0E
-0
5
*
-3
.1
1E
-0
5
*
-2
.3
4E
-0
5
-2
.3
1E
-0
5
-1
.9
8E
-0
5
-1
.9
3E
-0
5
   
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
(0
.0
0)
   
   
  
E
xc
ha
ng
e R
at
e R
eg
im
e
F
in
e 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
/3
0.
04
7
**
0.
04
9
**
0.
04
2
**
0.
04
5
**
0.
05
1
**
0.
05
4
**
0.
04
9
**
0.
05
2
**
 (R
ein
ha
rt 
an
d 
R
og
off
 fi
ne
 cl
as
sif
ica
tio
n)
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
(0
.0
2)
   
   
  
L
ev
y-
Y
ey
at
i a
nd
 S
tu
rz
en
eg
ge
r
1.
07
9
**
1.
08
4
**
1.
16
1
**
1.
16
9
**
0.
84
1
0.
84
9
*
0.
53
7
0.
55
0
 (L
ev
y-
Y
ey
at
i a
nd
 S
tu
rz
en
eg
ge
r d
efi
ni
tio
n)
(0
.5
2)
   
   
  
(0
.5
2)
   
   
  
(0
.5
3)
   
   
  
(0
.5
3)
   
   
  
(0
.5
7)
   
   
  
(0
.5
7)
   
   
  
(0
.5
8)
   
   
  
(0
.5
8)
   
   
  
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
10
81
10
81
10
81
10
81
10
81
10
81
10
81
10
81
P
ro
b 
>
 c
hi
2 
(W
al
d 
ch
i2
)
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
1 
It
 ta
ke
s 1
 if
 u
nd
er
va
lu
at
io
n 
is 
gr
ea
ter
 th
an
 5
%
, 1
0%
, 2
0%
 a
nd
 2
5%
, r
es
pe
cti
ve
ly.
2/
 T
hi
s c
ap
ita
l c
lo
se
ne
ss
 is
 ca
lcu
la
ted
 b
y 
m
ul
tip
lyi
ng
 -1
 b
y 
ka
op
en
 in
 C
hi
nn
-I
to
 I
nd
ex
.
3/
 T
he
 fi
ne
 cl
as
sif
ica
tio
n 
co
de
s f
ro
m
 1
 to
 1
5.
 T
he
 h
igh
er
 n
um
be
r d
es
cr
ib
es
 m
or
e f
lo
at
in
g 
re
gim
es
. (
R
ein
ha
rt 
an
d 
R
og
of
f, 
20
04
) 
Tables 151
Table 27
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit  Estimation 
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.271 ** -0.273 ** -0.260 ** -0.263 ** -0.228 ** -0.230 ** -0.211 ** -0.212 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.033 0.028 0.030 0.029 0.037 0.034 0.041 0.034
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.06)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 ** -0.014 ** -0.013 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.004 ** 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.007 ** 0.007 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.07E-05 6.51E-05 -1.70E-03 -1.68E-03 5.01E-04 6.02E-04 6.71E-04 7.90E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -8.43E-05 -6.91E-05 -2.91E-04 -2.69E-04 5.61E-06 1.71E-05 -1.02E-04 -8.90E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -3.73E-05 ** -3.66E-05 ** -2.91E-05 * -2.91E-05 * -2.25E-05 -2.21E-05 -1.96E-05 -1.88E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.046 ** ..   0.045 ** ..   0.050 ** ..   0.047 ** ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        
Course classification /4 ..   0.149 ** ..   0.131 ** ..   0.156 ** ..   0.162 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.06)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 1.051 ** 1.094 ** 1.039 * 1.081 ** 0.779 0.818 0.451 0.485
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)        (0.53)        (0.54)        (0.54)        (0.58)        (0.58)        (0.60)        (0.60)        
Observations 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 28
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit  Estimation 
The role of real vulnerabilities and different undervaluation thresholds
Dependent Variable: Incidence of undervaluation (binary variable that takes the value of 1 whenever undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.269 ** -0.251 ** -0.255 ** -0.237 ** -0.227 ** -0.210 ** -0.212 ** -0.195 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        
Capital Controls
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.043 0.039 0.045 0.031 0.044 0.041 0.047 0.054
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.07)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.007 ** 0.006 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -8.73E-04 -5.33E-04 -1.15E-03 -1.90E-03 5.15E-04 9.54E-04 3.20E-04 1.24E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Output Concentration           /2 0.101 ..   0.634 ..   -0.068 ..   -0.587 ..   
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index (1.99)         (2.17)        (2.38)        (2.61)        
Export Concentration            /3 ..   0.048 ..   0.021 ..   0.313 ..   0.391
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index (0.42)        (0.44)        (0.47)        (0.52)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.75E-04 -2.58E-04 -2.66E-04 -3.14E-04 4.72E-06 5.11E-05 -9.93E-05 1.26E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.69E-05 ** -3.64E-05 ** -2.94E-05 * -2.85E-05 * -2.33E-05 -2.17E-05 -1.99E-05 -1.79E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Flexibility  4/ 0.048 ** 0.047 ** 0.045 ** 0.044 ** 0.045 ** 0.051 ** 0.042 ** 0.047 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        
Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market  5/ 0.993 * 1.186 ** 1.036 * 1.149 * 0.788 0.620 0.443 0.098
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.58)        (0.54)        (0.59)        (0.58)        (0.63)        (0.60)        (0.66)        
Observations 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of output concentation based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of economic activity.
3/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of export concentation based on the 2-digit SITC classification of export revenues.
4/ Our proxy of exchange rate flexbility follows the "fine" classification coded from 1 to 15 by Reinhart and Rogoff. Higher values of this variable indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
5/ Annual average change in the ratio of reserves to broad money. Positive values of this variable imply a "strong" degree of intervention, because for intervention to be positive reserve accumulation must exceed the incresae
 in monetary aggregates (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007)
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Table 29
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit  Estimation
Baseline Regression Analysis
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.229 ** -0.373 ** -0.230 ** -0.373 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)        (0.02)        (0.03)        (0.02)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.051 0.056 0.048 0.057
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.04)        (0.05)        (0.04)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.67E-03 5.16E-04 ..   ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..   ..   5.39E-04 1.54E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.26E-03 7.33E-04 -1.05E-03 7.61E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 5.29E-05 1.56E-04 1.06E-04 1.75E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -2.69E-05 ** ..   -2.62E-05 * ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.021 0.017 0.025 * 0.018
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.01)        (0.02)        (0.01)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 0.188 0.777 ** 0.198 0.783 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.51)        (0.40)        (0.52)        (0.40)        
Observations 1081 1480 1081 1480
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 30
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit  Estimation
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.233 ** -0.231 ** -0.372 ** -0.372 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.02)        (0.02)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.004 -0.006 0.026 0.016
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.006 ** -0.005 * -0.008 * -0.007 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.003 ** 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.24E-04 3.66E-04 0.002 0.002
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.21E-04 -1.65E-04 2.66E-05 5.85E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -2.56E-05 * -2.39E-05 * ..   ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.025 * ..   0.015 ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.01)        
Course classification /4 ..   0.121 ** ..   0.080 *
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)        (0.04)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 0.110 0.138 0.800 ** 0.811 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)        (0.52)        (0.40)        (0.40)        
Observations 1081 1081 1476 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 31
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit  Estimation
The Role of the Real Vulnerabilities
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.230 ** -0.226 ** -0.231 ** -0.228 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.003
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.008 ** -0.006 -0.008 * -0.005 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.002
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 5.50E-04 -7.24E-04 -1.25E-03 -4.22E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.00)        
Output Concentration /3 1.767 ..   1.213 ..   
as Herfindahl Index ratio (2.07)        (2.52)        
Export Concentration /4 ..   1.042 ** ..   0.983
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.42)        (0.76)        
Output Concentration ..   ..   0.010 ..   
as openness times output concentration (0.04)        
Export Concentration ..   ..   ..   -2.80E-04
as openness times export concentration (0.01)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.75E-04 -4.82E-05 -8.89E-05 -1.31E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -3.69E-05 ** -2.74E-05 * -2.74E-05 ** -2.34E-05 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /5 0.048 ** 0.020 0.020 0.022
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 0.993 * 0.125 0.132 0.129
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)        (0.60)        (0.53)        (0.61)        
Observations 1049 955 1046 952
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. 
The output concentration ratio gives more weight to larger firm.
4/ Herfindahl Index of Merchandise Export Revenue Concentration
5/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
6/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 33
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit  Estimation
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  /1 -0.233 ** -0.231 ** -0.239 ** -0.237 ** -0.251 ** -0.248 ** -0.249 ** -0.247 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.04)        (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.014 -0.009 -0.021 -0.006 -0.018
   (one lag) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.07)        (0.07)        (0.07)        (0.07)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.006 ** -0.005 * -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.011 * -0.011 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.003 ** 0.002 * 0.003 ** 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.006 ** 0.006 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.24E-04 3.66E-04 -1.06E-03 -2.62E-04 4.24E-04 9.57E-04 7.75E-04 1.41E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.21E-04 -1.65E-04 -2.50E-04 -1.90E-04 -2.67E-04 -2.00E-04 -1.25E-04 -1.28E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Governmnet Balance -2.56E-05 * -2.39E-05 * -2.47E-05 * -2.34E-05 * -2.65E-05 -2.51E-05 -3.00E-05 -2.75E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.025 * ..   0.027 ..   0.045 ** ..   0.040 * ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.03)        
Course classification /4 ..   0.121 ** ..   0.116 ** ..   0.179 ** ..   0.187 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)        (0.05)        (0.07)        (0.08)        
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 0.110 0.138 0.216 0.237 0.034 0.083 -0.184 -0.156
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)        (0.52)        (0.58)        (0.58)        (0.74)        (0.74)        (0.83)        (0.82)        
Observations 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
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Table 34
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit  Estimation
The Role of Real Vulnerabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Incidence of undervaluation (binary variable that takes the value of 1 whenever undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.230 ** -0.226 ** -0.235 ** -0.231 ** -0.249 ** -0.245 ** -0.252 ** -0.247 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.04)        (0.04)        
Capital Controls
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.004 -0.003 0.012 -0.011 0.019 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.07)        (0.07)        (0.08)        (0.08)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.008 ** -0.006 -0.010 ** -0.008 * -0.011 * -0.008 -0.012 * -0.009
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.003 0.006 ** 0.004
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 5.50E-04 -7.24E-04 1.48E-04 -1.51E-03 -1.67E-04 2.23E-04 4.20E-04 8.00E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Output Concentration           /2 1.767 ..   1.672 ..   0.533 ..   -0.092 ..   
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index (2.07)         (2.25)        (3.06)        (2.98)        
Export Concentration            /3 ..   1.042 ** ..   1.062 ** ..   1.371 ** ..   1.530 **
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index (0.42)        (0.46)        (0.54)        (0.60)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.75E-04 -4.82E-05 -7.91E-05 -7.12E-05 -8.32E-05 3.88E-05 -1.20E-04 8.03E-07
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.69E-05 ** -2.74E-05 * -2.74E-05 * -2.63E-05 * -3.08E-05 * -2.68E-05 -3.01E-05 -2.68E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Flexibility  /4 0.048 ** 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.033 0.040 * 0.035 0.039
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.03)        (0.03)        
Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market  /5 0.993 * 0.125 0.229 0.184 0.093 -0.248 -0.189 -0.755
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.60)        (0.59)        (0.68)        (0.75)        (0.85)        (0.83)        (0.95)        
Observations 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of output concentation based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of economic activity.
3/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of export concentation based on the 2-digit SITC classification of export revenues.
4/ Our proxy of exchange rate flexbility follows the "fine" classification coded from 1 to 15 by Reinhart and Rogoff. Higher values of this variable indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement
 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
5/ Annual average change in the ratio of reserves to broad money. Positive values of this variable imply a "strong" degree of intervention, because for intervention to be positive reserve accumulation must exceed the incresae
 in monetary aggregates (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007)
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Table 35
Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Real effective exchange rate 
(REER)
Multilateral real exchange rate index (trade-weighted), monthly 
observations.
Author's construction using the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics.
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) The net foreign asset position is the sum of net holdings of direct
foreign investment, plus net holdings of portfolio equity assets,
and the net position in non-equity related assets (i.e. ''loan assets'').
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001, 2007).
Productivity Differentials The labor productivity in the traded and the non-traded sectors in
the domestic country.
Author's construction using the 1-degit ISIC 
Classification
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index (1995=100) The World Bank's World Development Indicators.
GDP Real Gross Domestic Product. GDP is in 1985 PPP-adjusted 
US$. 
Author's construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991) and The World Bank's World Development 
Indicators
Growth Rate in GDP Log differences of Real GDP. Author's construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991) and The World Bank's World Development 
Indicators
Trade Openness: Policy 
Measure
Average years of trade openness according to Sachs and Warner 
criteria.
Sachs and Warner (1995), Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003).
Trade Openness: Outcome 
Measure
Exports and imports (in 1995 US$) as a percentage of GDP (in 
1995 US$).
The World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Trade in Manufacturing Goods Exports and imports in manufacturing goods (in 1995 US$) as a 
percentage of GDP (in 1995 US$).
The World Bank's World Development Indicators 
and UN COMTRADE.
Trade in Non-Manufacturing 
Goods
Exports and imports in non-manufacturing goods (in 1995 US$) 
as a percentage of GDP (in 1995 US$).
The World Bank's World Development Indicators 
and UN COMTRADE.
Financial Openness: Policy 
Measure 1
Average years of absence of controls on capital account 
transactions during the corresponding 5-year period.
IMF's Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (Various Issues), and Prasad, Rogoff, 
Wei and Kose (2003).
Financial Openness: Policy 
Measure 2
First principal component of indicators of absence of resrtictions 
in cross-border transactions: multiple exchange rates, current 
account and capital account transactions, and surrender of export 
proceeds.
IMF's Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (Various Issues), and Chinn and Ito 
(2006)
Financial Openness: Outcome 
Measure
The stock of: (a) Foreign Assets and Liabilities as % of GDP (in 
logs), and (b) Foreign Liabilities as % of GDP (in logs).
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001, 2006).
Financial Openness: 
Composition
We use both the equity-related foreign liabilities and foreign assets 
and liabilities as % of GDP (portfolio equity and FDI) as well as 
the ratio of loan-related foreign liabilities and foreign assets and 
liabilities to GDP.
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001, 2006).
Trade Openness: Output 
Concentration Measure 1
We construct our indicator of output concentration using the 9-
sector classification from the 1-digit level ISIC code on economic 
activity, which comprises the following activities: (i) Agriculture, 
Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing; (ii) Mining and Quarrying; (iii) 
Manufacturing; (iv) Electricity, Gas, and Water; (v) Construction; 
(vi) Wholesale and Retail Trade; (vii) Transport, Storage and 
Communication; (viii) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and 
Business Services, (ix) Community, Social, and Personal Services. 
The United Nations’ National Accounts database as 
Herfindahl Index ratio.
Trade Openness: Export 
Concentration Measure 2
We construct our indicator of export concentration using the 10-
sector classification from the 1-digit level SITC Rev. 1 code on 
international trade activities, which comprises: (i) Food and live 
animals, (ii) beverages and tobacco, (iii) crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels, (iv) mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials, 
(v) animal and vegetable oils and fats, (vi) chemicals, (vii) 
manufacturing goods classified chiefly by material, (viii) 
machinery and transport equipment, (ix) miscellaneous 
manufactured articles, (x) commodities and transacts. not 
classified according to kind.
United Nations' COMTRADE
Dummy for Exchange Rates 
Regimes
It takes values between 1 and 15 where higher values indicate a 
higher level of flexibility in the exchange rate arrangement in 
place.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and updated by Ilzetzky, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009
Intervention It is constructed as Foreign Assets minus Foreign Liabilities and 
Central Government Deposits, and normalized by the monetary 
base. This variable is positive whenever reserve accumulation 
exceeds the increase in monetary aggregates while implying a 
strong degree of intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007)
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Author's construction.
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Table 36
Sample of Countries
No. Code Name Region No. Code Name Region
1 DZA Algeria MENA 41 JOR Jordan MENA
2 ARG Argentina AMER 42 KEN Kenya SSA
3 AUS Australia INDC 43 KOR Korea, Rep. EAP
4 AUT Austria INDC 44 MDG Madagascar SSA
5 BGD Bangladesh SA 45 MYS Malaysia EAP
6 BEL Belgium INDC 46 MEX Mexico AMER
7 BOL Bolivia AMER 47 MAR Morocco MENA
8 BWA Botswana SSA 48 NLD Netherlands INDC
9 BRA Brazil AMER 49 NZL New Zealand INDC
10 BFA Burkina Faso SSA 50 NIC Nicaragua AMER
11 CAN Canada INDC 51 NER Niger SSA
12 CHL Chile AMER 52 NGA Nigeria SSA
13 CHN China EAP 53 NOR Norway INDC
14 COL Colombia AMER 54 PAK Pakistan SA
15 ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. SSA 55 PAN Panama AMER
16 COG Congo, Rep. SSA 56 PNG Papua New Guinea EAP
17 CRI Costa Rica AMER 57 PRY Paraguay AMER
18 CIV Cote d'Ivoire SSA 58 PER Peru AMER
19 DNK Denmark INDC 59 PHL Philippines EAP
20 DOM Dominican Rep. AMER 60 PRT Portugal INDC
21 ECU Ecuador AMER 61 SEN Senegal SSA
22 EGY Egypt MENA 62 SGP Singapore EAP
23 SLV El Salvador AMER 63 ZAF South Africa SSA
24 FIN Finland INDC 64 ESP Spain INDC
25 FRA France INDC 65 LKA Sri Lanka SA
26 DEU Germany INDC 66 SWE Sweden INDC
27 GHA Ghana SSA 67 CHE Switzerland INDC
28 GRC Greece INDC 68 SYR Syria MENA
29 GTM Guatemala AMER 69 THA Thailand EAP
30 HTI Haiti AMER 70 TGO Togo SSA
31 HND Honduras AMER 71 TTO Trinidad and Tobago AMER
32 ISL Iceland INDC 72 TUN Tunisia MENA
33 IND India SA 73 TUR Turkey ECA
34 IDN Indonesia EAP 74 GBR United Kingdom INDC
35 IRN Iran MENA 75 USA United States INDC
36 IRL Ireland INDC 76 URY Uruguay AMER
37 ISR Israel MENA 77 VEN Venezuela AMER
38 ITA Italy INDC 78 ZMB Zambia SSA
39 JAM Jamaica AMER 79 ZWE Zimbabwe SSA
40 JPN Japan INDC
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Figure 1.1: Real Exchange Rate (RER) Misalignment in Argentina and 
China, 1971-2005 (Trend Component of RER Fundamentals Calculated 
Using the Band-Pass Filter) 
Figure 1.1: RER Misalignments Calculated by 
                  BP Decomposed Fundamentals 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Argentina
China
Figure 1.2: Real Exchange Rate (RER) Misalignment in Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea, and Thailand, 1971-2005 (Trend Component of RER 
Fundamentals Calculated Using the Band-Pass Filter) 
Figure 1.2: RER Misalignments Calculated by 
                  BP Decomposed Fundamentals
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Figures 163
Figure 1.3: Real Exchange Rate (RER) Misalignment in Advanced 
Countries, 1971-2005 (Trend Component of RER Fundamentals Calculated 
Using the Band-Pass Filter) 
Figure 1.3: RER Misalignments Calculated by 
                  BP Decomposed Fundamentals
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
UK Germany
Japan France
Italy Spain
Figure 2.1: Histogram of the Speed of Adjustment of RER for 79 
Countries, 1970-2005
Figures 164
Figure 2.2: Estimate of the Speed of Adjustment of RER Deviations 
across Countries, 17971-2005
Coefficients (Alpha) of Estimations in Misalignments for 79 Countries 
1970-2005 
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of the Estimated Standard Error of the Lagged 
Real Exchange Rates
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Figure 2.4: Response of the Exchange Rate to Shocks in Fundamentals,
the Case of Argentina
Figure 2.5: Response of the Exchange Rate to Transitory Shocks in 
Fundamentals, the Case of Argentina
Figures 166
Figure 2.6: Response of the Exchange Rate to Shocks in Fundamentals: 
the Case of China
Figure 2.7: Response of the Exchange Rate to Transitory Shocks in 
Fundamentals, the Case of China
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Figure 3.1: Real Macroeconomic Aggregates around Undervaluation 
Episodes: Completed Episodes for All Countries (averages)
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Figure 3.2: Monetary Policy Variables around Undervaluation Episodes: 
Completed Episodes for All Countries (averages)
Median
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Figure 4.1: Real Macroeconomic Aggregates around Undervaluation 
Episodes: Completed Episodes for Developing Countries (averages)
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Figure 4.2: Monetary Policy Variables around Undervaluation Episodes: 
Completed Episodes for Developing Countries (averages)
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Figure 5.1: Real Macroeconomic Aggregates around Undervaluation 
Episodes: Completed Episodes for Industrial Countries (averages)
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Figure 5.2 Monetary Policy Variables around Undervaluation Episodes: 
Completed Episodes for Industrial Countries (averages)
Median
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